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ABSTRACT 
 
THE TROJAN HORSE IN YOUR HEAD: 
COGNITIVE THREATS AND HOW TO COUNTER THEM 
 
Lora Pitman 
Old Dominion University, 2019 
Director: Regina Karp 
 Vulnerabilities of the human mind caused by the way it is designed to processes 
information have always been exploited in warfare, since the dawn of humanity. History is 
marked with frequent use of deceits and manipulations over the centuries, with examples ranging 
f m he e f he T ja  H e  Faceb k  e -profiling. While largely used over time, 
these tactics, that I call cognitive threats, have not been collectively examined. I hypothesize that 
they pose a security issue to which prevention strategies on different levels could be successfully 
applied. The research questions that this study asks are what the characteristics of these cognitive 
threats, and what specific techniques could be employed to counter them. To respond to them 
and to contribute to filling the gap in the literature, I describe four case studies that illustrate 
some of the most common types of cognitive threats in the 21st century - the case with Maria 
Butina, the case with Russian disinformation, the case with ISIS recruitment, and the case with 
Cambridge Analytica. Then I analyze them and suggest different approaches that are fit to 
respond to the contemporary political and psychological features of these cognitive threats. The 
findings from the study, the policy recommendations, and the additional measures I propose are 
grouped into six categories: creating alternatives, narrative change, official government 
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The Trojan War, one of the most emblematic events in the ancient civilization still 
fascinates scholars and practitioners. It begins with the abduction of the Spartan queen Helen, by 
Paris  a Trojan prince. A  a e e, Me ela , Hele  h ba d a d the king of Sparta asked 
his brother Agamemnon, king of Mycenae to join him for a campaign aiming to return Helen to 
Sparta and to punish the brazen Trojans. This mission was, reportedly joined by various of the 
ancient Greek heroes, including Odysseus, Achilles, and Ajax. Writers and historians in the 
antiquity claim that the siege of Troy lasted for ten whole years. Desperate from the lack of 
success, the Greeks knew that traditional military means would not ensure completion of their 
goal. Instead, they decided to implement a well-developed plan intended to make the Trojans 
open their own gates since the efforts to do so with force were hopeless. It is claimed that the 
Greeks built a giant wooden horse in only ten days. This creature was left in front the Trojan 
gates, with only one person around it, as the Greek ships were seen to slowly sail away from 
Troy, leaving their tents surrounding Troy in flames as a sign of retreat. Sinon, a Greek soldier, 
who was the only person around the horse, pretended to be abandoned by his people. He 
explained to the Trojans that the horse was a gift to the goddess Athena and symbolized entreaty 
of the Greeks for a safe return home in an act of remorse for destroying one of her temples in 
Troy. Perceived as a truthful story, the Trojans let the colossal horse figure inside the gates 
thinking it was a souvenir of their victory. What they did not know was that inside of the horse, 
there were 30 of the best Greek soldiers, waiting for the enemy to bring them effortlessly inside 




or a single weapon was used to get beyond the gates. When the night came, the Greeks returned 
with their ships to Troy. In the meantime, the Greek soldiers left the horse and opened the gates 
to the Greek army who defeated the Trojans, brought back Helen to Menelaus, and ended the 
war.  
Some claim that this story is a legend more than a historical fact, although Homer, 
Sophocles, Herodotus and Virgil all contribute with some details about the Trojan War that 
testify for its potential authenticity. Legend or not, the conflict in Troy ended with the victory of 
the Greeks only to open the door to other types of wars  those of the mind. What appeared to be 
the key to the Greek success was not military superiority but a simple trick that made the Trojans 
welcome their enemies straight into their home. The reason for the defeat was not a lack of 
bravery, lack of material capabilities or poor quality of their fortress. After all, they endured a 
10-year-long siege. It was something else  a Pandora  Box that all humans have in their heads. 
The idea that the Greeks acknowledged their defeat, went home and left a gift behind them was 
so tempting that it inevitably led Trojans to think that this charming idea was the truth. 
Psychological research overwhelmingly confirms the phrase, that people see what they want to 
see. In the case with the Trojan War, what the Trojans wanted to see in this giant horse figure  a 
triumph of their military superiority - was what brought their defeat. While this ancient story 
serves as a proverbial lesson for those who are too naïve, the history before the Trojan War and 
after this is full of examples of similar deceptions because an ultimate solution to the problem 
was never achieved. Access to perfect information is impossible, and people only have at their 
disposal a limited amount of it. In addition, human cognition can further obscure a more accurate 
judgment of facts. It is inclined to make deductions in a predictable way when influenced by 




social perceiver. What people frequently are not aware of is that it is quite enough an emotion in 
a particular social setting to be provoked, in order the cognition to produce a predictable reaction 
that corresponds to this emotion. What is more intimidating is that such barriers to independent 
thinking are not only inherent for individuals with medical conditions. They are typical for all 
individuals because each person has a Pandora  bo  that represents how vulnerable our 
cognition is when it processes information, as one simple trick of the mind, can always open the 
box. Such deceptions and manipulations, I call in the present work cognitive threats. 
Centuries after the Trojan Horse deception, the problem with cognitive manipulation in 
warfare kept being present even in the 21st century. The issue was the same but manifested 
differently, as a lot has changed since the classical antiquity period, but not everything. Wars 
were still led, the desire to win them was as high as it once was. In spite of this, there were also 
new actors. They had new goals and new ways of using their old weapons  persuasion. The 
addictive nature of social networks and the mimicking of an in-person conversation made people 
eager to communicate more than ever. The basic human need for maintaining a particular social 
image, a distinct identity, made users share a wide variety of information not only with people 
with whom they are close but also, sometimes quite unconsciously, with people who they do not 
even know. It was not long before power elites started seeing value in social networks as a means 
of warfare. The involvement in all sorts of actors in society changed even modern diplomacy and 
how it is conducted. Disinformation as an old tool for deception gained new meaning for state 
and non-state actors. A rare combination between h ma  c g i i e mechanisms and the 
presence of a suitable platform for manifestation of the liabilities of those mechanisms gave birth 




The success of social media did not remain a secret for a different, post-Cold War type of 
threats coming from non-state actors in the face of radical organizations. The main kind of threat 
that they posed was related to their violent means of achieving their goals, but this was not 
exhausting all the ways in which they were endangering the peace. Their skillful use of the 
online space has become a powerful tool of recruitment of people. They were enticed to join 
these radical organizations by allegedly making an independent choice. That choice was, 
however, influenced to a large extent by manipulations and in many times by deception. The 
promises that the cause of the radical organization will fulfill a longing that the vulnerable target 
has was the key to the success of recruitment operations. At the same time, anti-terrorism units 
were failing to eliminate the ongoing online recruitment of new members because of the 
anonymity for which the online space allows. Only reasonable suspicion of illicit activities 
would be enough to restrict some of the online privacy of the users, as an essential human right 
guaranteed on both the national and international level in most states. The paradox was apparent: 
the more freedom people had to communicate and connect, the less independence they had in 
their thinking and decision-making because their judgment was exposed to even more cognitive 
threats than before.  
Individuals have always been an important factor in the political scene but only if they 
had power or were members of collectively expressed interest. Generally, when thinking about 
powerful individuals, one would be most likely to imagine state leaders. With the proliferation of 
non-state actors, however, leaders of organizations and corporations became just as powerful as 
states, in some cases. They have tremendous assets at their disposal including material, non-
material and human resources. They also have certain purposes and goals. One of them is related 




likely lead to even more profits in the future. Especially, with the current level of globalization, it 
was inevitable that big corporations stayed immune from the changes on the global political 
scene. They embraced these changes and employed them to work for them  as it is in the case 
i h cial media. I ead f le i g li ical a d cial di ac i  ake a a  he e  
attention from social networks, they were used as an arena for discussing them. Social networks 
quickly became new sources of information about events of importance. The media outlets 
delivering the information were not the social platforms themselves, however, thus their owners 
are still not held accountable for the information that is disseminated through their products. 
Consequently, social media are providing only a fruitful environment in which political and 
corporate interests merge to benefit from cognitive vulnerabilities in humans. The so-called 
super-empowered individuals who own these companies have little to no interest in changing the 
current situation. It works for their goals  vivid discussions and exchange of information 
increases the popularity of their networks and generates a larger pool of topics for users to 
discuss. Moreover, once something is posted on social media, it becomes an asset belonging to 
the owner of the platform. This enormous volume of information collected through social media 
c ld hel  c c  a ma  f a  i di id al   a g  f i di id al  c g i i . A ma  ha  
could be easily sold to the highest bidder. 
 With every technological development in human history, there were also notable changes 
in society, politics, education, and culture. The changing environment made wars different, some 
of which not even real wars at all. The traditional and non-traditional wars required new 
weapons. Some of them were intelligence gathering, deception, and disinformation. With the 
growing numbers of democratic countries in the world, the meaning of the individual in the 




definition but merely conflicts, was to know the individuals who create the system. Intelligence-
gathering has always been a tool for getting acquainted with the enemy with the ultimate purpose 
of influencing them. Within the context of expanding democratization, it has the meaning of a 
preliminary step for gaining power over the individuals as a way to impact the state itself through 
them. In the digital age, the intelligence-gathering means simply the collection of data, most of 
which were even voluntarily shared by users on social media. Considering these circumstances, 
i  a  alm  i e i able ha  he e da a e e  ea i ed. I di id al  e al i f ma i  
was directed against them in the global game of politics in which they were the vehicle for a 
change of the status quo, and thus the targets. In the era of democratization and with the 
increased importance of the individual, the states retain their role of central units in the system of 
international relations but with one limitation  their identities are malleable and a subject to 
ci i e  efe e ce . Wi h me e ce i , -modern conflicts no longer lead to traditional 
hot wars against the enemy state directly, but against its people. Consequently, the protection of 
the individuals, their cognition and their independent decision-making should be a matter of 
national and global security. This argument also pertains to authoritarian countries that 
intentionally distribute disinformation to their population through government-owned outlets in 
order to support the state  goals (e.g. Russia). Regardless, democracies are much more exposed 
to cognitive threats since, while in autocracies, the perpetrator is only one  the state itself, in 
democracies the range of the perpetrators is much wider, due to the transparency and the 
treasured freedom of speech. 
I designed this study to respond to the following research questions: what cognitive 
threats are, and how to counter them. The preferred methodology is qualitative in nature and 




I provide context to the problem by building upon the following three pillars: 1) psychological 
studies proving that human cognition is vulnerable; 2) political psychological research that 
underlines how internal experiences of humans are exploited for political gains; 3) historical 
overview of cognitive threat showing that different conditions matter for the magnitude and the 
success of these security threats. My hypothesis is that information always mattered in different 
periods of history, all the way to the present days. In order to gather information or/and change 
he e  beha i  ba ed  hi  i f ma i , ac  killf ll  k ad a age f he ba ic 
information-processing mechanisms inherent for humans. In the contemporary political, 
technological and social environment, these threats represent an even more significant problem 
that finds expression in a wide range of scenarios in which one actor benefits politically from 
triggering a certain psychologically predictable reaction from the victim. This problem, I argue, 
is best addressed through prevention strategies based on the individual psychological and 
political elements that make the threat possible in the first place. They are inevitably intertwined 
in cognitive threats since the latter is a perceptual category that contains an intention by the 
perpetrator to inflict damages to a victim. The threat remains as such in the psyche of the 
perpetrator and takes the form of an actual attack when the perpetrator acts upon their intentions. 
Regarding the perception of the victim, they may have experienced the influence to their 
cognition as a threat or not. In the first case, even if the individual perceives the cognitive threat 
as such, it is almost always after the damages have been inflicted, which is when the victim 
becomes aware of the deception, if it is successful. In some more rare cases, the victim becomes 
aware of the cognitive threat before the damages have been inflicted. In other cases, the 
individual never realizes that their cognitions have been influenced. They consider their 




threats are so secretive, difficult to expose and prevent. Moreover, they could be distributed and 
facilitated through various actors, state and domestic or international non-state ones, and 
different phenomena with systemic effect (e.g., globalization). Thus, cognitive threats could be 
studied on all levels of analysis. The level that always has to be present in every analysis, 
however, is the individual level since the threat is aimed at e  m e e  c g i i . This 
is also the reason that makes findings, derived from level one of analysis - about human 
cognition, relevant to all other levels of analysis. 
Cognitive threats differ from non-cognitive ones through one essential component that 
has to be present in them  the purposeful attempt of a perpetrator to influence he i di id al  
cognition through exploiting innate cognitive vulnerabilities in order to benefit politically. They 
could be labeled as vulnerabilities, however, only when they are being exploited by an interested 
party. Otherwise, they should simply be labeled as the human cognitive apparatus with all its 
inherent psychological mechanisms for reaction. That said, cognitive threats exist only when an 
actor intends to obtain gains by provoking a change in the behavior of an individual through 
exploiting the existing cognitive structures of the human mind. Relevant example would be 
instigating fear, stress and anxiety that will make the individual reacting defensively to a 
highlighted by the perpetrator threat. In this intentionally induced state of distress, the individual 
searches for more information which is typically provided by the perpetrator in the form of a 
solution that allegedly resolves the problem. To achieve this goal, very often there are other pre-
existing conditions of the victim that the perpetrator exploits such as personal loss, financial 
need, ontological insecurity, and the immaturity of the victim.  
While cognitive threats are not material in nature, but psychological, they may have 




consequences but as opposed to cognitive threats, it does not involve an interested party that 
attempts to influence the victim  che. For cognitive threats to be constituted as such, it is 
only needed that the perpetrator (state, non-state actor or an individual) perceives them as 
threatening to the victim, who is almost always unaware of the influence that is exercised. In this 
sense, the cognitive threat can only disappear when it is not intended as a goal by the perpetrator 
who is ready to act upon their intention. Therefore, I argue that the best strategy against this kind 
of threats would be strategies such that are focused on prevention. 
The study I am conducting seeks to contribute to the security studies literature. In 
a ic la , hi  k  g al  alig  i h the ones that the field of non-traditional security sets 
forth. It seeks to introduce the idea of cognitive threats and to fill a gap in the literature about the 
applicability of prevention strategies based on the concrete expressions that cognitive threats 
have in the contemporary environment. In terms of scholarly agenda, I advocate for the inclusion 
of cognitive threats in the security studies field literature, as their effectiveness and the 
seriousness of their consequences have been proven continuously throughout the centuries, even 
though they have not been officially part of traditional definitions of war. My intention for this 
work is to serve the needs of academics and policy-makers, nonetheless, some practitioners who 
see hi  d  applicability in their research as well. It is organized in the following way. In 
Chapter 1, I introduce the problem. In Chapter 2, I present the idea of cognitive threats and why 
they are so difficult to control. To explain why, I provide an overview of the basic mechanisms 
upon which the human cognition is built. Then, I outline some vulnerabilities that it has in terms 
of processing information. In addition, I follow what possible effects can emotion-inducing 
situations have on decision-making and overall behavior. Based on these deductions, I explain 




how this has an impact on political level. Next, in Chapter 3, I describe the evolution of cognitive 
threats to explore what factors changed them over time and how. I also discuss the value and the 
conditions of previously employed ways to combat them in different historical periods. I 
maintain that prevention strategies should be preferred in addressing cognitive threats rather than 
focusing on their consequences after they take the form of an active campaign (attack) and are no 
longer a just a threat. In Chapter 4, I offer four case studies that illustrate some of the most 
common types of cognitive threats in the 21st century. By studying them, I try to identify their 
elements, the reasons for their success, their effects and some contextual factors that are of 
importance. Chapter 5 consists of an analysis of the described scenarios, as its goal is to produce 
strategies that are fit to counter the contemporary features of cognitive threats. Chapter 6 
summarizes the findings of the study, outlines policy recommendations, and discusses 
implications for the role of academia in studying cognitive threats as a conceptual category. 
Lastly, I suggest some potential factors that should be taken into consideration in thinking about 





 COGNITION AND COGNITIVE THREATS 
 
In Chapter 2, I introduce the idea of cognitive threats as a central element in this work. 
Since the focus of the current study is political in nature, I continue by exploring the academic 
dialogue between psychology and politics as I seek to identify what psychological concepts 
inform political psychology, how they are used, what are the methods and the theories that are 
interested in employing psychology in politics. Then, I provide an overview of one of the most 
central elements in political psychology  the human cognition, how it is constructed, what are 
its components, how they function and what is the relationship between them. It has to be 
mentioned that the literature on this topic is more than voluminous since it is one of the most 
critical questions in psychology. Therefore, I only selected foundational works that build the 
understanding of how cognition works regarding information  its selection, interpretations and 
reactions to it. Next, I link the cognition to its inevitable interaction with society and revisit the 
questions about cognitive processes but this time in a social context. For instance, how people 
make inferences and what factors affect them, how important is control for the aggregation of 
information and how social judgments and social stereotypes are formed based on the selection 
and the interpretation of certain information. After I outline the importance of the individual in 
the study of politics, I emphasize the dual role that they have  as an agent that can influence 
structures, and as a political tool for achieving specific goals. Consequently, I list some of the 
recognized in the literature cognitive mechanisms that make the individual both an influence and 






The emerging cognitive threat: a result of political moves and processes 
In order to understand how the individual can be used as a tool for achieving political 
results, first, I will outline what is defined as a threat in the study of politics and international 
relations and what is the place of the individual in it. Next, I will explore how a threat to the 
individual can become a collective national and international threat, what are the characteristics 
of these emerging cognitive threats and their relationship with two phenomena already 
established in the literature such as propaganda and frauds, both possible in the physical and the 
cyberspace.  
Individual security and national security. Similar to many questions in the study of 
politics and IR, the field is not unanimous about its understanding of what security studies 
agenda should include and based on this, what concepts are included in the notion of threat. 
Threat is defined by Rousseau and Garcia-Re ame  a  a i a i  i  hich e age   g  
has either the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence on another agent or 
g 1. In the context of politics, this intention could be either explicitly demonstrated or 
implied. Stephen Walt2 discusses this question in his work from the early post-Cold-War period 
and concludes that security is inevitably and immediately related to the concept of war. He refers 
to a definition by Nye and Lynn-Jones3 ha  f c e   he d  f he h ea , e, a d c l 
f mili a  f ce 4. As the challenges discussed in the field multiplied, it became necessary that 
                                                           
1 David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, "Identity, power, and threat perception: A cross-national 
experimental study," Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 5 (2007): 745. 
2 Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1991). 
3 Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International security studies: a report of a conference on the state of 
the field," International security 12, no. 4 (1988). 




new approaches are undertaken. Krause and Williams5 observed that the discourse about 
expanding the security studies agenda either moves toward the study of the individual and human 
security, or toward more complex approaches about the global environment, regional, 
international security. At the same time, some neorealists6 7 8 remained true to their systematic 
paradigm excluding the individual from equations of how anarchy affects the system. Aside from 
the realist school of thought, however, the figure of the individual became more and more 
important even for h e i g a  i i i al ci l gical a ach beca e i h he e d f 
the Cold War, the mix of factors affecting national security is changing. Issues dealing with 
m , ide i ie , a d c l e a e bec mi g m e alie 9. In a chapter about human security, 
Fen Osler Hampson10 refers to the definition offered in the report of the Commission on Human 
Sec i  ha  a e  ha  i  le i   ec  he i al c e f all h ma  li e  i  a  ha  
enhance freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental 
freedoms - freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) 
a d e a i e ( ide ead) h ea  a d i a i 11. When it comes to the cognitive abilities of 
an individual, it is important to delineate what are these fundamental freedoms and what these 
threats represent. Article 18 and 19 from the Universal Declaration of Human Right underline 
ha  fi , e e e ha  he igh   f eed m f h gh 12 a d  f eed m f i i  a d 
                                                           
5 Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," 
Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 2 (1996). 
6 John J. Mearsheimer, "The false promise of international institutions," International security 19, no. 3 (1994). 
7 Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies." 
8 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of international politics, 1st ed. (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
9 Peter J. Katzenstein, The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), 2. 
10 Fen Osler Hampson, "Human Security," in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2012). 
11 Commission on Human Security, "Human Security Now," (New York, NY 2003), 4. 




expre i ; hi  igh  i cl de  f eed m  h ld i i  i h  i e fe e ce 13. That said the 
freedoms that human security protects include gathering and processing of information that is not 
in any way purposefully obstructed by external influences.  
Regardless of the threat that an intentional manipulation of information conveyed to the 
individual can cause, there is something more than this being a question merely in the realm of 
human security. What if this threat to the individual could also constitute and is perpetrated with 
he e  ha m a a ic la  cial g , a a e  a  e i e egi  ec i ? All i g f  
a discussion of these threats targeting the individual but only as means to harm a broader entity 
links the human security research agenda to the agenda followed by neorealists who exclude the 
study of the individual but are still concerned about the security of the state. A research question 
focusing on cognitive threats could bridge the agendas of both divisions in the field despite their 
different assumptions about the world of international relations since these kinds of threats 
include both the individual and the system as objects of a threat. The direct mechanism that 
make  he i di id al h ea  a c llec i e e i  ma i la i g e s perspective through their 
c g i i e abili ie  a d he ela ed ce e  ha   i di id al em i  c llec i e, cial 
blic, a d, h , li ical 14.  
Cognitive threats. In the past, the field of security studies focused almost ultimately on 
military affairs and traditional threats as the extreme point in conflict was thought to be the 
beginning of a war. Nowadays, while wars still occur, the liberal order and the democratization 
of many countries made it unlikely that states go to war with each other using their militaries. 
This does not mean that conflicts do not occur. It does not even mean that wars do not occur. 
                                                           
13 Ibid., Article 19. 





They just have different forms and expression in the contemporary highly interconnected 
technological world in which ideas could be used as weapons in conflicts. These modern 
conflicts and modern wars do not involve casualties in the traditional sense, but they are still not 
victimless. However, the harm inflicted to the individuals is not the ultimate goal that these 
modern wars pursue. They seek to achieve political goals by manipulating the cognition of a 
person who will inflict some harm to others. Based on this, cognitive threats could be 
characterized as any type of information, written and/or verbal, in the cyber and physical space, 
purposefully conveyed to a recipient(s) with the intent to provoke a certain reaction that will 
cause harm to them and another party. This reaction is in nature inherently linked to cognitive 
processes, emotions and habits could be expressed in the form of a verbal or physical act or both. 
At the same time, the reaction could also be an intentional abstaining from verbal or physical 
acts, as an act of a protest, for instance. The recipient of the information could immediately 
express a certain reaction as a consequence of the conveyed information, or it could be delayed 
with seconds, minutes, months or even years  when the information acts as a trigger to the 
recollection of past events and associations. The recipient of the information is in the position of 
a victim and a perpetrator to harm to others. They are first and foremost a victim because their 
judgment is manipulated. It is manipulated through the delivery of a specific type of information 
that the author of the message suspects or knows, and hopes and intends, to enable a chain of 
cognitive processes that will make the recipient do something that benefits the cause of the 
author. Second, the recipient of the information acts also as an unconscious perpetrator of harm 
to third parties that could be another individual, an institution, an organization, a state or groups 




theoretical concept, I would like to point to four examples that elucidate its components and its 
meaning.  
The first most common scenario in which this concept finds application is the 
proliferating cases of disinformation on popular topics for political purposes. The second set of 
cases in which cognitive threats are present refers to political espionage conducted through 
intentional misleading of the recipient of the information. For instance, numerous cases show 
how humans can be exploited to give away secrets of national value and not even through 
extortion, blackmailing or other similar practices. Instead, a simple chain of cognitive processes 
in the brain of an individual can be stimulated as this could be enough to get results that other 
strategies may fail to deliver. The goals that such manipulations can pursue could pertain to trade 
secrets, classified/confidential information, passwords or any other ways to gain access to such. 
The third cluster of cognitive threats refers to recruiting practices of radical religious or extremist 
groups. In such cases, the individual is recruited through the purposeful induction of emotions 
and the offer of a powerful solution to various problems. The recruiters, however, do not only 
aim  cha ge he i di id al  a itude about certain issues or to take them to the extremes but 
instead, they seek to provoke a certain behavior  joining the radical organization that aims to 
cause harm to third parties. The fourth type of scenarios are related to a new form of power 
concentrated in the hands of super-empowered individuals15. Many of them created companies 
through which a large amount of information is collected. For instance, in the case of Facebook 
and other social media, the users themselves are the ones providing the information. What they 
did not know, at least, not until recently is how their information could be used and to what end. 
One of them is, of course, profit. However, this does not mean that profit is the only goal of the 
                                                           




collection of information. Instead, marketing and political purposes were frequently present after 
large amounts of information were sold to corporate or political entities. Thus, not only the 
individuals themselves suffered from the leaks of their own information, but the consequences 
had a much wider range  f m ail ed ma ke i g me age  acc di g  e  e al 
preferences to political messages to targeted audiences whose final goal was influencing the 
outcome of elections and referendums. Since cognitive threats include only tools for influence on 
mental rather than the physical level, they should be compared and contrasted with two similar 
phenomena: frauds (traditional and cyber) and propaganda. 
Cognitive threats and frauds. In order to discuss how fraud, as a crime, differs from 
cognitive threats, it should be first underlined what criteria I will use. Popular definitions of 
fraud generally incorporate four major elements: 1) an individual or a collective body presents a 
certain information to the recipient that is not true; 2) the information presented to the victim is 
believed to be true; 3) the victim perceives the information as true and exhibit behaviors that are 
activated by the information; 4) the behavior of the victim causes the latter to endure financial or 
property losses as a consequence from the untrue information that was conveyed to them16. The 
following comparison using these four categories seeks to identify to what extent fraud overlaps 
with cognitive threats. The first component from the definition of fraud slightly differs from the 
one of cognitive threats. While there is certain information conveyed by an individual or a 
collective body, in the case of cognitive threats, this information could be true or false. Second, 
for frauds, the information should be perceived as true but for cognitive threats it could be 
perceived as false and still to trigger some reaction in the recipient that is desired by the sender 
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of the message. Third, regardless of whether the recipient thinks the information is true or untrue, 
there is some reaction that is provoked in them. Fourth, while for frauds, it is necessary that the 
victim suffer some economic loss, when it comes to cognitive threats, the loss could be of any 
other kind as well as of financial/property nature. Based on this juxtaposition, a logical question 
follows: could a fraud constitute a cognitive threat? The answer to this question is affirmative. In 
some cases, the same elements that characterize fraud as a crime could also present a cognitive 
threat. For instance, an employee in a company in the defense sector responds to an e-mail 
allegedly sent by their supervisor and discloses trade secrets. As a result, the employee is fined or 
fired thus suffering financial losses, as well as the company itself. So far, this constitutes fraud. 
B  ha  if he c m a  f m hich he ade ec e  e e le  a  a c ac  f  a a e  
defense project and the trade secrets were stolen for political rather than merely economic 
purposes? In this case and in other similar ones the fraud merges into the broader understanding 
of cognitive threats. That said cognitive threats are not necessarily frauds but could include them 
in some specific cases. 
Cognitive threats and propaganda. When thinking about disinformation, as an example 
of a cognitive threat, one can easily confuse it with the notion of propaganda. Lasswell 
cha ac e i e  he la e  a  he ma ageme  f c llec i e a i de  b  he ma i ulation of 
ig ifica  mb l 17. This definition captures a variety of elements that can also carry meaning 
for cognitive threats. However, for cognitive threats, only one person can be the target of the 
manipulation, rather than a group of people. Regardless, the most significant difference between 
propaganda and cognitive threats is that the main purpose and the end goal of propaganda are to 
shape particular moods toward an idea or a person. In the case of cognitive threats, shaping 
                                                           




moods, habits and emotions are not the final destinations that the threat reaches. Instead, it seeks 
to go further by making the individual do something more than just changing their attitude about 
a particular matter. Propaganda could be used as a tool to manipulate certain judgments and 
opinions but only with the aim to achieve another goal. For instance, one of the goals of 
disinformation could be the defamation of a particular political party and the reorientation of the 
voters toward another  the change of their attitude is needed but only as long as it serves also to 
change their behavior when the elections come. It is possible that propaganda is employed 
indirectly in this process, but in comparison to cognitive threats, it lacks concrete objectives 
different than changi g e  mi d  i  . C e e l , aga da c ld be a  f a 
cognitive threat, but it does not overlap fully with it.  
Free choice and cognitive threats. Since cognitive threats are so widespread then what is 
the place of the free choice considering the politicization of almost every issue in society? Free 
choice is a complex category of philosophical questions that will not be by itself an object of 
discussion in the current section. Instead, I would like to emphasize that cognitive psychology 
has proven that there is a multitude of factors that drive our attitudes, behaviors, opinions, and 
habits  a fact that makes it very difficult to talk about an entirely free, independent choice. 
However, there must be some free will that is independent of fac  i fl e ci g e le  
judgment. A compromise between the ideal scenario of a free choice and all the elements that 
affec  e  deci i -making would be the informed choice. In the context of the idea of 
cognitive threats, an informed choice would be when the individual is aware that the information 
conveyed to them with certain intentions by the author, and with a certain goal. Moreover, an 
informed choice should include knowing who the real author of the message is, the intentions of 




recipient and other parties. If the recipient has all this information or a good idea about these 
questions, then this could be defined as making an informed choice. An informed choice 
excludes the existence of cognitive threats because the cognitive manipulation element will be 
substituted by consent to specific consequences that the recipient of the information knows will 
or might follow from their actions.  
 
The individual in the study of politics   
Whe  hi ki g ab  li ic , he image f he i di id al immedia el  eme ge  i  e  
mind. That is because politics will be impossible without the presence of people  leaders and 
followers, and their opponents. While these people all have cognitive apparatuses that are, as 
described already, somewhat similar, their behavior can be governed by different rules  the ones 
of social psychology. While it is very challenging to construct an exact formula about political 
behavior and politically-motivated or driven acts by people, cognitive and social psychology to a 
large extent contribute to a deepened understanding of the world of politics. As Rose 
McDermott18 underlines, while efforts were made by political scientists to contribute to the field 
of psychology, it is to a large extent recognized that it is the psychology field that imports its 
theories into the political science realm.  
Theories and the place of the individual in them. In order to provide an accurate 
overview of the place of psychology in political science and international studies, I will first 
outline what place different IR theories assign to the individual, followed by the methods mostly 
used in the field. One of the most prominent theories in IR is undoubtedly the realist school of 
                                                           





thought. Classical realists such as Machiavelli19, Thucydides20 and Morgenthau21 place an 
emphasis on human nature as a source of political conflict. As opposed to this, the structural 
realism that later became the more prevalent realist way of thinking made a drastic turn in terms 
of the place of the individual in politics. Assigning a great role to the system, rather than to the 
individual, Waltz22 divided the three levels of analysis in the contemporary study of politics to an 
individual, domestic and systemic. He stresses that it is the systemic level on which scholars 
should focus as it carries the most importance for understanding how the international relations 
shape the world.  
Similar to realists, liberalists23 24 25 look at the system in general but through a different 
lens  not how it inevitably hinders cooperation but how cooperation can emerge between the 
units in the system. In this theory, states are also seen as the main actors with the only difference 
that an accent is placed on domestic politics and their characteristics as well as on the system 
itself, thus leaving the role of the individual somewhat underappreciated. Constructivists such as 
Wendt26, Kratochwil27 and Katzenstein28, on the other hand, explore topics such as identity, 
traditions, culture and any other elements that help the individual to perceive and assess events 
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and other people. Katzenstein29, in particular, advocates for an approach that may not necessarily 
be limited to one theory or one problem-solving technique thus enhancing the field with a 
perspective oriented toward leaving theoretical parsimony concerns aside. A relatively newer 
wave in the study of IR has presented the field with contributions focusing on rational choice30, 
psychobiography and social psychology31 32 33. A central element within these contributions is 
the attention on the individual and their mental and decision-making processes, values, interests, 
and emotions. For instance, one of the scholars who stands out with high accuracy of his 
prediction models, based on expected utility, is Bruce Bueno De Mesquita34. His design rests on 
four pillars: 1) individuals interested on the outcome of the negotiations; 2) the initial bargaining 
preferences of the participants; 3) bargaining power of the participants; 4) significance of the 
issue at hand for the stakeholders. In spite of the success of this model and such that are relying 
on rational choice and expected utility theories, some doubt has been cast in regarding their 
eliabili  i ce ch a m i  lack em i ical de c i i e acc ac  i  eal e  f h ma  
beha i  a d deci i  maki g 35. As McDermott underlines, in some more complex political 
i a i  ha  e i e a m e de ailed l k i  h  h ma  c g i i  a d cial i e ac i  
work, rational choice theories could be of little help. Therefore, to assure relatively broad 
applicability of the implications and conclusions of this work I will rely on more general 
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theoretical and empirical underpinnings from political psychology than on the assumptions of 
rational choice theories.  
Methods. When analyzing the relationship between political science and international 
studies, and psychology, it is important to mention what are the methods that the former employs 
in order to study the latter. The methods established in the literature of political psychology are 
mainly five, and they can be used alternatively or jointly to study the research question 
interesting the scholar36. Political psychology finds expression mostly in the literature about 
American politics, but there is no reason why the same tools should not be used to extend the 
knowledge produced in other fields of IR/political science. The first kind of methods that 
scientists implement is the one involving experimentation and simulations. These research design 
instruments include an environment that is observed and controlled by the person(s) conducting 
the experiment. They manipulate one or more conditions of this environment and document how 
other conditions in the environment will change as a consequence of the manipulation of the first 
one. While experiments are not so common in the field of political science, they are still utilized 
by some researchers and even claimed to be even more and more commonly encountered over 
time37.  
The second group of methods in political psychology engages with questionnaires 
through which a group of random or non-anonymous interviewees offers their oral or written 
responses to various questions. Despite the fact that the higher level of convenience and 
accessibility to such research designs due to budget and time constraints, as opposed to 
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experimentation, this method has some downsides underlined by the scholarly community38. On 
the one hand, the interviewee may possess some biases that will inevitably find reflection in the 
answers provided. Moreover, it is possible that the responders are oriented toward providing 
answers that will, allegedly, be satisfactory to the interviewers. On the other hand, the 
interviewees, their preferences and predispositions may be determined by experiences for which 
the survey does not account  thus producing an omitted variable that could affect the final 
conclusions of the study. As it was outlined previously, a significant problem with this kind of 
research instruments is the one related to biases and instability of the provided answers by 
respondents over time. Also, in accordance to the implications of the prospect theory, reviewed 
previously in this chapter, depending on how the surveyors asked the question, the answers may 
vary39. 
The third method that has its role in studying political psychology is the content analysis. 
This tool employs psychological techniques to understand political processes and political 
figures through speech and non-verbal acts. One of the caveats of using content analysis is that 
the materials used to record speeches and other public performances are not always reflective of 
the persona of the political leader that is being studied40.  
The fourth kind of research technique is observer ratings that individuals provide for 
politicians. The perceptions include mostly traits and other impressions that politicians leave in 
the observers. Similar to the other methods in political psychology this one is not without any 
flaws. Observer ratings usually suffer from a high level of biased responses by the observers who 
frequently make the fundamental attribution error. They tend to assign to the object of evaluation 
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characteristics that they think are a d c  f e  e ali  a he  ha  f i a i al fac  
that could change the perceptions if the object was observed throughout a more continuous 
amount of time41.  
A fifth possible research tool for conducting political psychology inquiries is the use of 
case studies  an approach very well established in the field of political science and IR. It is 
common that a single case study research designs are employed  through which a higher 
number of details is covered but at the expense of breadth of the study. As opposed to this, 
multiple case studies allow for a greater breadth of the research conclusions but at the cost of 
me de h f he a al i . McDe m  ad ca e  ha  ca e die  a e ed i  he ea l  age  
of a research project, when it is still unclear which aspects of a particular event or problem are 
important, what evidence should be sought, and which factors may play a role in explaining 
c me 42. However, she warns that the analysis may be vulnerable to these very same biases 
that are valid for other kinds of research designs. They, she underlines, should be overcome by a 
number of case studies that are first, more than one, and second, complemented with experiments 
that will prove the causation between the independent and the dependent variables.  
Having in mind these insights, the current study that I conduct will be based on the 
following methodology. First, considering the subject matter, it will rely on case studies rather 
than on other research tools since it is a new topic for the field. It also marks a theoretical 
contribution that has not been explored to a sufficient extent and aims to achieve at this point of 
the political psychology research agenda a certain breadth rather than depth. Regardless, the 
number of case studies that will be greater than one will provide some depth of the implications. 
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The chosen methodology also will guarantee that the hypothesis will be properly tested in 
various case studies whose characteristics differ.  
As the individuals are main objects of analysis in this work, it is important to explain 
what are the elements of the human cognition, and in what ways it is vulnerable to cognitive 
threats by actors intending them in order to benefit politically. The following sections, informed 
by the study of psychology reveal that cognition is a very complex structure affected by 
multitude of factors whose influence vary in different social situations. Much of the ongoing 
processes regarding information storing and aggregation happen also unconsciously  which is 
why individuals may not be aware of how a particular inference was made by their cognition. In 
particular, they may not be aware what factors impacted their decision-making, and what subtle 
influence may have been exercised over them, as they allegedly conducted an independent 
cognitive reasoning. Moreover, the information for this reasoning may even be improperly stored 
by the mind as the social elements responsible for the memorization could vary, as well as the 
quality and the reliability of the memories themselves. Consequently, individuals may not even 
have a perception about the threats that actors pose to their cognition and independent decision-
making. Regardless, the way human cognition operates demonstrates a certain predictability that 
is not a threat by itself but only if manipulated purposefully in a direction to benefit a certain 
political entity. To trace these predictable mechanisms of information-processing, decision-
making and behavior, first, I outline the concept of cognition and explain the elements that 
constitute it. Then I add the role of the social environment in which human cognition is operating 
and its importance for the manner in which people use, produce and exchange information 




experiences shape the world of politics in which the individual is both influencing the system, 
and an actor being influenced by it.    
 
What is cognition and how does it work? 
The psychological literature does not offer a unanimous, commonly accepted definition 
for cognition. However, scholars unite around what should be understood by this term. George43 
defi e  i  a  he a  h ma  bei g  perceive and learn, how they reason and think, even how 
they remembe  a d imagi e; a d h  hei  mi d  work in the ordinary day-to-day activities of 
life 44. Pe ce i , he c i e , i  ible h gh he e e  f he h ma  body that convey 
some information to the brain through specific mechanisms. Many psychologists argue that the 
perception of information could be occurring in both conscious and unconscious state, as the 
latter is also referred to as a beha i ali ic  a  f d i g c g i i , which excludes 
introspection as a means of inquiring about how cognitive processes work. Behavioralism is 
especially valuable in scientific research since humans are not capable of accounting for every 
step of the cognitive processes taking place in the brain, why they occur, how and what 
influences them45. In a slightly different definition about cognition, Drever46 describes it as a 
e m ha  e c m a e  e cei i g, imagi i g, emembe i g, c cei i g, j dgi g a d 
ea i g  a  he c a  c g i i e ce e   he  ha  a e ba ed ima il   e a i  
rather than on a logical chain of mental steps. As opposed to perception, deception would 
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represent an effort to stimulate the creation of a false perception about facts or events in an 
individual47. It could be involuntary but also purposeful.  
In the following paragraphs, I will break down the study of cognition into different 
components that either compound it or have some function that is essential to cognition. The first 
element that is central to the study of cognition is the mind. In this section, it will be viewed not 
that much in the context of neuro-psychology or philosophy but rather in a psychological context 
that supplements some aspects of the political science focus of this work. The mind characterized 
a  a ce  f i f ma i 48 ed  be de ic ed l  i  e m  f he h ma  abili  to 
perceive information, and to guide their behavior based on this information. Nowadays, with the 
rapid development in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, the mind and its complexity 
are discussed in two different types of systems: the traditional cognitive system of humans and 
animals (living organisms), and the cognitive apparatuses of AI creations. Garnham writes about 
he ide ead a  he ime belief ha  machi e  ill e e  be eall  i ellige  il he  ca  
lea 49. The learning process of machines and its continuous enhancement is already a fact in 
2019 and not a possibility as it used to be a few decades ago, with all of the upsides and 
downsides that this progress entails. While not excluding AI from the study of cognition, the 
following sections focus on the individual  c g i i  and its elements. 
The mind serves as the operator for cognitive processes thanks to its ability to store 
information and create memories and a logical chain of steps. This is accomplished through 
processing the perceived through the senses information (thinking), then sending signals to other 
parts of the body in order to trigger a certain action or abstain from such and to create 
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associations between events and notions thus stimulating a learning process and creativity. Three 
other factors that also contribute to the functioning of the mind and are included in this section of 
the chapter are also the emotions, the feelings, and the language.   
Memory. The memory acts like an archive that ensures the conscious revival of old 
events, or at least the ones perceived as such by the brain50. A tremendous amount of the 
information that is stored and processed by the memory serves to guide human behavior. 
However, the memories that represent the information stored in the brain could be conscious and 
unconscious as they all create what is called knowledge but in the first case, it will be labeled as 
explicit and in the second as implicit knowledge. Regardless of this theoretical division, both 
e  f mem  ede e mi e e  beha i . It is important to be noted that memories are not 
an accurate and full reflection of the reality but are selective. That said, human behavior is driven 
by selective memories that could be both conscious or unconscious. Searching for the 
information that these memories represent takes very little time but still longer than it takes a 
computer, for instance51. Scientists attempted to model the human memory, and one of the first 
efforts in this direction was called the modal model  a representation that accounts for two 
departments in the memory. The first one is the short-term memory and the second  the long-
term memory. When new information enters the cog i i e b a ch f he h ma  b d , i  i  
immediately stored in the short-term department, and if it is considered that it has to be 
memorized for longer periods of time, then the information is transferred to the long-term 
memory section. Because human memories are selective and everyday life requires a significant 
amount of information in order to ensure proper decision-making, cognitive science considers 
the importance of some supplemental materials. Notes, diaries and other written and non-visual 






tools tha  c ld c c  a  i di id al  e ce i  f a  a d e e  e e  eflec i g he 
reality, as the individual sees it, serve as an external memory storage.  
Atkinson and Shiffrin52 add one more department to the memory map that other scholars 
use, called a sensory register. This department contains short-lived memories that store 
information collected through sensory organs  for instance, scholars identify the iconic store of 
the human memory that represents the capabilities for recalling a written content. Another part of 
the sensory store is the echoic store that preserves for a short amount of time memories about 
speech53.  
Another distinction of the memory types is the one that focuses on the nature of the 
memories created54. Based on this, the memory could be episodic and semantic. The first kind 
represents memories that are related to the recipient of the information and have a distinctly 
autobiographical character. The semantic memory, on the other hand, contains information about 
the world that is not so closely pertaining to the recipient. This discrepancy also serves as an 
answer to the question of why some memories are brighter than others. Wagenaar55 emphasizes 
that it is the emotional element in both kinds of memories that makes them so durable over time. 
Eysenck and Keane56 label these memorie  a  elf- efe e ce  mem ie  a d fla hb lb  
memories. While both carry some symbolic value to the owner of the memories, the self-
reference memories are important for the individual because they store information directly 
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pertaining to them. Contrary to this, the flashbulb memories embody information about publicly 
relevant events with a significant value to society in general. 
Emotions. The em i  mai  f c i  i   d ce acc a e b d  a d b ai  e e  
to changes in the environment or within the organism. In other words, they represent coping 
mechanisms for survival. A vital part in these coping mechanisms are the emotions that together 
with the feelings have a crucial role for reasoning and decision-making. The nature of these 
responses to the changing environment could be mental or entirely physical. While there are 
cultural reasons that could affect the occurrence of emotions, they still could be defined as 
chemical a d e al e e , f mi g a a e ( ha ) ha e me ki d f regulatory role to 
play, leading in one way or another to the creation of circumstances advantageous to the 
organism e hibi i g he he me 57. The emotions that trigger a certain reaction after signals 
were sent to the brain could be divided into three main groups: primary, secondary and 
backg d  em i 58. The primary emotions are an immediate result of an existing 
phenomenon, the secondary emotions (guilt, pride, embarrassment), also called social are 
chemical and neural reactions that occur after a primary emotion has already taken place. Some 
authors attribute the existence of secondary emotions to representatives of in-groups as opposed 
to lack of such when it comes to individuals from an out-group59. As for the background 
emotions (e.g., love, wellbeing, affection, etc.), it could be said that they are much less 
researched and difficult to be described as he  efe   he c  f affec  a  i  i  la ed  
i  ime 60. These emotions could be conscious or unconscious, and he  d i e e  beha i  i  a 
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very subtle way61. The relationship between emotions and cognition could be mapped in three 
consecutive steps. First, an evaluation of the change in the environment or within the organism, 
second, adjusting the body to respond to these changes, and third, the occurrence of a feeling62. 
Feeling. As a part of the emotions, feelings are described in the literature as a perceived 
state of the body and the mind at a time at which the brain is processing certain thoughts. A 
logical question following the definition of feelings would be how they differ from emotions, 
despite their obvious similarities. Feelings are a component of emotions whose ultimate goal is 
delivering a report about the state of the body and the mind to the brain. The emotions, on the 
other hand, are a preliminary step to the feeling making it possible by sending signals to the brain 
in an effort the latter to adjust the body according to changes in the environment and within the 
organism. In other words, emotions could be conceptualized as a process that captures external 
elements and internalizes them, while feelings are an entirely internal process that provides 
information about the body and the mind to another organ - the brain. 
Thinking. As evident from the definition provided previously, cognition has a lot to do 
with thinking. The latter, according to some researchers63, is built on a perceptual mechanism, 
called categorizing behavior that: 1) is intended to simplify the multitude of conditions in the 
surrounding environment, 2) enhances processes of identification, 3) sends signals to the brain 
for a required action, 4) shortens the learning process, and 5) captures the common pattern 
betwee  diffe e  e e  f m life. All f he e f c i  dem a e he eed f he h ma  
cognition to make generalizations possible in a quick, easy way in order to ensure efficiency. 
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Other psychologists call these generalizations mental models that reflect on perceptions about the 
world while at the same time they allow for alterations following the ever-changing 
circumstances so that they help the brain with problem-solving64. 
Thinking as an information handling process is indeed mostly intended for problem-
solving which is best accomplished through concepts. They incorporate a specific set of common 
elements across material objects or notions. Creating this mental pool called concepts helps the 
brain and the body to react to the same phenomena similarly since they fall into one perceptual 
group. Davidson65 claims that it is a matter of assessment and beliefs that help the individual 
classify objects and other non-material phenomena into concepts. These two mental processes 
could be shaped by physical experiences but also by cultural norms and beliefs. An essential part 
of the thinking  the reasoning mechanism - is an object of study by researchers as they try to 
find what elements could be an obstacle to this activity. Garnham66 lists three situations in which 
the construction of mental models could be obscured. In the first case, thinking is related to a 
desired abstract mapping of a phenomenon and the concepts that the cognition uses are built on 
specific circumstances rather than on general. In the second case, the mental-modeling is related 
to instances in which memories stored in the long-term cognitive branch are needed, and some of 
them cannot be retrieved or there are no experiences that created them. Thus the necessary 
information from the memory is missing. The last problem that can occur when using mental 
models for reasoning is that people tend to simplify the models and use one single model rather 
than multiple models that could embed applicable information for the decision-making.  
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Another aspect of thinking refers to emotions and how they alter the perception of 
information. The network theory67 suggests that when an individual is under the influence of a 
particular type of emotion, positive or negative, they are more likely to trigger thoughts of the 
same nuance. For instance, positive attitude brings associations of other happy events, negative 
attitude  of negative events. In addition to this, while there is no categorical proof from studies 
confirming the tendency of the negative memory bias in individuals who suffer from depression 
and/or anxiety, scholars predominantly support the notion that in according to this bias, 
ega i e  h ea e i g i f ma i  i  ecalled ela i el  be e  ha  i i e  e al 
i f ma i 68. Series of studies by Eysenck and his colleagues69 70 71 confirmed the existence of 
an interpretive bias, stating that people with anxiety are more likely to perceive some signals of 
unclear nature as threatening.  
An intriguing question is also how people problem-solve and make judgments when they 
do not have enough information. A classical study by Tversky and Kahneman72 exploring 
heuristics and biases poses three factors influencing decision-making processes. First, the 
decision-maker assigns the object a place in a particular group that will help classifying it and 
simultaneously transfer other characteristics from the group to the object. Second, the number of 
scenarios and situations to which the decision-maker can relate determines the frequency or 
likelihood of an imagined event happening. Third, the starting point from which predictions are 
made is also of importance during decision-making. Complementary to these findings are the 
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ones refuting the expected utility theory and substituting it with one called prospect theory73. 
According to it, people seek to avoid risks when the choice involves guaranteed gains and take 
risks when one of the choices likely involves certain losses. In addition, Kahneman and Tversky 
outline that it matters greatly how the choice is presented to the social perceivers because their 
final decisions, based on gains and losses, may be predetermined by how the question is asked. 
Creativity. Another question that deserves attention when discussing thinking is the one 
about creativity. Mainly, the issue that I want to address in this section is what is creative 
thinking, and to what extent it follows the same rules that are valid for thinking in general. 
Scholars overall agree on the fact that creative thinking does not differ substantially from the 
conventional thinking that constructs mental models and utilizes them in decision-making. When 
it comes to a precise definition of creative thinking, however, such is lacking in the scholarship 
on cognition. Responsible for this is the complex idea of creative thinking that will largely 
depend on specific circumstances that will distinguish a regular idea from a creative one. Once 
the creative idea becomes part of the mental model, future solutions of problems will become 
less creative since the creative idea has entered a social realm of realistic and applicable 
concepts. This is possible thanks to existing information that could have been previously 
considered inapplicable to the problem at hand that was later validated by the creation of a new, 
adjusted mental model74. Other scholars categorize creative thinking as a result of cognitive 
processes of association and analogy-making75, as the latter c i e  ma i g f he 
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conceptual structure of one set of ideas (called a base domain) into another set of ideas (called a 
a ge  d mai ) 76. 
Learning. One part of e le  cognitive functions is developed already when a baby is 
born, but the vast majority of their cognitive skills humans acquire later through learning. A very 
long and vivid debate about the nature of the learning process is one of the core topics in 
psychology and philosophy, whose beginning dates back to works by René Descartes and 
Immanuel Kant and still continues in the present. The debate offers two opposing 
conceptualizations of how people learn. Rationalists maintain that learning is occurring not 
through experience but rather through mechanisms that are already in existence in the human 
body. Contrary to this view is the one held by empiricists who claim that the learning process is 
made possible by experiences that help the brain construct links (called associations) between the 
obtained through senses information, grouped into concepts. The repetition of experiences 
involving similar circumstances leads to a more manageable process of categorizing information 
and building faster both cognitive concepts and the associations between them77. Both schools of 
thought are encountering series of questions that their theory is not capable of addressing and to 
this day, neither perspective could be considered more prevalent in the field.  
While sharing some similarities, it is important to distinguish between knowledge and 
learning, as the latter represents a process and the former  the result of this process. As for how 
thinking is different than learning they relate to each other in the following way. In order 
learning to take place, thinking has to be present first. However, with the speed with which 
human cognition is working, a lot of these processes and the results from them would seem 
almost simultaneously occurring. 
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Language. One definiti  f la g age e  ha  i  i  a c g i i e abili  ha  de e d   
a store of specialized information in long-term memory  information specifically about 
la g age 78. This does not mean, however, that non-language-specific knowledge is not used in 
utilizing the language skills. A controversial issue in cognitive science that has not yet been 
answered is the one asking the question about the extent of language-specific information stored 
in the brain and at what point does it mix with non-language-specific information. An insight 
with which both psychologists and linguists agree is that languages are means of exchanging 
information between individuals that presupposes two conditions. The first one is that the person 
conveying information can efficiently express their thought in verbal or written form. The second 
c di i  ela e   he eci ie  abili   de a d he i f ma i  hat is being conveyed to 
them ha k   a me al le ic 79 where words are being searched. An area, regarding the 
question of language, in which scholars tend to disagree with each other is if the language is used 
independently to convey certain information to the recipient or the message is inevitably 
influenced by some linguistic specificities.  
Rationality. The concept of rationality is discussed in this essay not only because it has a 
significant meaning for the study of cognition in psychology and thus is a topic of a major 
debate, but furthermore, rationality is a building block in political science, economics, modeling 
and simulation, and other fields. Every science defines rationality slightly different as the goals 
that these sciences pursue are not the same, though they are sometimes similar. For the purposes 
of this work, I will focus first on its meaning for the study of cognition and will transition to the 
implications that psychology provides for the same topic but situated in a political science 
context.  
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The foundations of rationality in psychology are laid by the Classical Model that states 
that rationality is present when desires and beliefs drive actions. These two elements constitute 
reasons for controlled by desires actions80. More recent works dedicated to this problem do not 
see desire and belief as the only factors that engender a certain behavior. Instead, they propose a 
desire-independent model based on judgment rather than on desires and beliefs81 82 83. Other 
scholars, such as Harvey Siegel84 connect both the assumptions of the Classical Model in terms 
of desires and beliefs to judgment.  
The same debate about rationality in the field of political science has slightly different 
dimensions than the one in psychology. The Utility Maximization Model that political science 
borrows from economics underlines the importance of achieving results that will benefit the 
individual the most and thus the behavior is oriented toward achieving these goals. Very 
frequently in discussions about foreign policy, political rivals whose goals are different than the 
ones of the discussants are labeled as irrational simply because of a misunderstanding of their 
goals, desires and beliefs and often the ethnocentric thinking of the decision-makers85. For 
instance, Simon86 a g e  ha  e e  elfi h  al i ic beha i  d e   make a  i di id al  
thinking more or less rational. Furthermore, he claims that the rationality of the behavior should 
be assessed based on the connection between desires, beliefs, judgment, cultural norms and the 
goal that is intended, because acce   i f ma i  i  al a  im e fec  a d he i di id al  
thinking will only consider the amount of information that they have available. This and other 
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reasons make Simon87 conclude that an applicable simplified model of costs-and-benefits 
deliberations relevant in a large number of cases would be inevitably flawed without the 
necessary empirical research that accounts for all the elements that are present in a certain 
cognitive process for decision-making. Recent innovations in neuroscience suggest that instead 
of the rationality-bound theories that political scientists use to explain political behavior it is also 
the emotions that carry significant meaning for the decision-making and actions, especially risk-
taking88. 
Action. It is also important to explore the relationship between cognitive functions and 
actions in their two forms: physical actions and actions that are entirely verbal in nature. For both 
types, it is valid that the brain has to send some signals to the muscles in order to perform an 
action, even if only verbal. Learning a physical skill such as a particular activity differs from 
cognitive tasks as memorizing, for instance. While they both have a particular action as a goal, 
they require different kind of knowledge to execute the function. The first kind of knowledge 
that is needed in order for an individual to acquire physical skills and perform physical actions is 
called procedural knowledge, and the second type  declarative knowledge89. An interesting 
question in the field of cognitive science is whether the procedural knowledge helps the 
individual to execute specific tasks better with repetition of these acts, having in mind the results 
from previous attempts. Scholars claim that while it is possible, this is not necessarily a rule 
because people cannot control physical functions entirely. At the same time, repetitive 
performance could help the individual become better but thanks to unconscious processes that 
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ide e  feedback  he b d 90. To define the link between actions and cognition, 
another component also should be taken into consideration - how the cognition orders actions. 
Mental reasons that people have to make verbal or physical acts should be distinguished from the 
causes of these actions. While they could match in ideal cases, reasons for actions and causes of 
actions could be quite different in practice. Sometimes, when actions are undertaken without a 
logical explanation, it is likely that the individual who committed the act tries to reconstruct the 
event that happened and to rationalize their actions so that they correspond with the event91. 
 
Social cognition  
In the current section, I will explain how the main elements from the human cognition are 
affected when another component is considered  the social one. No cognition exists in a 
vacuum. It is always influenced by the interaction between people, or the thinking of other 
individuals. It has an important meaning for politics mainly regarding the construction of 
identity, social networks, exchange of information (and disinformation), and the perception of 
social events and facts delivered to the recipient by a secondary source. Since these factors are 
important to politics, they frequently become targets of actors intending to score political gains 
by exploiting feelings of fear, anger, empathy, pain, trauma, shame, and habits. 
The scientific field studying the social context of cognition is called social psychology. 
While c g i i  ide  he ch la hi  i h im a  i igh  ab  h  h ma  mi d i  
wired and what processes determine attitudes and behaviors, social cognition, a branch from 
social psychology, focuses on social conventions, rules and norms as people are social creatures 
                                                           





influenced by the environment in which they live92. The social component plays an important 
role in understanding attitudes and behaviors and, though separate from the study of cognition it 
is nevertheless intertwined with it. Thus, psychologists label the research dedicated on cognitive 
processes influenced by social factors as social cognition, a category interested in h  e le 
make e e f he  e le a d hem el e 93. A more detailed definition by Hamilton94 
em ha i e  ha  cial c g i i  c i e  a c ide a i  f all fac  i fl e ci g he 
acquisition, representation, and retrieval of person information, as well as the relationship of 
these processes to judgments made by the e cei e . Both explanations of the term incorporate 
many different categories including the study of social interactions, perception, and processing of 
information, stereotyping, leadership and other branches. For the purposes of this chapter, I will 
focus only on 1) attribution; 2) control and behavior; and 3) social judgments and stereotypes. 
Attribution. A central element in the field of social cognition is how the recipient of 
information forms causal relationships between the information that was presented to them and 
different phenomena from social life. This research question gave birth to the attribution theory. 
The latter seeks to explain what factors contribute to a chain of logical thinking that connects a 
certain event in the social environment to its cause. Constructing inferences about social events 
and attributes of other people is possible through analyses that the recipient of information 
creates, in order to make sense of the surrounding environment and to better adjust themselves to 
it.  
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Emotions, feelings, judgments, and perception to a large extent shape reactions in a social 
setting. For instance, when emotions are concerned, a preliminary step to experiencing them is 
arousal that should be accompanied by an acknowledgment (cognition) that categorizes it and 
sends the necessary signals to the brain. However, as Bargh95 reminds, awareness of the stimulus 
is different than the awareness of its influence. In this regard, a study by Schachter96 concluded 
that in order to adapt better to an upcoming phenomenon that brings negative emotions to a 
person, one seeks the company of other people who also expect a stressful event in their life. The 
explanation that Schachter gave was that people tend to affiliate with others experiencing similar 
stressors to adjust to the event better by enriching the knowledge they have about it so that they 
can form appropriate reactions to it. A further study by Schachter and Singer97 highlighted 
another finding: when lacking information about the cause of the arousal, people could attribute 
it to different factors as that could result in a positive or negative mood depending on interaction 
with a person in a positive or in a negative mood, respectively. The test of Schach e  he  f 
emotional lability has its limits, however. Scientists tried over time to determine if a lack of 
i f ma i  ab  e  a al ca  lead  i i e, ega i e  e al m d  de e di g  
exposure to social influences of different kind. For instance, Maslach98, and Marshall and 
Zimbardo99 emphasize that the lack of information about arousal leads to a negative mood rather 
than to a positive one. Regardless of the variations in the exact results of the study of this theory, 
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it could be inferred that social influence has a vital role in a state of no information about 
phenomena that evoke arousal in the recipient. Furthermore, without social influence providing 
attribution cues for the recipient of this information, as Maslach and Marshal and Zimbardo 
conclude, it is more likely that the lack of information will entail anxiety and frustration. 
While some studies about attribution focus on an ideal situation where people use the 
normative cognitive process that interprets social cues logically and unbiasedly, other studies 
de li e m e ac ical c di i  ha  ake i  c ide a i  ha  me e cei e  c g i i e 
process may be disrupted due to disabilities or individual factors. An example that illustrates the 
second type is what is known in the social psychology as the fundamental attribution error, 
acc di g  hich e le e d  a ib e he  e le  beha i   hi   he   
di i i al ali ie , a he  ha   i a i al fac 100. People see other pe le  beha i  
frequently as objective and not influenced by situational norms and conditions but instead as a 
stable pattern of qualities and personality traits. In addition to these findings, studies exploring 
defensive attributions emphasize that observers ascribe much higher responsibility to people 
whose behavior caused incidents of substantial significance than to those whose behavior 
inflicted less significant consequences101 102 103. While this finding has not remained 
unchallenged, Shaver104 105 accepts that individual and situational characteristics matter a lot and 
can cause variations across studies. However, he accentuates on the fact that the greater the 
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similarity between the observer and the perpetrator and the situational factors, the higher the 
likelihood of the observer becoming defensive to the behavior of the perpetrator. 
 Another bias that can distort a normative inference-making process pertains to the 
consensus information  the opinions and beliefs of other people. The social perceiver tends to 
conceptualize the consensus information not as what other people actually think but what the 
perceiver considers to be the case. By doing so, the social perceiver attributes a large number of 
their own values and beliefs to others thus thinking that the consensus information is much more 
similar to the social perceiver   ie 106 - a phenomenon also known as the false consensus 
effect107. Hence, social perceivers tend to accept that others share their beliefs even if they do not 
know if this is not necessarily the case108. The self-serving bias, on the other hand, makes the 
social perceiver more likely to attribute success, as an outcome, to their own behavior rather than 
to acknowledge responsibility in cases of failure. The explanation could refer to the ego-boosting 
tendency of people in addition to cognitive mechanisms that perceive expected outcome as a 
c e e ce f m e  eff  i  hi  ega d. I  i  im a   be ed al  ha  in cases in 
which people assume responsibility for a failure, people tend to attribute it to conditions that they 
can control in further attempts109. The self-ce e ed bia , i he e  f  e  cial c g i i  
explains why individuals are more likely to assume responsibility for positive and negative 
outcomes of a collective work. First, human cognition has the ability to remember much more 
information pertaining to e   actions, as opposed to actions of others. Second, the 
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possibility that one has done more amount of work, regardless of the outcome, could be quite 
flattering for the self-esteem.   
Control and behavior. A central function of the social cognition is constructing causality, 
as it was highlighted previously. In order for this process to happen, the social perceiver has to 
assume that the observed behavior is a product of controlled mental and physical activity110. 
Furthermore, if the social perceiver is not under the impression that they have control over some 
situation, they will be unlikely to attribute any outcome to their own behavior. Instead, they will 
a he  a c ibe he c me  he  fac  ha  a e be d he e cei e  c l. Lerner111 for 
instance, claims that people have the need to believe in a just world where everything that 
happens to individuals is deserved. This coping mechanism is developed to protect the cognition 
from the stress resulting from the idea that unpleasant events happen to people who did not do 
anything to provoke them. A very intriguing question in this regard is what happens with the 
human cognition when there is a loss of control. In this case, loss of control means that the 
individual previously had control over some circumstances that they have lost. The four major 
coping mechanisms that human cognition uses to adapt to a situation, especially a threatening 
one on an emotional or/and physical level, are related to the need to obtain more information, the 
increased sensitivity to stress, the reactance, and the feelings of helplessness112. Usually, the first 
stage after a loss of control by the social perceiver is namely the search for information so that 
the individual forms an idea about the appropriate reaction to the event. Two of the most 
common consequences in this scenario are the vulnerability that the perceiver experiences to 
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social influence and the decreased amount of attention that the perceiver pays to offered 
information and alternative solutions when a heightened level of stress is experienced113 114.  
A second consequence from loss of control that follows the lack of information is the 
increased vulnerability to stress. An increased heart rate, loss of ability to concentrate, or other 
adverse physiological conditions are also among the common symptoms in events that entail a 
loss of control in the social perceiver who is exposed to stressors.  
Reactance is another phenomenon following the loss of control or a restriction pertaining 
to the options available to the social perceiver. It has an emotional and behavioral expression115. 
Emotionally, reactance is very similar to stress. Individuals suffer from increased adrenaline 
levels which frequently results in antagonistic and hostile moods that illustrate the behavioral 
expression of reactance. These behaviors can be followed by a pursuit to restore previous options 
that were available to the social perceiver. If this attempt turns out to be unsuccessful, it is very 
likely that the option that is no longer available becomes much more appealing than the options 
that were left. In other words, what was taken away attracts the social perceiver to a much higher 
level than what is achievable. Another possible behavioral opportunity for the social perceiver is 
that they commit an act of protest so that the lost freedom of the individual is, at least partially, 
regained.  
Another component that gives its reflection on the social cognition when a loss of control 
is experienced is the feeling of helplessness. The latter, contrary to reactance, causes anxiety 
because of a lack of options available to the social perceiver. A consequence from the 
                                                           
113 Harold H. Kelley, "Attribution theory in social psychology" (paper presented at the Nebraska symposium on 
motivation, Lincoln, NE, 1967). 
114 Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and commitment 
(New York: Free Press, 1977). 
115 Rex A. Wright and Sharon S. Brehm, "Reactance as impression management: A critical review," Journal of 




helplessness condition is that the individual may cease to make efforts in a direction to regain 
control because they see the elements of the surrounding environment as impossible to be 
managed. A study by Wortman and Brehm116 explored under what conditions reactance and 
helplessness will occur, having in mind that they are not mutually exclusive, and they can both 
be observed. They concluded that increased perceptions of control in a situation evokes reactance 
and then feelings of helplessness while not so strong expectations of control will merely result in 
helplessness.  
Now that the consequences of loss of control were reviewed, I would like to highlight 
what are some of the strategies for reducing the anxiety that the loss of control triggers. Probably 
the most effective technique for behavior control is the perceived sense of control that the social 
perceiver can construct117. It is especially useful when it occurs before the stressful event 
manifests itself in reality118 119. Another stress-reducing strategy is cognitive control. It consists 
either of reorientation of e  a e i   h gh  ha  a e  ela ed  he a ici a ed e e  
that may entail a loss of control or of adjusting how one thinks about the event. These strategies 
have been proven successful for situations before, during and after situations connected to a loss 
of control120 121 122. A third strategy is decision control. This technique suggests that the social 
perceiver awaiting a stressful event should make some decisions about it (its length, duration, 
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and/or conditions) so that some of the control is regained and potential adverse outcomes of the 
event are seen as not so detrimental once a certain choice is made123. Naturally, the sense of 
control that the individual regains could be illusory, but this does not affect the ultimate quality 
of the decision control strategy even if the sense of control was not real. Information control, as 
obtaining more information about the exact dimensions of the future stressor bolsters the sense of 
control in the recipient of the information. In particular, information about how the event will 
affect the social perceiver serves as a mechanism to adjust both the body and the cognition to 
consequences from the event. Research shows convincing support that this type of technique 
alleviates stress caused by upcoming negative events124. However, it should be kept in mind that 
according to the concept of premature cognitive commitment125, it is difficult for a recipient of 
information to use it for different purposes once it was presented to them and thus stored in the 
h ma  b ai  i h a a ic la  g al. 
Social judgments and stereotypes. When it comes to social judgments, while the process 
of attribution and causality generally looks the same for all cognitively developed individuals 
who reached a mature age, it can still vary across people. This could be due to personal 
characteristics, different values they hold and belonging to a particular culture that reflects on the 
way social judgments are made126. In addition, social perceivers select information for the social 
judgment in various ways. It is typical that the individual focuses on a certain amount of 
information about other people and events thus excluding other types of information that pertain 
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to the social perception. The focus of the information selected by the recipient should help them 
explain behaviors and occurrences. A study by Dornbusch, Hastorf, Richardson, Muzzy, and 
Vreeland127 f d ha  f  he elec i  f i f ma i , he e cei e  e ali  ma e  m e 
than the one of the perceived individual. The perceiver seeks to identify a unique set of 
categories for which they search in a person. Wegner128 labels these groups of information as 
ge e al a ib e , hile ecific a ib e , he defines, as a particular type of information 
that carries a certain meaning to a specific person. In addition to individual characteristics, 
another factor that influences the social judgment involves situational elements. The latter could 
not only determine the type of information that is collected but also its amount. For instance, a 
research project conducted by Vallacher129 highlighted that self-consciousness about being 
observed makes the observer more likely to use categorical judgments. Contrary to this, 
observers who were not self-conscious about being observed, demonstrated a wider range of 
judgments on the scale between the two categorical judgments made by the other group of 
participants in the experiment who were self-conscious. On a more general level, these findings 
point to the following conclusion: the more attention is directed to the social perceiver, of which 
they are aware, the more limited the collection of information about the social setting becomes.  
Complementary to this contribution is the one that was reached through a series of 
experiments: in making judgments, social perceivers tend to assign much more importance on 
negative rather than on positive impressions130. Thus, in building an impression about a person, it 
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is the negative characteristics that take prevalence over the positive ones and shape the overall 
impression. Two explanations that try to explain this phenomenon are present in the literature: 
the figure-ground and vigilance explanation131. According to the first one, people are adjusted to 
see positive things in life and thus are much more impressed when something negative occurs. 
The second explanation accentuates on themes such as jeopardy and survival132. This theory 
seeks to explain why people are more impressed by negative rather than by positive 
characteristics of the social environment through the vigilance that is required of humans in order 
to ensure preservation and wellbeing.  
When it comes to making social judgments the amount and the kind of information that 
the social perceiver obtains is essential. A logical question is how the information that is 
necessary for judgments selected. People distinguish between information that is pertaining to 
the decision-making process and such that is irrelevant. In order to do so, they assess the nature 
of the information presented to them as either rewarding or punishing, as both kinds lead to the 
relevance of the information for its recipient. Through the first impression, the social perceiver 
has either a rewarding, pleasant experience or a negative and unpleasant one, based on which 
they make further judgments. One of the most central elements of the impression management is 
physical attractiveness, as it is highly related to positive qualities such as being smart and kind. 
Another element that contributes a lot to forming impressions is someo e  imila i   
dissimilarity to the person making the judgment. The more similar the person is to the perceiver, 
the more positive the impression, and vice versa. This pattern inadvertently leads to a subjective 
evaluation that equals dissimilarity to abnormality. Moreover, there is another component that 
adds details to these dynamics: 
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Quite often, our attitudes are based on ambiguous or conflicting evidence. On almost 
a  i e, he e i  a l  f fac  i g c flic i g i i . Ambig i y and 
uncertainty, however, are psychologically uncomfortable; the individual desires unequivocal 
e ide ce ega di g he c ec e   alidi  f hi  i i . Beca e he alidi  f e  
opinions often cannot be unequivocally assessed with objective evidence, the individual must 
judge the correctness of his attitudes by comparing them with the attitudes of others. The 
e ide ce ega di g e  a i de , i  he  d , i  la gel  cial. He ce a e h  e e e  
an opinion contrary to that of the individual is in effect providing him with contradictory 
evidence. People with dissimilar attitudes thus pose a threat to the validity of our thoughts and 
feelings 133. 
Very commonly identified as a product of negative prejudices, stereotypes could be 
bearing both type of connotations  positive and negative. Prejudices e e e  ha ed belief  
about person attributes, usually personality traits, but often also behaviours, of a group of 
e le 134, he ea  he mecha i m f e e i g i  he ce  f a l i g a  stereotypical  
judgement such as rendering these individuals interchangeable with other members of the 
ca eg 135. Stereotypes serve as a set of norms within a particular group. The need for 
stereotypes in the social cognition lies in the necessity for categorizing phenomena in everyday 
life for the purposes of providing simplicity and easier decision-making. As a consequence, 
people instinctively look to identify themselves within a social formation after which they seek 
information about the valid norms within this group and apply these norms to their own 
behavior136 137. The social perceiver feels a need to share the identity of the group with which 
they would like to associate and therefore embraces the beliefs and norms of the group itself (the 
in-group) and about proper reactions regarding out-groups as well. This process is described by 
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Hogg and Abrams138 as an important example of social influence exercised from the group to the 
individual who desires to be a member.  
The aforementioned social approval is particularly impactful since researchers recognize 
the large le f he cial e cei e  eed f cial a al139. A question that immediately 
surfaces when discussing social influence is the one pertaining to leadership. In a group that 
consists of equals, there is always someone who stands out with their unique leadership abilities. 
Interestingly, in a series of studies conducted by Mann140 it was the intelligence of the leaders 
who constituted them as such among other group members in addition to the determination of the 
leader to be perceived as such. Other scholars prefer to focus, however, on more situational 
characteristics of leader-selection. Leavitt141 found, for instance, that in network groups 
established for executing a particular task, the persons who naturally stood out as leaders were 
the ones who had essential functions on the chain of the communication process. In order to 
connect the findings from different studies, two central characteristics of leaders emerge142. First, 
the leader in a group setting will be the person who is capable of providing most rewards for the 
majority of the group members thus ensuring satisfaction while keeping the dissatisfaction of 
other group members to a minimum. It should be noted here that the more deprived the group 
members are from particular goods, the more the figure of the leader capable of delivering the 
goods becomes desired by the deprived. Simultaneously, a leader in a group will most likely 
become a person who benefits from holding a position of power. The leade  behavior and their 
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overall role are considered crucial for the survival of the group members. An example of this 
dimension is the role of the physician (healers in some cultures) as his function is to ensure 
preservation and wellbeing of the group143. Regardless of these general trends, diverse situational 
factors could lead to different types of people and qualities to stand out in terms of leadership. 
The members of a particular social group can have different necessities at a given time which 
calls for different qualities that they may seek in a leader. This assumption requires a less 
parsimonious approach in social psychology that could decrease the value of its applicability. To 
compensate for this, Hollander144 145 proposed a useful concept according to which when the 
leader accumulates enough benefits for the group members over time, they may deviate to some 
extent from this pattern without to risk losing their leadership position. In spite of this, in the 
long-run, the leader is still obligated to provide benefits for the group due to their role, otherwise, 
their influence over the group will reduce gradually.  
When discussing leaders and social judgments mechanisms, one impressive phenomenon 
in social psychology remains to a large extent undisputed over the years  the powerful influence 
that the obedience to authority produces. In the seminal series of experiments by Stanley 
Milgram146, the latter found that positions of authority and positions implying power are capable 
of exercising a tremendous amount of control over the behavior of people perceiving themselves 
as inferior in a social situation. In his experiments, the behavior that was required of the 
participants was in complete opposition to their views, but still, they obeyed the authority and 
strictly followed the instructions given to them  to allegedly inflict harm to another human 
being. This study confirmed the relationship between individuals seen as leaders, being in 
                                                           
143 Ibid. 
144 Edwin Paul Hollander, "Conformity, status, and idiosyncrasy credit," Psychological Review 65, no. 2 (1958). 
145 Leaders, groups, and influence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1964). 




positions of power, and followers, perceiving themselves as obeying norms, rules, and authority. 
The controversy surrounding the experiments also deserves some attention so that another 
important psychological phenomenon is also highlighted. The study resulted in emotional 
reactions and potential trauma that the participants suffered during the experiments and after 
them. The reason for this was that their moral perspectives and values were challenged by the 
need  be   a h i . Thi  c a  be ee  ha  e  ide i  c i  f a d ha  e 
feels obligated to do is also known as cognitive dissonance. It illustrates the difference between 
attitudes, understood as judgment patterns, and behaviors, as expressions and extensions to these 
judgments. When attitudes and behaviors do not overlap and are in conflict, then cognitive 
dissonance occurs. Two works, by Festinger alone147 and in collaboration with Carlsmith148 
began exploring the question of how people overcome this cognitive dissonance. They concluded 
that people convince themselves in the rightfulness of their actions (behaviors) through altering 
their attitudes (internal evaluating processes) so that they avoid the discomfort of having 
conflicting thoughts. I  Milg am  e e ime , hi  a  achie ed h gh he fi m belief ha  he 
participants were doing what they were ordered to do by the authority, rather than what they 
decided to do themselves.  
Another central question in studying leadership behavior concerns the possible ways in 
which members of the group get dissatisfied by the status quo149. First, the need for novelty in a 
certain relationship that is constructed by continuously repeating dynamics. In other words, 
human beings need to explore and discover thus inviting boredom when these activities are not 
present in their life. This does not mean, however, that the group does not need consistency. On 
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the contrary, both tendencies seem to coexist even though the exact extent to which one desires 
changes in the environment and wants consistency cannot be accurately measured. Second, non-
conformity to the existing norms could lead to complete expulsion of the individual from the 
group which is not so problematic in small groups as it is in large groups. Third, the unequal 
distribution of goods between members of the groups and leaders, assigned by their social roles. 
After some time, these inequalities become commonly accepted and blend into the overall 
pattern of the established relationships within the group. Fourth, when certain norms within a 
community become stable and fixed, the members will be likely to continue obeying these norms 
even though the environment may be changing, as this could lead to social irrelevance of the 
entire group.  
David Campbell150 documents how the conditions of a changing environment, 
conceptualized as a threat, could act as a catalyzer for consolidating and bolstering the identity of 
a particular group. Paradoxically, from a social psychological perspective, the refusal to obey to 
an altered set of social norms tha  ld cha ge e  ide i  c ld lead  a marginalization of 
the group, in case the environment requires a changed mindset that the members of the group are 
not ready to embrace. A historical example of this tendency would be the emergence of the 
railroad in the U.S. which some people at the time rejected as potentially being disruptive due to 
the increased number of newcomers perceived as a threat. As a consequence, many locations 
were left disconnected from the route of the railroad and thus became marginalized. Moreover, 
members of a group may have a false perception about the changing surrounding environment 
due to the tendency of people to connect with like-mi ded i di id al . Ne c mb  d 151 
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c ec  i e e al a ac i   a i de imila i  be ee  i di id al . F he m e, 
once a relationship is established, the people in it begin to share the same attitudes. In addition, 
the social networks of people consist not only of their closest friends but, instead, of a much 
broader range of acquaintances sharing similar beliefs and values152. 
 
The dual meaning of perception, emotions and actions in politics 
One of the most vivid debates in the field of international studies has always been the 
place of the individual in the system. Some researchers, primarily realist thinkers, consider that 
they are merely a pawn in a grand chess game governed by the powers influencing the structure, 
while other scholars (constructivists, liberalists to some extent, and critical thinkers) maintain 
that they are more than a pawn and possess the strength to change the system and alleviate the 
effects of anarchy. Consequently, since the realist paradigms about the IR-world exclude to a 
large extent the influence of the individual as an agent, their role has not been studied much. 
Alexander Wendt claims that in most social scientific research there are two relationships 
between agent and structure that are essential and make them both interdependent: 1) h ma  
beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform 
the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure 
the interactions between these purposeful acto 153. Interestingly, even rational choice theorists 
who focus on the individual and their preferences assume that there is a cost-benefits analysis 
that is conducted every time a decision has to be made by an individual. Psychological theories 
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disagree with this type of modeling, as it was argued earlier. As the role of the individual 
becomes more and more important in a political environment where beliefs, norms, emotions, 
and behaviors can provoke regime overthrows, significant changes in the political apparatus and 
in the institutions themselves, how we study individuals in political science is a topic that enjoys 
a revived scholarly interest in the post-Cold War era. Jervis argues that in this political climate 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the focus of researchers should again be placed on beliefs, 
values, and biases that trigger reactions, attitudes and behaviors in individuals154. Much of this 
new wave of political psychology research on individuals was dedicated to leadership, leadership 
styles, personality traits and disorders155 156 157 158, and the literature is voluminous. While it is 
evident ha  d a i g i fe e ce  ab  li ic  ba ed  e  ch l gical cha acteristics is 
understandably difficult, these scholars prove that it is not impossible. A much more complex 
research question would be to draw political conclusions based on the individual behaviors, 
feelings and emotions of many people that do not qualify for the category of group thinking 
because they are relatively independent in their decision-making process. It is true that 
individuals differ greatly, but as it was outlined previously in the chapter, there are some general 
trends that are consistent and can allow for some generalizations. For instance, the field of 
marketing is quite successfully using psychology for the purposes of the discipline. Therefore, in 
this study, I will attempt to apply these psychological tools to situations that include groups of 
people that take decisions relatively independently from each other. I say relatively 
                                                           
154 Robert Jervis, "Leadership, post-Cold War politics, and psychology," Political Psychology 15, no. 4 (1994). 
155 Jerry S. Wiggins and Aaron L. Pincus, "Personality: Structure and assessment," Annual review of psychology 43, 
no. 1 (1992). 
156 Paul T. Costa Jr. and Robert R. McCrae, "Four ways five factors are basic," Personality and individual 
differences 13, no. 6 (1992). 
157 Stephen G. Walker and Lawrence S. Falkowski, "The Operational Codes of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of 
State: Motivational Foundations and Behavioral Consequences," Political Psychology 5, no. 2 (1984). 
158 Margaret G. Hermann, "Explaining foreign policy behavior using the personal characteristics of political 




independently because if individuals are part of the same society, there are some trends (norms 
and values) that could be influencing their decisions the same way even if the individuals do not 
know each other and are not in any way in communication with each other.  
That said it is important to analyze now how the same type of psychological phenomena 
can play a dual role in the study of politics, how the individual can contribute to changing the 
system with their behavior, and how at the same time the individuals are part of a system that 
controls the maintenance of the status-quo element in their behavior. 
First, I will briefly discuss the first scenario or how the system affects the individual. 
Structural realists argue that the system that is inevitably producing mistrust and uncertainty 
affects the units in this system (the states) by making them willing to cheat, and not to comply 
and cooperate with other units because of the anarchy. On the other hand, states consist of 
individuals that, according to some classical realists159 160 161, possess the same characteristics as 
the states  the inclination to maximize benefits at the expense of moral principles, egotistic 
nature, seeking power. At the same time, the system has to govern the individuals and exercise 
some power over them. Here comes the notion of authority and its expressions in society. One 
crucial way that authorities can use to control individuals is through depicting the contours of 
their social environment. Leaving aside merely economic control that authorities have, in the 
field of IR, other types of control include securitizing areas of public life and altering the 
otherwise malleable identities of people. I use the word malleable mainly because no matter how 
strong a particular identity of a group is, it is still vulnerable to mostly negative connotations that 
power structures can ascribe to it. I  hi  e e, K ch  de li e  ha  em i al e e i  
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arguably represent an important link between the discursively constructed identities of subjects, 
on the one hand, and the power exerted h gh di c e ,  he he  ha d 162.  Building on 
hi  i , S l m  add  ha  la g age ac i el  c c  ide i ie , elf-perceptions, and 
cial ela i 163. What makes the power of speech and non-verbal acts particularly important 
is that it is concealed so well that in most cases its influence is not even recognizable for the 
recipient of the information.  
As for the second type of control that the system has over the individual, securitization is 
another prerogative that power structures have. Thinkers from the Copenhagen School consider 
that the way to securitize an issue is for the authorities to assign a place to a problem in the realm 
of extreme threats that require some extraordinary political measures that can find expression in 
different domains (military, economic, societal and environmental)164. As noted in this section, 
emotions such as fear, joy, grief, passion, hate, shame, pride, anger, sorrow can contribute both 
to the securitization of some issues and to the formation and the cha gi g f e  ide i . What 
is fascinating about these emotional states is that they are an inherent mechanism for every 
individual, and through them, the system affects its human parts through the elites conveying 
verbal and non-verbal information that will evoke these emotions in the recipients. 
Simultaneously, this cognitive apparatus of individuals could also be an engine for a change in 
the system through the opposite process  the individuals reacting to the power structures 
because of decision-making influenced by emotions. Examples in this regard are not lacking in 
the history  from emblematic revolutions to regular democratic elections. It should not be 
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forgotten, however, that human emotions can also be skillfully used by politicians to achieve or 
try to achieve the desired outcome with political consequences by persuading social perceivers 
through presenting to them emotion-inducing information. Consequently, a change in the system 
can still be achieved by individuals but purposefully manipulated by third parties, a theme that is 
central in this work. The field of political science and IR pose an emphasis on emotions when it 
comes to outcomes with political significance. The reason for this is that not only emotions can 
contribute to decompose the complex process of decision-making, but some scholars165 166 argue 
ha  em i  i  a  f a i ali  i elf, a d ha  he  a e i ima el  i e i ed a d 
i e c ec ed ce e , ch l gicall  a d e l gicall 167.  Emotions help the decision-
maker select relevant information for this process and, as Vogel a , a ea   be a  e e ial 
f da i  f  a  lea  me ki d f ea i g 168. That said it is important to focus on how these 
emotions affec  he i di id al  c g i i  a d ha e c me  i  he f m f a particular 
behavior.  
The literature focusing on this question, as mentioned previously, mostly belongs to the 
field of American Politics. It concerns the relationship between emotion and voting, and political 
behavior, and democratic processes169. Based on the contributions made in this area, 
McDermott170 proposes ten pillars that have significant implications about the relationship that 
emotions have with politics. First, emotions trigger a certain reaction regarding an event that 
either occurred or existed i  he i di id al  imagi a i  in some form. Second, a  i di id al  
emotions serve as a compass to the judgments made about the expected utility in decision-
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making. Third, emotions experienced by the social perceiver can influence a perceived likelihood 
of positive or negative outcomes. Fourth, certain emotions can make the individual more 
receptive to some kinds of information, which they will not be otherwise willing to consider. 
Fifth, mood as a collective state of the body and the mind has an important influence over 
perception and processing of new information, recollecting old one, and making judgments. 
Sixth, mood influences the recollection of past events and produce emotions that can affect the 
creation of new memories. Seventh, different emotions can make the individual either more 
inclined or more skeptical to undertake risks. Eight, forming emotions from non-verbal 
information decreases the time necessary for decision-making, as opposed to forming emotions 
based on verbal information. Ninth, while emotional cues make decision-making faster, extreme 
emotions can lead to biased thinking. Tenth, emotions and intuition are also related, and the 
former can shape the contours of the latter thus inviting a biased judgment. 
Clausewitz171 underlines in his view about the political philosophy of war that the 
bala ce be ee  he h ee m i a i  ( a i , ea  a d ech i e 172) that the three leading 
fig e  i  cie  ( he e le, he g e me , a d he mili a 173) have is crucial. It is evident 
from his definition that he sees people as inevitably driven by emotions. The discussion of the 
relationship between emotions and politics is particularly importance because, as Neta Crawford 
a , i stitutionalization links the pri a e a d i di id al  he c llec i e a d li ical 174. 
Below, I will provide an overview of the most influential emotions that authors document in the 
study of politics.   
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Fear is among the emotions with the most notable impact on human cognition regarding 
decision-making. When a particular stimulus is perceived as a threat, a series of biochemical 
reactions are triggered that make the perceiver more alert and attentive to the social situation. 
The increased production of certain hormones, such as adrenaline and cortisol, for instance, helps 
the brain distinguish between threats and non-threats. After the shocking stimulus ends, the brain 
goes back to normal and precludes the production of hormones and sends signals to cease the 
state of extreme alertness. However, when the body and/or the mind are exposed to continuous 
stress, it becomes very difficult for them to recognize a stressor, and when the stressor is present 
and when it is gone. This can result in a lengthy process of being overly vigilant and overly 
responsive to stimuli in the surrounding environment175. As a consequence, this cha ges what 
e l k f , ha  e ee, a d he a  e hi k 176. Fear and stress also affect how memories are 
comprised and recollected. In terms of the former, the way one stores a memory under fear/stress 
would not necessarily be accurate since the selection of information at the time of the memory 
production will be highly biased and limited. Moreover, the analysis of the options available and 
their value cannot be properly assessed under stress. In terms of the way humans recollect events 
stored in the memory under stress, they will most likely be effortless to retrieve because they are 
bright and influential for the individual.  
Empathy, on the other hand, possesses opposite characteristics of experiencing fear. It is 
defi ed a  he c g i i e abili   ake a he  e  e ec i e [a d]  de a d h  
and why others feel and think the way they do and the capacity to see how our behavior might be 
understood by another 177. Studies show that people are more likely to feel empathy toward 
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individuals with whom they have a significant resemblance, the more similar, the more empathic 
they are178. Based on this principle, the more emphatic people feel, the more they are willing to 
help179. However, when people do not think that they have much in common with another 
individual, and there is even some feeling of resentment, this could give room for the emergence 
of another emotion  antipathy. It can even produce positive emotions stemming from someone 
el e  ega i e em i  (j  f m he ha i e  f a person with whom the perceiver does 
not feel associated). It is also apparent from the studies described above that stressors can reduce 
the feelings of empathy as they disrupt the normal functioning of the brain, as the empathy 
becomes an emotion with secondary meaning at the expense of the need to eradicate the stressor 
(the threat). For a deeper empathy, scholars argue, it is better if the person imagines what the 
others may feel, as opposed to just witnessing it. Through the mental images, the person 
empathizing will project their own way of feeling in an unpleasant manner that may or may not 
be identical with what is actually experienced by the ones in distress. It is still much more 
accurate and influential experience if the empathizer could vicariously experience the emotions 
of the ones who provoked the feelings of empathy, even if not utterly accurate180 181. Antipathy 
and fear, as emotions, are frequently used in military doctrines and could sensibly increase the 
mistrust and alienation between states thus reinforcing the perception of anarchy. Therefore, it is 
crucial that individuals make a difference between reasonable fears and unjustified ones relying 
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on techniques like empathy that help them identify a real threat, as opposed to one that was 
depicted to them as such and was most likely already institutionalized182.  
Anger. As opposed to feeling fearful, sense of anger increases the chance of the social 
perceiver to have positive views about the future. Another effect that anger has on people is that 
i  ca  al  ge e a e blic  f  a  beca e a ge  lead  e le  be m e i e f 
i i e a d e e i e blic lic  ch ice 183. A group of scholars explores the effect of 
emotions, anger, anxiety and enthusiasm and political information seeking184. The findings from 
their study are consistent with previous research outlining that anger actually reduces 
significantly the information-seeking tendencies, as opposed to anxiety that encourages such 
behavior. According to another study185, the latter can also downplay the role of habitual voting 
for a particular political party, and to orient the voter toward looking for new information, while 
provoking enthusiasm is correlated with party identification and reduced need for new 
information. 
In a more politico-philosophical context, David Ost186 shares an interesting perspective 
regarding anger in politics. He argues that it is not only that the power structures in society have 
to find an outlet for the anger of the masses, but instead, he presents anger as an integral 
component of power  a tool in the hands of both groups. In fact, politicians and activists 
ca e a d cha el 187 this powerful political energy that anger produces through the figure of 
the enemy that is portrayed as responsible for certain issues, usually economic. Ost underlines 
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that if the politicians/political activists convincingly introduce the enemy to the public as such, 
their cause has a significant chance of success, as these dynamics are evident both in democratic 
and authoritarian societies. Lyman188 elaborates on this view adding that it is important to look at 
how the power structures employ anger. In particular, how anger is transformed to support the 
e i i g de  a he  ha   al e  i . The a g me  he make  i  ha  force, moral indignation, 
care, silence and ech i e 189  are four main ways in which anger is subjugated to serve the 
power structures and the status quo in terms of the order. The first element - anger is dressed by 
the regime as a force that obeys and complies with the rules established by the hierarchy of 
command incorporated in a particular structure. The method of transforming anger into force is 
the training that the military receives, for instance. The second element, moral indignation is 
achieved when the anger alone shifts toward a wave of anger invested into a specific cause or 
ideology – which is typically the political regime or other institutionalized values cherished by 
the regime. Third, care, as a transformation of anger should be understood as the need to protect 
something dear to the individual. An instance in this regard is the feeling of patriotism and duty 
to loved ones, groups in society and the state itself190. Fourth, authority requires that anger 
provoked by perceived injustice is silenced so that the integrity of the regime is intact. Lyman 
suggests as an example the denial of injury and the acceptance of unequal treatment as a 
technique that achieves silence as an extension of anger under the influence of the perceived as a 
legitimate power in a state or in a structure191. The fifth element from the proposed model is the 
technique. The bureaucratic techniques used to transform anger into non-emotionally charged 
outcomes through rules and norms is another way of subjugating anger to power  establishing 
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and reinforcing the existing order. An empirical study by Small and Lerner192 investigated the 
relationship between anger and sadness, on the one hand, and welfare policy, on the other. They 
found that feelings of anger decreased intention of more generous welfare support, as opposed to 
feelings of sadness that increased the intention for support. The reason for this finding, they 
a g e i  ha  he ad e  c di i  e i ed a  i c ea e i  ema ic h gh 193 that the anger 
condition did not require. Another explanation they offer about the results pertains to the 
stereotyping tendencies that angry people exhibit. 
Pain, trauma, and shame. An overview of emotions and how they influence politics 
requires that another phenomenon is included in this work  trauma. Scholars agree that this is a 
deeply intimate and private experience that ultimately disturbs fundamental understandings of 
how the individual sees and perceives the world. Moreover, some scholars stress the inability to 
link trauma to politics because of the impossible task of expressing the feelings coming from a 
traumatic experience through language194. While these characteristics make the study of this 
unique phenomenon difficult, its relationship to politics is nevertheless established. One of the 
mechanisms through which an inherently personal experience like trauma can enter the domain 
of politics is through representation and transforming the personal into collective. Trauma cannot 
be described as emotion itself, but rather it represents various emotions that connect the 
individual to the community through the emotion of solidarity195. However, in the process of 
constituting the individual trauma as a collective one, it is possible ha  la  e e e a i  
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of trauma tend to pave the way for political responses that define security narrowly and create 
c e  i  hich a ag i ic  bellige e  ec i  licie  e ail 196.  
Closely related to trauma is pain. It is described ei he  a  a e a i   feeli g 197. 
More detailed characteristics of this sensation or feeling are that it is inherently subjective and 
individual, it reveals more complicated characteristics than other emotions evoked by visually 
perceived events, it e abli he  a li k be ee  eleme  f e  e e ie ce a d a  a e i e 
feeli g a e 198, and lastly, the negative sensations related to pain are constructed through 
ascribing meaning to what provoked them199. An interesting study examining the relationship 
between pain and information selection found that individuals experiencing chronic pain are 
oriented to seeking pain-related information200. Another research focuses on the information 
seeking and the fear of pain. It showed that the higher the anxiety provoked by fear of pain, the 
higher the interest toward pain-related information201. While it comes mostly, if not entirely, 
from the psychological field, research dedicated on the relationship between information and 
pain (and other emotions) has important implications for the study of politics, especially for the 
field of security studies.  
When discussing pain and traumatic experiences, there is another emotion that also adds 
value  he eff   e l e em i  effec   li ic . Shame, a  bei g c cial  he 
ce  f ec cilia i   he heali g f d 202 serves to acknowledge previous 
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wrongdoing. The role that shame has in constructing identity and sense of community between 
its members is similar to the one that trauma has. Shame is one of the most social emotions since 
i  a me  ha  me e i  i e i g  he gd i g, a c cl i  hat holds true even if the 
individual experiencing shame and guilt is alone. An interesting feature of shame - national 
shame e me  feeli g  f l e. Tha  aid, feeli g  f hame ma e  he  he i e  f he 
shame is someone of whom the person experiencing the shame thinks highly203. The same goes 
for national shame where the sense of pride of the citizens was harmed as a consequence of 
wrongdoing that they would like to compensate for  i e i g ha  i  hamef l ab  he 
a , he a i  ca  li e   he ideal  ha  ec e i  ide i 204. That said, one of the most 
influential findings in the literature about trauma and pain is undoubtedly the fact that the 
discomfort and insecurity that the individual experiences in many ways bolsters their ontological 
security205.  
Habit. While habits in politics and IR are not emotions, they have an important meaning 
about political relationships. They represent repetitive acts that include among other things 
emotions as well. Therefore, they will also be included in this section. Ted Hopf discusses that 
c g i i e e l g  di c e ed ha  e le eg la l  e cei e, feel, a d ac  bef e he  
hi k 206, thus casting doubt in the predominant assumption in IR that actors act rationally, 
deliberately analyzing costs and benefits before making a decision. He maintains that social 
constructivism exaggerates the unproblematic nature of changes that the individual can bring into 
the system, ignoring the powerful influence that habits have. Moreover, socialization eventually 
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reaches its boundaries and gives room to the creation of habits that serve as an automated 
behavioral mechanism in which attitude and internal assessment of factors are almost or entirely 
predetermined by the habitual processes. That could be attributed to the social system that 
bolsters and encourages the formation and repetition of manifesting habits as they help the 
individual better adjust to the social environment in an easy, efficient manner. Habits, as 
i e i al, c ci , i l a , a d eff le 207 processes governing human behavior 
stand in opposition to emotions that require at least some cognitive function to take place before 
a reaction is expressed. They are, however, still closely related and comprised of emotions as 
ell a  he  hi g  a  he  e e e  eflec i e eac i  e ha e  he ld a d :  
e ce i , a i de , em i , a d ac ice 208. One of the most central questions in the study 
of habits and political behavior is whether they can be broken and how. To this, Ted Hopf209 and 
Wegner and Bargh210 respond that habits can cease existing over time through a consideration 
about the relevance of the habit to the surrounding environment, its compliance to the norms and 
the rules or the lack of such. Conditions favorable for the creation and the practice of habits 
include situations in which there is little possibility for the social norms to be challenged and 
thus there is almost no need for consideration and analysis of any factors that determine 
behavior. Hopf211 finds the study of habits especially relevant to topics including cooperation, 
security dilemma, rivalries, and security communities. All of them, according to him, can be 
easily explained by the existence of the habit as a phenomenon and the security dilemma, in this 
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sense, is not a dilemma at all since the parties either see and treat each other habitually as 
enemies or as friends. 
This chapter highlighted the cognitive construction of individuals. The known 
mechanisms of human cognition become a vulnerability if they are exploited purposefully for 
gains of the party seeking to exploit them. The way human cognition is built does not allow for 
any changes that could be made to prevent its exploitation. However, social cognition, an 
apparatus that creates and maintains certain predispositions regarding social phenomena, is much 
more susceptible to influence, including one in a direction to limit manipulations and deceptions. 
Research shows that among the psycho-emotional areas that are most vulnerable to threats, in 
particular, are the feelings of anxiety and fear, the sense of identity, control and behavior, and 
habit, as all of them are more powerful than other experiences, and are thus exploited more. All 
of them pertain to innate instincts for self-preservation and survival that very often 
overwhelmingly predict judgments and decision-making. Advances in the field of psychology, 
social psychology, and political psychology highlighted these patterns through numerous studies 
over the years and made human cognition a target for different political and corporate interests. 
As the research produced on this subject matter provided strong evidence for these cognitive 
tendencies, they began being exploited long before this. The following chapter documents how 
cognitive vulnerabilities and dispositions were utilized for political purposes over the different 








 HISTORY OF COGNITIVE THREATS 
 
Chronicle of cognitive threats through the ages 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the development of cognitive 
threats throughout the ages and to trace the specific components and conditions that had some 
meaning for their successful execution. Some tendencies inherent for previous historical epochs 
are preserved in present times, and others are a new phenomenon for the 21st century, as Chapter 
4 will prove. In addition, examining the factors that made them possible would inform and 
justify a prevention strategy against cognitive threats described in detail in Chapter 5. As this 
chapter will demonstrate, advances in technological, political, religious and cultural aspects offer 
insights about the level of applicability of prevention as a strategy, in what situations it presents 
fruitful opportunities for countering cognitive threats, and when it is severely limited by factors 
that are difficult to be altered. 
As being central pre-condition for knowing and influencing the enemy, very early in the 
history of humankind, intelligence gathering was recognized as one of the most powerful tools 
for achieving a military victory. In the fifth century, Sun Tzu underlined that having knowledge 
ab  he i al  la  i  he ea  he e ligh e ed i ce a d he i e general conquer the 
e em  he e e  he  m e 212. He also emphasized that gaining leverage against the enemy 
without fighting requires elaborated skills but is however a priority213. The ability to obtain 
information from political adversaries or even allies has had many names in history: spying, 
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intelligence gathering, diplomacy, etc. One of them that focuses on planting a certain desired 
perception about reality that is typical for military settings is reflexive control. It originated in the 
1960s and focused on the attempts of both sides of a conflict to impose reflexive control 
(cognitive control) over the opponent214. While it ultimately pursues the end goals of the 
aforementioned methods of obtaining information, it is described as being more ambitious in 
terms of how it ill deli e  he efe ed c me. Tim h  Th ma  ide ifie  i  a  a mea  f 
conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to 
voluntaril  make he ede e mi ed deci i  de i ed b  he i i ia  f he ac i 215. A central 
element in this concept and in the others mentioned above is power. The immediate goal of 
intelligence-gathering and information operations is obtaining a piece of knowledge about a fact 
or facts and/or  cha ge he i al  beha i . Regardless, the ultimate purpose of this process is 
to gain power over them. This is frequently achieved by deception and manipulation  a common 
characteristic in the skillset of spies216. Their activities could be m i a ed b  g eed, 
disappointment, bruised egos, failure in promotion stakes, talents that went unrecognized, 
di ill i me  a d a de i e f  e e ge 217. Needless to say, while the use of spies in 
intelligence operations may have decreased in the 21st century, they still exist but are now 
accompanied by technologies that execute the same functions thus saving money, time and 
resources. Moreover, the people employing these technologies are motivated very often by the 
same ambitions as the spies from classical antiquity to post-modern times. Besides, the 
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technologies used to gather information in the 21st century remarkably resemble cognitive 
techniques that were inherent for the first spies known to human history. 
 Classical antiquity. The need for information, as outlined in Chapter 1 has always been 
among the most fundamental human necessities since it is crucial for survival. In most basic 
forms, the need for information was met through different types of predictions provided by 
sorcerers, astrologists, prophets, fortune-tellers, oracles and various rituals supposed to provide 
signs for the future218. In terms of military strategy, the need for information developed from an 
initial passive stance of obtaining information from prophets to active dissemination of 
information to the enemy intended to convince them to make a certain type of decision favorable 
for the former. Deception as a strategy, as opposed to simple information gathering, is a much 
more complex course of action. It requires a good perception of he e em  a  f hi ki g  
that the deceiving information is processed as being truthful. Therefore, deceit presupposes good 
k ledge f he e  che as the latter could be delivered by traditional intelligence 
gathering. Perhaps one of the most well historically documented manifestations of a cognitive 
threat is the Trojan Horse. About the same historical period, the ancient Greek historian 
Xenophon stresses three types of groups that were usually trusted with intelligence gathering  
outsiders, neutrals, and insiders219. Outsiders were typically fake deserters who infiltrated the 
e em  cam , de  he fal e e e e ha  he  de e ed, ga he ed i f ma i  ab  mili a  
plans and strategy and went back to their original camp to report their findings. Another task that 
they used to have was disinforming the enemy in a way that the latter would find believable. The 
idea behind the fake deserter role is that the spy would otherwise be denied access to the social 
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group. However, through a process of assimilation to the new camp, the spy gains access to 
information that would be otherwise inaccessible. Similarity between people, as psychological 
studies show, has always been a powerful bond between members of a group that builds their 
identity. The assimilation, however, could have been time-consuming and intelligence was 
sometimes needed urgently. A solution to this problem were the neutrals and the merchants. 
Neutrals and merchants gained access to the desired location and social and military circles much 
easier than the infiltrators. The difference is that fake deserters have to be trusted that they 
actually abandoned their duties and sincerely joined the enemy, while for merchants and 
neutrals, the skepticism toward their intentions was much less due to their occupations or the 
lack of military background that can link them to the enemy. Moreover, merchants, in some 
cases, were warmly welcomed because of the need for the products and the services they were 
offering. Namely this characteristic was making them suitable spies that would not raise 
ici  i  he e em  cam . In ancient Egypt, merchants traveling from Babylonia to Syria, 
and Palestine were also a very significant source of information220. In addition, native people in 
Egypt served as secret agents delivering intelligence to the pharaoh through the commander of 
the garrison close to which their villages were. 
 While Xenophon does not particularly mention the third type of spies  the insiders, it is 
well known that they have been one of the most valuable sources of information221. These so-
called agents in place e e i di id al  h  e e al ead  membe  f he e em  c h  a d 
were delivering information to their leaders. Since no previous preparation, training or any 
outstanding skills were needed for this role, insiders, as opposed to outsiders, were just regular 
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people who did not have to convince anyone that they belong to the social group. In terms of 
gender, Aristotle makes a very interesting observation. While most historical evidence from this 
period does not provide any clues that female spies were employed along with their male 
counterparts, Aristotle explicitly mentions female spies in Syracuse. The lack of sources 
specifying that women were assigned intelligence gathering missions, as well as men, could be 
attributed also to the problems related to translating some texts from ancient Greek. For instance, 
Plutarch uses masculine forms to refer to groups including both men and women222. It was 
mostly women who were engaged with arts, music, and tasks related to entertainment that were 
recruited as spies because of their access to significant events. However, it was not uncommon 
for women of noble origin and their servants to also act as spies reporting information about their 
husbands or their masters. Another kind of intelligence gathering position was the one of envoys 
that were officially assigned a diplomatic office in a foreign country. Among the benefits of this 
position was the lack of likelihood of getting exposed and imprisoned since the ambassadors 
were in the foreign country in an official capacity. There was also a downside to this position  
the common knowledge that the attaché is reporting information to their countries made people 
more hesitant to share and entrust sensitive information. However, it was possible that envoys 
turned against their sending countries and began delivering information to the rulers of the 
receiving country.  
 The matter of who was providing intelligence was also relevant to the quality of the 
delivered information. First, the agents in ancient Greece reported information that they thought 
was important as the latter was a purely subjective judgment. Second, it was delivered in a way 
that represented how the recipient of the information interpreted it and understood it. Third, 





many of the spies back then were not explicitly trained to execute these tasks, therefore, all 
information gatherers may not be equally capable in differentiating the pertinent from the 
e i he al 223. Soldiers, merchants, and envoys all have different perception about what 
information is important and how it should be interpreted in a certain context. Ancient Greek 
rulers and military commanders were aware of the problem and attempted to resolve it in 
different ways. Aeneas Tacticus suggested that the intelligence gathering should be done by men 
with a military background who will ensure that the essential information is distinguished from 
non-relevant facts that can cause confusion224. The quality of the delivered information was 
essential in missions aiming to b c e he e em  e ce i  ab  fac    ke a  
ac i  be eficial  he decei e 225. Demosthenes underlined the importance of the interests that 
different sources of information have and how they might affect the delivered information. He 
a med ha  ca i e  a a i e  e e h  e ide ce f he eliabili  f a fac  beca e 
they had no longer interest in the outcome of the events226. Xenophon and Alexander the Great 
sought to resolve this issue by obtaining information for the same fact from different sources 
such as indigenous people, scouts, prisoners, spies, envoys, etc. Regardless of the methods 
employed by Xenophon, Alexander, and other Greeks at the time, deception by disinformation 
remained largely successful and thus frequently used as a strategy in military affairs. Another 
instance of successful disinformation practices in the early ages is given during the battle of 
Kadesh, in which the Hittite king used deception to mislead the Egyptians led by Ramesses II. 
Documents reveal that he e   Bed i , i g a  de e e ,  he Pha a h  cam ; he 
two agents played their role so successfully that Ramesses II readily believed their story and 
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pushed forward with but one division to invest Kadesh, his three remaining divisions straggling 
slowly behind 227. As opposed to the very well-developed intelligence-gathering systems in 
Greece and Egypt, in the early Republican period, Rome mostly relied on information shared by 
its allies, rather than collecting it on its own228. Another instance of the poor level of the Roman 
i ellige ce ga he i g i  ha  i  c m a i   R ma , he Pe ia ,  he a cie  Eg ia , 
would hardly have been taken so off guard by the sudden invasion of an enemy as were the 
R ma  he  Ha ibal i aded I al  e 229. There were some exceptions from this rule, 
however. Sertorius, a Roman general, from the early years of his early military career recognized 
the power of good intelligence and the efficiency of deception. As Romans were fighting the 
Teutons in Gaul, Sertorius, dressed in Celtic clothing, succeeded to present himself as one of the 
locals, and gathered valuable information for his mission. Despite this ingenious move described 
by Plutarch, it is also mentioned that it was very rare for Romans to adopt such deception 
techniques230. Another exception from the rule was Caesar in the Gallic campaigns in which he 
had to turn to some deception techniques to trick the Gauls. Caesar ordered his army to build a 
small camp that implied a sense of fear than such of courage, and force. The Gauls, thinking that 
Cae a  a m  a  eake ed b h h icall  a d me all , k he bai  a d a acked l   see 
that they have been deceived and fled i  di a a 231. It is reported that Romans avoided using 
deception in their military and diplomatic campaigns in the beginning, but by the time of the 
Republic, for them, this has become a perfectly acceptable and useful tool in warfare.  
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 Accepted as a continuation of the Roman Empire, Byzantium realized that the Roman 
Em i e  i ellige ce ga he i g eak e e  h ld be compensated. Among other measures that 
were undertaken was the establishment of corps of the agents who were carefully selected by 
their skills, behavior, social status. They had five years to show evidence of their abilities, and if 
approved by the Master of Offices and the emperor, they were accepted to serve for twenty-five 
years, after which they would retire232. Another tool used to gather information was through the 
Christian religion of some of the subjects that have fallen under the rule of the Arabs. In 
addition, Byzantines used natives acting as spies within the Arab territories that were recruited 
most often through money or other specific interests, religious reasons, or dissatisfaction by the 
rulers. Complementary to this, information for the people and the lands surrounding the 
Byzantine Empire was collected by the Office for Barbarian Affairs from merchants, envoys, and 
soldiers. This structure was functioning from the fifth to approximately the eleventh century233. 
Similar to other political formations at the time, in the Arab Muslim Empires, merchants, 
travelers, and even elder women were also recruited as spies by different rulers such as Al-
Mansur, Harun Al-Rashid, and Al-Mamun. Archives document that Al-Mamun had recruited 
around 1,700 old women among his spies in Baghdad234. In the Mongol Empire, Jenghiz Khan, 
wanting to obtain intelligence about the Muslims used merchants as sources. He also paid careful 
c ide a i   he e em  la d  he i hed  bjec , i g  b ai  a  ible i f ma ion 
on the military strength of the neighboring nations and on the rivalries among the members of the 
li g cla , hich hi  di l mac  c ld e l i   eake  he ad e a 235. In the Muscovite 
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State, similarly to the Byzantine Empire and the Arabs, Muscovites used foreign envoys as 
sources of information by spying on them while at the same time aiming to withhold information 
about their own state from the envoy. 
 The times of the classical antiquity fascinate with different techniques of information 
gathering, resembling a lot these in current times. Ancient Greece, Egypt, the Byzantine Empire, 
the Aram Muslim Empires, the Mongols, and the Muscovites all had some forms of postal 
services, developed differently. Later, with the technological developments in this regard, 
manipulations became much more common as the postal services gained a position of higher 
importance. Thus, in the Renaissance and in the early Modernism, the intelligence gathering was 
vulnerable to more challenges but at the same time grew into a more sophisticated system. It 
even developed into an institutionalized structure through the implementation of regular 
diplomatic missions in countries.  
 Renaissance and Modernism. In the ages of the Renaissance and Modernism 
cartography as art evolved sensibly. It became a valuable tool for planning, strategizing and 
execution of military campaigns. As a consequence, maps started to invite a more significant 
interest by enemies and their spies. People who have seen certain maps of importance and the 
plans made from them also attracted much attention as they were perceived as sources of 
valuable information. This included merchants, envoys, soldiers, their commanders, sailors, and 
captains of ships. Stealing these maps also became a profitable enterprise. One example is the 
case with the military engineers Johannes and Cornelis Elandts who threatened to hand the maps 




of money236. It is documented that this was a regular practice among military engineers who had 
access to the valuable information that maps contained. Their skills were highly appreciated by 
the royals in Europe. Reports share that Lopo Homem fled Portugal to seek asylum in England 
where his cartographic skills amazed Queen Mary who ordered him to prepare an atlas with the 
newest geographical discoveries. King Louis XIV also had an appreciation for one of the most 
treasured sources of information and continuously sent military engineers to Italy with the 
mission of obtaining the plans of fortifications in Lombard. One of the most celebrated French 
cartographers, Nicolas de Nicolay, invited by John Dudley, Viscount Delisle went to England 
and mapped the location of the English ports with considerable significance. After the death of 
Dudley, it turned out that Nicolay was working for the French the entire time, a proof of which 
was the receipt documenting the payments made by the French king. Considering all these 
circumstances, at the time, ca g a hic e i age a  e cei ed f bei g f g ea e  ac ical 
e 237. Although the methods and the people involved in the process have changed, attempts to 
gain access to the plans illustrating locations of important buildings resemble, to a large extent, a 
contemporary theft of secrets that, similarly to centuries ago, both private and public parties 
treasure greatly. 
 In the Renaissance and the early Modernism, spies increasingly started to be selected 
based on their relationship with the person of interest, as opposed to choosing a person of skills 
who was unknown to the target. For instance, in England, circa 1540, among the spies employed 
to gather intelligence on suspected traitors of the crown were also scholars238. During the reign of 
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Elizabeth, other tactics were also used to manipulate people of interest. Spies delivered gossips 
and specific information intended to persuade the recipient in a certain cause. Rather than money 
i  hi  e a, ie  e e al  eeki g a age a d efe me 239 in the context of intelligence 
gathering as a political activity. An interesting fact for this historical period is that there is no 
written evidence about the life of popular spies after they ceased their operations. Sporadic are 
the examples of spies who retired after the end of their employment and historians are 
speculating that such retirements could have been initiated on behalf of the person who hired 
them because the agent was exposed240. Regarding he me  le i  i elligence gathering 
during the Renaissance and Modernism, it is well emphasized and acknowledged, as opposed to 
ea lie  hi ical e i d , ha  he  e e li ical i e media ie , b ke  f a age a d 
i f ma i 241. This was true because of the social networks they have established with family 
members, relatives, friends, acquaintances and other people who were connected to the same 
social circles. Since transportation was not very well developed at the time and distances were 
long and people  frequently traveling, letter-writing has become instrumental to the 
maintenance of these networks through which women regularly received, disseminated and 
exchanged news in addition to exercising influence and persuasion.  
 Especially in England, having a queen, rather than a king made the role of women in 
court tremendously important, as Elizabeth herself relied heavily on information gathered by 
appointed female servants and members of the nobility. In addition, it was not only information 
that was collected by them. They had even more active and responsible roles such as negotiators, 
intermediaries, and influencers. Women skillfully used personal contacts to convey political 
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messages to their addressees and convince them in a particular cause. These dynamics were, 
however, not exempt from the context of power and hierarchy structures that undoubtedly had an 
important meaning for the efficiency of the persuasion. The presence of the women in court 
brought them quick and easy access to both national and international news as well as knowledge 
of the reactions to them. However, it was not only valuable information from home and abroad 
that interested women of the English nobility. News about the monarch, court affairs, 
negotiations, and any changes in the health, the marital status and the wealth of the powerful 
members of the court was also of particular importance. Women were also instrumental in 
informing their husbands, fathers, and relatives living away from the court about the latest 
developments in politics and social life. While ea i g he Q ee  a age a d affec i  a  
among the main goals of members of the court at the time, many of the female spies and 
informants were also acting as such driven by a longing for financial profit. There are multiple 
examples documented in the history of women exercising influence over family members, 
including husbands and fathers about important matters for which they were generously 
compensated242.  
 The development of the post office institution in Europe brought new opportunities for an 
enhanced and speedy correspondence but also made room for covert operations that challenged 
the integrity of the information enclosed in the mail. Famous at the time were the so-called black 
chambers ha  e e he hidde  ffice  f ec e  i ellige ce i , affed b  a  eli e g  f 
polymaths and scribed allotted their own compartmentalized task, whether translation, short-had, 
cryptanalysis, or forging seals, signatures and other marks that authe ica ed a d c me 243. 
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These chambers allowed that letters be copied, altered and resealed within a short period of time 
and the skills of the people employed to accomplish these were proficient enough to convince the 
recipient of the letter that it was never compromised or even opened. One of the most impressive 
black chambers was run by the postmistress of Brussels  Alexandrine (1589-1666) who was 
allegedly working for Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III, or, as suggested by some, for whoever was 
providing remuneration for her services244. As Brussels was a pivotal point for all the 
correspondence in Europe, possible influence over the information flow was an important 
acquisition. To alleviate the problem with the monopolization of the mail distribution, the 
emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was asked by citizens to grant permission for private 
messengers who would deliver regular mail, supposedly without political significance. While the 
emperor allowed private messengers, the condition that he set made the delivery difficult, 
expensive and without any practical use. This way, the family of Alexandrine of Taxis 
established control over all the correspondence coming out and passing through the empire, 
which allowed her to exercise power over the political and diplomatic affairs in more than one 
state. 
 Deception continued to be a weapon in the hands of the parties in conflict after the end of 
the Renaissance and the early Modernism. A vivid example from the eighteenth century is the 
one with the Jacobite rebellion from 1745 against the Hanoverian rule245. In this case, both sides 
skillfully used deception to gain leverage in their battle with the enemy. First, the Jacobite 
employed strategic tactics to confuse the Hanoverians about the size and the location of their 
forces. Small numbers of troops were sent to different locations that were inconsistent with 
where they mapped their routes in reality. This way, the Hanoverians not only made a mistake 
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about the size of the Jacobite army but also got misled about their intentions in terms of locating 
the troops and the routes they were going to use. However, the Jacobites were outsmarted by the 
Hanoverians as well. The latter sent a spy to the Jacobite camp who pretended to be a soldier 
who wanted to join their forces. Warmly welcomed among the Jacobites, the Hanoverian spy 
provided some false information that was perceived as plausible by Prince Charles.  
 A later example of the art of deception is the one involving Richard Meinertzhagen, a 
British Colonel who diligently executed a series of deception operations during World War I246. 
Meinertzhagen prepared a set of British official documents listing their intentions to attack Gaza. 
The purpose behind this plan was to mislead the Turks about the British military plans. 
Meinertzhagen hoped that Turkish spies will intercept these letters. Previous attempts to employ 
such maneuvers, however, appeared to be unsuccessful as the Turks did not seem to get access to 
the planted false information. Thus, Meinertzhagen utilized a different strategy this time. He 
made the deception scene much more believable for the Turks, as he fired a few shots in the 
proximity, leaving some bloodstains on his equipment and his haversack where the letters were 
left. The operation gained success as the Turks focused on Gaza thus allowing the British to 
invade Beersheba without resistance. 
 Post-Modernism. The two world wars brought new aspects to the problem of intelligence 
gathering. They provoked rapid developments in technology as this changed how it was used to 
support the collection of information about the enemy. Deception operations were proliferating. 
An integral part of such operations was the outlet through which the information was 
disseminated. While in democratic countries the opportunities for purposeful dissemination of 
particular agenda-oriented content were somewhat limited, in authoritarian countries such 





actions were much more easily implemented. The Soviets skillfully played with the tools of 
dece i  a  he  me ime  ld  a mame   di la  i h a ce ai  am  f fa fa e 
in order to draw attention away from other armaments they may have in their arsenal or may plan 
to have. Sometimes they exhibit mock-ups of planes and other equipment, which may never see 
he ligh  f da  a  e a i al e 247. Other outlets of disinformation were also employed. For 
instance, archives show that Soviet diplomats were instructed to share a specific piece of 
information with diplomats of a neutral country who also had contact with the enemy countries, 
relying that the neutral diplomat would share with them this piece of information, as it happened 
on more than one occasion. Such strategy was frequently put in action by the Soviet Foreign 
Office248. Moreover, there was a special unit within the KGB called the Disinformation Bureau 
whose main purpose was to misinterpret and place in negative context policies, statements, and 
other official documents of Western governments. In addition to this, this bureau was assigned to 
forge documents and provoke tension based on religious grounds, such as propagating anti-
Semitism. On the other end of the world, the CIA was also busy recruiting different agents to 
report to them. They were successful in recruiting Soviet agents who, as reported, were 
disillusioned by the false promises of the Soviet political system or particular issues such as the 
KGB  ea me  f R ia  ea a 249. Later, the traitors were captured and executed by the 
KGB as the CIA had promised them no protections as voluntary agents. However, in cases in 
which intelligence was needed, and there were no voluntary spies, CIA used deception to make 
people, unwilling to report to the agency, share information with them through another agent, 
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typically known to the involuntary informant. For instance, if the unknowing informant harbors 
resentments toward the U.S., then the person interacting with them would present themselves as 
non-U.S. citizens, typically citizens of a neutral country. Another way of obtaining information 
from people unwilling to share it with the CIA was through coercion. The CIA agent would 
exercise pressure over the informant through some sensitive, humiliating or incriminating 
i f ma i  a d h  e e he i f ma  c e a i 250.  
 After the end of the Cold War, the espionage declined in intensity. Later, with the 
emergence of the Internet, almost everything changed, including the ways espionage was 
conducted. Interestingly, many of the deception and manipulation techniques remained the same, 
but they were executed differently. With astonishing ease, a sentence could travel to the other 
end of the world, reaching millions of people, in a split second. In 1993, alarming articles 
warning people of the beginning of a cyberwar started appearing. Two political scientists  John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt added that people should prepare for a netwar which includes 
actions  di , damage,  m dif  ha  a a ge  la i  k  or thinks it known about 
i elf a d he ld a d i 251. They also mentioned that such manipulation could take place 
in many domains (psychological, political, cultural) and take many forms (altering public 
opinion or the opinion of the people with power in society). The most important conclusion that 
they reached was that such type of deception was going to change both politics and warfare.  
 In 2003, a policy document from China confirmed the predictions of Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt. The Chinese military declared that their strategy is built on three pillars  warfare 
understood as a psychological influence, manipulations of legal aspects of international 
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agreements, and influence over public opinion252. Fully realizing the growing threat, NATO 
created the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, intended to counter disinformation 
and propaganda campaigns on social media. Very soon, the Internet became an arena for battles 
of regular people, politicians, celebrities, armies, terrorists, criminals and even entire 
governments. The technological advances gave birth to bots and trolls who severely disrupt the 
perception of public dialogue, of public opinion. The consequences of their actions went far 
beyond a simple disruption, however. Slowly, the disruption started to change the dialogue itself 
and to reach matters of highest importance  the U.S. presidential election in 2016. At his point, 
it has become clear how seriously the information warfare affects every sphere of the public and 
private life of people. As many things changed from the classical antiquity period, other integral 
elements of deception remained unchanged  he e  f a a i e, em i , a he ici , 
community, and i da i 253. Bots and trolls mastered the art of disinformation and 
misinformation as they changed the public dialogue in the desired way allegedly establishing 
social consensus on popular topics among the users online.  
 Advancements in information science were welcomed in authoritarian countries as just 
another way of imposing control over the citizens by monopolizing the public dialogue. Some 
states went even further than this. China, for instance, introduced its social credit system in 2015, 
according to which the citizens will be assigned a specific score based on their activities thus 
assessing their loyalty to the state254. Establishing control over WeChat  the Chinese version of 
an expanded, multi-functional Facebook would feed the authorities with useful information about 
he ci i e  dail  ac i i ie , h gh , j dgme , a d ge e al a i de. Interestingly, a study by 
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Pan, King, and Roberts (2017) found out that in addition to the propaganda efforts of the Chinese 
government executed by people called the 50-Cent Army (based on the payment they receive for 
one social media post), Beijing also relies on methods of distraction rather than just 
disinformation255. Converting the attention from popular public topics to other topics that do not 
attract attention is a strategy that is among the weapons of domestic psychological warfare. 
Russians, however, openly employ disinformation techniques, adopted by government agencies, 
b h a d hei   e le a d ab ad. O e f R ia  ge e al , Vale  Gerasimov, 
emphasizes the increasing role of non-military methods of influence, simultaneously viewing 
R ia  eff  a  a defensive campaign that is merely a response to information cyber-attacks 
by the West256. Some non-cognitive cyber-attacks (such in which a device has been 
compromised directly, without manipulating an individual) are prevented successfully by the 
computer engineering industry through anti-virus programs, passwords, encryptions, and cyber 
security tools. This does not mean that cyber-attacks are not getting more sophisticated and 
ceased to cause problems online. In comparison to cognitive cyber-attacks, however, non-
cognitive ones are much more easily identifiable and are therefore much easier to be prevented. 
An instance for this is Mark Jakob who, using access from his former employer  Internet Wire, 
issued a fake press release concerning the resignation of Paul Folino, a CEO of Emulex (server 
a d age ide ), acc m a ied b  e  ha  he c m a  a  de  SEC i e iga i 257. 
As a result, stock prices dropped and ultimately led to Mark Jakob profiting from rates that were 
lowered artificially after the press release. I  a  Jak b  acce   I e e  Wi e  the company 
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producing press releases, rather than any technical skills that helped him achieve his goal. The 
same rule applies to theft-of-secrets cases in which an employee in a company from the defense 
industry is misled to release confidential information, thinking that the person requesting it is 
entitled to know it. Rather than old-fashioned hacking and unauthorized access to computers, the 
problem here is the human cognition rather than the level of security of a device.  
 
Evolution of cognitive threats: from the Trojan Horse to Facebook 
 Development of cognitive threats in the classical antiquity. The technological, societal, 
and cultural developments in the classical antiquity may look much slower and much less 
progressive when compared to further historical periods, but they are nevertheless still 
ig ifica . The  e  he f da i  f ma  c m e  f da  life, i cl di g some social 
consensus about reality and truth, and identifying deviations from these, such as deception. In the 
21st century, the problem of truth is very complex. For the people in the classical antiquity, the 
dimensions of this notion were much clearer. There were figures within the society, outlining the 
aspects of what truth is who were trusted and who were enjoying respect and obedience. Truth 
was very closely related to the idea of culture. People responsible for cultural norms, usually 
men in this era, were i di id al  h  d  hei  k f c l i a i  i hi  ecific i i i al 
contexts for specific social groups with a vested intere  i  ai i g hei  ac i i ie 258. 
Different examples of such people were priests, monks, rabbis, scholars, librarians, educators, 
etc. Even as early as in the classical antiquity era, educational materials, such as the Latin 
classics, served a powerful political purpose  to unify people, to impose ideas both by religious 
and secular authorities. Simultaneously with this, access to knowledge was severely limited and 
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considered a privilege. Books were copied by hand and copies were disseminated by 
missionaries and pedagogues, traveling to distant locations, teaching pupils reading and writing 
in Greek. Literacy was a skill for the elite, not for the masses. Incapable of reading from the 
source of information, people were vulnerable to misinterpretations, intentional or not. 
Controlling literacy meant control over the truth. Control over the truth meant control over the 
population  mi d . The agreement with authorities was the prevalent spirit in which most works 
were written until the 18th century when authors started disobeying the accepted norms for 
writing259. This does not mean that attempts were not made to refute the truths established by the 
authorities, but they were quickly destroyed, and their authors sued for treason and either 
imprisoned or murdered. Because of this long-lasting tradition of works, embedding moral 
norms, political and social attitude, desired by the authorities, later works in 18th century denying 
these principles, became especially appealing to the masses  a tendency that continues even in 
the 21st century.  
 It was also in the classical antiquity when the first archetypes were created  a notion of 
which is still present into the contemporary literature and from there  to the everyday life. The 
e e e f he he , e e e i g he admi a i  f  he ma  f ac i 260 embraces different 
features, both physical and moral that created standards for generations of people from ancient 
Rome to present days. The male hero, muscular and physically attractive shows his strength and 
courage mostly in times of war, as the latter started to get perceived as a desirable opportunity 
for the hero to demonstrate his exceptional qualities261. Violence was depicted as acceptable, as it 
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served to portray the domination of the hero against the villain, the win of the good against the 
bad.  
 Seen as an ultimate opportunity for bravery and exceptionalism, wars were presenting a 
chance for demonstrating personal qualities and superior military thought that was becoming 
more and more technological in nature. The invention of the catapult as a powerful tool in sieges 
and attacks of fortifications brought an undisputable advantage to one of the sides of the conflict. 
As a response to this new weapon, further advancements in weaponry also emerged. For 
instance, during the siege of Perinthus in 341 BC, the Macedonian king used archers with arrows 
positioned in higher than the catapults towers262. Later, soldiers throwing stones were also 
included in the campaigns during sieges. With these technological innovations, sieges have 
become complicated, costly and lengthy operations. While it was obvious that both sides of a 
conflict will compete about whose weapons are more effective and have higher destruction 
capability, it was in many times wit and resourcefulness that won battles, rather than the 
technology itself, even in these early centuries of traditional warfare. Among many others, one 
example of human wisdom defeating military technology is the one with Diognetus  the 
mili a  e gi ee  f Rh de . He ed Deme i  P li ce e  iege f Rh de   ith a 
more powerful machine, as one of his competitors - Callias offered, but with wit. It is reported 
ha  Di g e   he iege e gi e i  i  ack  b  di e i g a  e m  am  f a e , 
m d a d ef e  f he ci ; he machi e i  ca gh  i  he mi e 263.  
 In conclusion, most ancient societies skillfully employed deception techniques, espionage 
and counterespionage as conventional weapons in war. Slowly with time, even Romans started to 
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use deception in their battles as wars became more complicated and the competition between 
new technology, advanced strategic planning and cartography became fierce. Manipulation and 
coercion manifested themselves as standard practice in later periods. Moreover, the historical 
figures who used them actively in their political careers were among the most successful leaders, 
using their intellect to gain and retain power quickly and efficiently. 
 Development of cognitive threats in the Middle Centuries and in the two World Wars. 
One of the most significant changes in terms of military planning was that modern intelligence 
institutions have emerged in this period, as one of the first official heads of such office was 
Queen Eli abe h  Sec e a  f S a e  Sir Francis Walsingham264. Some authors share that it is 
even possible that the famous Cardinal Richelieu learned a lot from his predecessor about 
deception, political maneuvers, and intelligence265. There was a notable proliferation of Black 
Chambers across the European states as the need of intelligence, espionage and counterespionage 
grew exponentially. However, durable institutions engaged with collecting information over time 
both in war and in peace were absent. When the need arose, different political figures were 
tasked with intelligence gathering through their networks of spies, including diplomats, who had 
their own channels of information266. Diplomacy, at the time, did not have the dimensions it has 
nowadays, as ambassadors were acting merely as official spies rather than having a more 
independent role than this. Industrial changes brought new opportunities and challenges in 
military campaigns for which armies should have prepared - the need for timely and quality 
intelligence mainly regarding maps and railways. The first permanent intelligence structures 
were established in Britain and in America in the 1870s and 1880s, followed by the British 
                                                           
264 Michael Herman, "Diplomacy and intelligence," Diplomacy and statecraft 9, no. 2 (1998). 
265 International Spy Museum with Denis Collins, Spying the secret history of history (New York, NY: Black Dog & 
Leventhal, 2004). 




Secret Service Bureau conducting operations of espionage and counterespionage in 1909267. 
Among other technological innovations, the radio changed not only the everyday life of citizens 
but also military planning and the campaigns themselves. Radio channels also provided ways of 
intelligence gathering and deception at the same time. For instance, a captured soldier may have 
been kept alive if he had a radio station ensuring direct communication with the enemy through 
which deceiving information could be conveyed268. Aerial photography, and later satellite 
surveillance also quickly altered the dimensions of traditional warfare. If this innovation was 
used by one side in a conflict, then automatically, ways of deceiving the enemy through this 
technology were emerging. An instance of this is the British deception of Nazi bombers during 
World War II. The former hid their airfields, masking them as farms269. A similar strategy was 
also used for other targets of significance. It is not clear if technological development in these 
decades was driven by military needs only or the military needs changed as a consequence of the 
rapid technological developments. Therefore, it could be concluded that they were intertwined in 
a way that made a clear statement  technology changes intelligence, its sources, its goals and the 
how counterintelligence was conducted. In this case, would it be enough to gather information 
only by using the latest innovations in the world of technology? Machines were replacing agents 
and other personnel, doing their job faster and without the worries of possible errors. Why did 
then the traditional intelligence gathering kept relying on methods different than machines? 
Jame  Schle i ge , h  became a di ec  f he Ce al I ellige ce i  1973, aid: [ ]  
ca  h g a h a  i e i 270, implying that human intelligence and technical intelligence 
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could only be successful as long as they are complementary and not used independently. This 
became even more evident in World War II as the notion of total war needed total intelligence, 
 e ic ed  mili a  ma e ,  he ad e a  a  a h le a d all hi  a i al ca abili ie 271.  
 While significant, changes in the way military campaigns were conducted was not the 
only way in which cognitive threats evolved. Religion and culture were just as important as 
technological developments in these periods. The rapid technological developments, along with 
cha ge  i  h  li ical e  a  di ib ed b gh  di i  i  e le  e e f ide i . 
European countries that were behind others or felt like they were soon going to be behind felt 
insecure and started questioning their belonging to a particular social entity. As this was 
compensated with an attempt by politicians to bolster this sense of identity and unity, some states 
started to feel like they were not getting the necessary respect that its citizens thought they 
deserved. The most vivid example in this regard was Germany, but similar moods were also 
present in Slavic countries, Finns, and Magyars272. The industrial revolution was understood 
differently by people. The first notable crises in religion were in the sixteenth century, as it was 
starting to fail to respond to some questions that were gaining popularity among people273. The 
role of religion, at the time and further until the Industrial Revolution, was still sensible but 
slowly declining, giving room to blossoming ideologies in the 19th century that were more suited 
to explain the changes that were happening during this time. Lindemann274 outlines a few 
questions that were taking central place in public debates in Modern Europe. These questions 
demanded more specific answers than what religion was capable of providing. Thus, these 
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questions were the generator of the prolifera i  f ide l gie : he S cial Q e i  ( chi g  
such new ideologies as socialism and capitalism), the Woman Question (feminism, the changing 
status of women), the Irish Question (nationalism, racism, imperialism), the Jewish Question 
(antisemitism, Zionism), the German Question (nationalism, racism), and the Eastern Question 
(having to do with the fate of the Ottoman Empire, especially in the Balkans and the Middle 
Ea ) 275. It is argued that in times of uncertainty, people look to attach themselves to a collective 
entity that ensures proper confirmation of e  ide i . An amalgamation between religion and 
nationalist ideology is found to be particularly successful in reaffirming identities and providing 
ontological security in times of intensively changing environment276. As leaders found that 
ideology could be a mighty weapon in mobilizing people to do one thing or another, they started 
shaping ideologies as antidotes of other ideologies (e.g. communism as an antidote to 
capitalism). Part of this discourse were propaganda campaigns with the aim to convince people 
in the rightfulness of a particular ideology. In some cases, however, the propaganda went further 
than this and employed disinformation to a goal different than just attracting people to an idea. 
There are some examples of cognitive threats that aimed to convince people in the superiority of 
a particular ideology, but they needed more than just this. They wanted particular actions from 
the recipients of the disseminated messages  for instance overthrowing capitalist governments 
(communism) or provoking oppression or aggression to minority ethnic groups (nationalism).  
 Development of cognitive threats in the 21st century. The beginning of post-Modernism 
brought tremendous changes in the way people understand warfare. While cultural, religious and 
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social changes are still very important in this time period, the progress in technology was the 
most remarkable component in studying the evolution of cognitive threats in warfare.  
 Social media made a big step toward changing traditional perceptions about 
communication, interaction, and even politics and diplomacy. The high number of significant 
events whose beginning can be traced to a conversation or an initiative in social media is an 
example of how successful they were in connecting and uniting people, easily, quickly and 
effortlessly. The figure of the individual in political science and international studies gained new 
meaning as humans, and their collective actions in social media attracted the interest of many 
scholars. It was not only he a ici a  g ill  cha ge egime , licie  a d  ice 
concerns of social significance that brought them to social media. It was simply the addictiveness 
of the social media platforms that not only attracted but kept and gained even more users 
worldwide. The idea behind social networks was to create an interaction that resembles the 
features of a real face-to-face interaction  through emojis, likes, shares, tweets, and other 
reactions. Lured into this easy way of compensating for distance and lack of actual 
communication with friends, people started to share details of their lives with individuals with 
whom they would not even think about sharing in person. Users have known and still know very 
little about the huge amount of data that was gathered from them but not for them. Tired of 
lengthy legal notices online, users eagerly click agree to anything that could be on these forms. 
As a consequence of this and the fact that very little has been shared about what has been done 
with the collected information, users consent to participate in a game for which they do not know 
much. This could not be labeled literally as deception since the legal notices notified users for 
various things. Companies are aware that the vast amount of the users will not read what they 




instinctive human reactions to avoid reading pages of information that they find hard to 
de a d, c m a ie  killf ll  gai ed a legal a  f fi i g f m hei  e  i f ma i . 
As opposed to this, some actions of social networks were violating rules and laws, as it was in 
the case with Cambridge Analytica, which will be explored in detail in Chapter 3. 
  The new social setting gave birth also to new conflicts and diplomacy-making. While 
both could come from public figures, most voices in these conversations were anonymous which 
made traditional understanding of warfare and negotiations disrupted and unclear. In the era of 
Modernism, diplomacy was a more secretive enterprise involving meetings at undisclosed 
publicly locations between representatives of different governments. Social media changed all 
hi , a  he e i e ce  became le  i a e a d lic -oriented and more public and 
e f ma i e 277. In practice, it was the loudest voice that mattered, rather than the voice stating 
the more solid argument. Quantity replaced quality in the online conversations whose main value 
was the attraction of attention rather than statements supported by proven facts. One of the 
mechanisms for spreading a message was through like-minded people who, due to their 
confirmation biases, agreed and shared rapidly the content online very often without even 
questioning the source or the truthfulness of the message. In the classical antiquity, Renaissance 
and early Modernism, the personality behind the message mattered, as reliability was mostly 
determined by the status of the person delivering the information. Commanders, rulers. and 
people of power shared information that was rarely doubted. However, even in these periods, 
with the creation of deception and disinformation as a military strategy tool, it became evident 
that a story that is confirmed by various sources should be accepted as true. As the power 
dynamics shifted and the world transitioned into democratic forms of government, the voice of 
                                                           




the citizens started to matter more. With social networks, the personality of the messenger 
became even more loosely associated with the reliability of the message, also because in many 
cases there was very little known about the author. Moreover, many people who use social 
networks for entertainment and communication are still not fully aware that unknowingly and 
inevitably they are part of a much bigger picture  of conflicts, of corporate interests, money, and 
power. 
 One of the most remarkable advancements in technology that reflected directly on many 
areas of human life are the neural networks. Simply put, they represent a different kind of 
computers that do not rely on a simple mathematical rule to make deductions but use complex 
systems of information that build connections between each other and are based on recognition 
rather than on a specific command. In many ways, these neural networks are supposed to imitate 
a human brain, as it was claimed years ago that machines would never be able to think on their 
own unless they start learning. That possibility is no longer theoretical as neural networks keep 
evolving in ways that are closer and closer to how human brains function. Among the numerous 
applications of neural networks that are beneficial to society (e.g., in medicine, predicting the 
weather and financial trends), neural networks started to get utilized in many other ways that are 
nowadays considered, controversial, the least.  
 Interestingly, as social networks took a central place in social life and modern warfare, 
the role of the users in these networks also changed dramatically. They intended to contribute 
content, exchange thoughts, and other information have transformed partially into observers of 
interactions between trolls, bots, chat-bots and other advanced algorithms meant to simulate 
human online activity278. The e e al e k  mai  a k i   make edic i . While hei  





application was oriented to helping people, the users turned out to be the study subjects of neural 
networks and AI technologies. This, by itself, does not necessarily entail adverse consequences. 
However, in the post-modern era in which corporations with practically unlimited capabilities 
were proliferating, money and power have become even more central. The means of obtaining 
them in a time period in which democracies are accepted as the predominant political model in 
the world is to simply control the demos (the population). Admitting to openly controlling a 
population would contradict the principles of freedom of thought and speech in democracies. 
Regardless, machine learning and AI made it possible that people give in the control over their 
own cognition to others, unknowingly sharing information about every corner of their minds. 
What is more problematic is that social media is just one part of the problem. It is also the easy 
access to tracking the digital moves of people, that helps corporations and governments collect 
so much data. Moreover, technological developments have a very important quality  they are 
irreversible. Once they emerge and begin being used, there is no way of forgetting about them. 
Even with nuclear weapons and years of international treaties and negotiations, they still exist, 
and their creation cannot be undone. The possibility that they are used will always be there. 
 Another technological development threatening to bring new meaning to warfare is the 
so-called deepfake software. What this software does is manipulating video and audio content. 
Thus, the face and the voice of a celebrity or a public figure can be adjusted in a way in which 
actions, statements, and expressions appear to come from them. An old predecessor of the 
deepfake content was the Photoshop software, which started being used to manipulate pictures to 
deceive people and institutions to which they were presented. The more advanced the 
technologies become, the more real their products look like. Furthermore, while such 




organizations, governments, or super-empowered individuals, specialists predict that these 
techniques will rapidly become more accessible to different actors with various goals, some of 
which harmful to society279. Strategic analyses outline trends that could create favorable 
conditions for the implementation and the intensive use of AI and cognitive threats  a fact that 
makes it an even more serious threat to society in the future280. First, in the political realm, 
changes are expected in terms of the increasing role of non-state actors, power-politics, and 
distribution of power in the international system. Among the most important elements of some 
cognitive threats is also the increasing public discontent with how power is distributed and is 
being exercised. As for changes expected with human capital, growing urbanization, the 
polarization of societies, and human networking will also create an environment for cognitive 
threats. In the area of economics and innovations, the dependence on technology and the 
expanding inequality (including gender inequality) is likely to make populations vulnerable to 
tools of psychological warfare and manipulations.  
 All of these conclusions led to several points of consideration. Singer and Brooking281 
de li e ha   ha  i e e  ha  c e ed a lace i  e le  e e da  life, i  ill c i e 
to be present and will even expand its meaning further. Next, they confirm that the cyberspace is 
an arena for battles, information is a weapon and should be carefully thought about in such way. 
Participants in these battles are users of technologies, regardless if they consider themselves as 
participants or have unknowingly become such. That said, governments should urgently adopt 
new approaches to fight any harmful practices employed in the cyberspace. Thus, it is crucial 
that users have literacy and are educated about the multitude of ways their information can be 
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used, and the purpose and the meaning of this use. It should be recognized that efforts at the 
governmental level are not going to be sufficient to combat the problem. Technological giants in 
he i d  h ld a me e ibili  f  hei  ac i  i ce m  f e le  e e da  life i  
linked to the use of the internet and technology in general. Presented as sources of entertainment, 
communication channels, and a non-political space, owners of social network companies can no 
longer pretend that their products do not have other applicability and goals. Before all, these 
companies are established to make profits, and such are provided through a variety of ways that 
obscure the idea of their neutral nature. Bots taking over Twitter, examples of hate speech 
remaining unpunished on Facebook are just a few examples of why cognitive threats have 
become so prevalent. Bots create conversations and provoke people to be more active online 
which increases the popularity and the attention to Twitter. At the same time, Facebook was 
incapable of imposing rules condoning hate speech and offensive behavior online. The number 
and the popularity of some of the users were just as valuable as money for the company since the 
former, in no small part, ensures the influx of financial profits. As any other entity that has 
influence over a large number of people, social media quickly became a means to achieving 
certain political goals by actors. They used this space to quickly and effectively disseminate 
disinformation or to impose targeted political advertisements, both of which for the purpose of 
tailoring public opinion in a way favorable to the perpetrators, thus violating the democratic 
process.  
 
The fight against cognitive threats  
 Cognitive threats are a very specific category of military and political challenges that 




are not material, in the first place. Thus, it is difficult to know exactly when they reach the 
victims and the extent to which they will be harmed. In many cases, it is also unclear how the 
damage will be manifested and when. Some of these questions are relevant to other, traditional, 
material types of threats, for instance, a nuclear threat but science has good answers about the 
predicted effect of these threats. However, similar to them, cognitive threats do not have a 
history of being successfully fought once the attack is launched. Regardless, there were many 
attempts over the years to combat cognitive threats, even nowadays. These attempts are mostly 
two main types  directly fighting cognitive threats that transformed into successful attacks, as 
the process of conveying the manipulative information is accomplished already, and prevention 
and deterrence  seeking to convince the party responsible for the cognitive threat that the costs 
of launching it outweigh the benefits. Psychological mechanisms, increasing the number of 
personnel and their preparation, educating users, implementing new secure devices, new 
software and policies were implemented to counter the detrimental impact of cognitive threats. In 
order to answer the question to what extent these measures were and are currently successful, in 
the following sections I will provide an overview of the tools used to counter four of the most 
common types of cognitive threats that I previously mentioned: 1) traditional intelligence 
gathering and persuasion through deception, 2) disinformation, 3) recruitment practices through 
cognitive manipulations, and 4) collection and exploitation of information for political gains by 
companies and even governments (e.g., China).  
 Traditional intelligence gathering and deception is probably the oldest type of cognitive 
threats in human history. As mentioned previously, some societies were reluctant to use them in 
warfare initially, such as the Romans, but later this changed as this turned out to be a war tool 




expensive and complicated machines which could be destroyed with a simple trick of the mind. 
The most common scenario in which cognitive threats were present in the classical antiquity is 
the one related to fake deserters who gathered information and then reported back to their 
command. At the time, the mechanisms that were used to prevent the flow of information to the 
e em  cam  e e mainly the experience with previously known cases of fake deserters and the 
awareness this brought to future cases. Commanders, politicians, military strategists started 
becoming more suspicious of newcomers and strangers and the information they were sharing. 
However, the complete isolation from contacts with newcomers or outsiders was impossible for 
many reasons including the need for merchandise, especially in wartime. Thus, the previous 
experience with deceptive practices, the awareness that it may happen in the future and the 
lessons that were learned were the primary weapons against such threats. This, however, was not 
in any way a guarantee that they will not happen again. Furthermore, if the very same deception 
that was used before in similar circumstances occurred again, there was no guarantee that it 
would have been caught even though leaders were aware of similar cases in the past. Captured 
spies, especially such from a perceived as friendly, state, were punished severely and the 
relationship between the former allies quickly became strenuous. Knowing the possible 
consequences of spies being caught, states were sometimes reluctant to proceed with their 
actions, especially if there was a risk of starting a war for which they were not prepared or an end 
of a diplomatic relationship that was otherwise beneficial in economic and political regard. In a 
very elementary form, deterrence against deception emerged as countries were sometimes not 
ready to pay the high price of a captured spy or an exposed deception that could be linked to 




 Further, in the Renaissance and in the early Modernism, the art of torturing and 
questioning, especially in the era of powerful monarchies was proliferating. A wide range of 
methods of obtaining information was used. Despite the elaborate mechanisms of making people 
report information of interest, in many cases, physical tortures made the prisoners more likely to 
deliver information that the torturers wanted to hear, rather than the truth. Torturing also became 
a powerful method for political retaliation thus information gathering did not always deliver the 
expected results. Monarchical societies after the end of the classical antiquities were more 
structured  farm workers had their own social circles, royals, and people of noble origin who 
were typically present in the court and had their own community. The lower class had no access 
to the elite, as the only exception were the merchants depending on their status. The wealthier 
and more prestigious merchants had access to court, and the poorer ones were selling their 
products and services to the lower class outside of the court. Even with these social divisions, 
however, it was difficult to know every single person who resided in the court since the servants 
taking care of the nobles were changing frequently. The sanctions for treason and espionage was, 
similar to the previous era  death. Even with the prospect of such punishment, a large number of 
people were ready to use deception and manipulation to obtain information for the highest bidder 
who will ensure money, power or both. Hence, the increased level of security and the relative 
isolation from other circles of the society were not sufficient. Without any doubt, such measures 
were contributing to some extent to prevent cognitive threats, but at the same time, they just 
made manipulations and deceptions more elaborate and thus frequently successful.  
 In the era of the Renaissance and the Modernism, the possibility of war and an end to 
diplomatic relationships with countries whose spies were caught, and their plans exposed also 




antiquity, economic dependence was present and was a powerful reason not to risk war or 
sanctions with a friendly or even an antagonistic country. The fear of lengthy and extremely 
painful tortures in cases of exposure of the agent was also a significant deterrent for the lack of 
involvement in such missions. It has to be mentioned that religion was still very important 
component in these societies. The loyalty to the monarch, whose figure was directly connected to 
he idea f G d  e e e a i e  Ea h, a  al  m i a i  f  ab ai i g f m i g a d 
deception against the crown. Loyalty, patriotism, and religious piety, at least partially, served as 
a barrier to actions involving cognitive threats. Interestingly, sometimes the same political and 
religious reasons served to encourage deceptive actions in support of the monarch. For others, 
however, money and power were a much more important priority, which is also the most 
important reason why even considering these deterrents, cognitive threats were still very 
common and once triggered were difficult to be prevented, and their effect reversed. That said 
the fight against cognitive threats was not delivering the expected results unless it was caught in 
time before it triggers a particular behavior from the recipient. Once the behavior, goal of the 
cognitive threat, was present, its mission was accomplished, and it could no longer be prevented. 
A very bright example in this regard is Lord Walsingham and his intention to do everything 
possible to protect the reign of Elizabeth I from her cousin Mary Queen of Scotts. Walsingham 
tricked the Catholic queen in exile to get involved in an assassination plot against Elizabeth. At 
the time, even though Mary was a threat to her throne and her lands, Elizabeth I was reluctant to 
sentence her cousin to death. Aware of these sentiments, Walsingham deceived Mary to consent 
to an assassination plot against Elizabeth. The proof of her involvement was still not enough for 




assassination with the idea to make her afraid for her life and reign282. Af e  Wal i gham  
skillful portrayal of Elizabeth being surrounded by Catholic enemies and traitors, she finally 
c e ed  Ma  e ec i 283.  
 Further, during the Cold War concerns about breaking diplomatic ties was not an issue 
since the world was bipolar at the time and the connections between the two camps were already 
broken. Economic dependency was only present in countries who were satellites either of the 
West or the Communist bloc, and they were reliant mostly on their patrons. Security measures 
were increased, espionage and counterespionage, deception techniques and intelligence gathering 
were proliferating. At the same time, connections of people from either the West or the 
Communist bloc with individuals from the opposite side was considered ideological betrayal and 
was thus severely repressed. It is paradoxical how in such isolation between the two camps, so 
much traditional espionage and deception was still taking place despite the highly limited 
interaction between people supporting different ideologies. The political conditions created a 
favorable environment for cognitive threats. Severe punishments including death were not 
enough to prevent agents from executing cognitive operations against their own countries. As 
opposed to nuclear threats whose detrimental effect both sides realized, cognitive threats were 
perceived as quite common weapon in warfare at the time. Moreover, since diplomatic relations 
were not a concern, states invested large amount of resources in expanding the espionage and 
counterespionage units. Deception gained new dimensions, and such operations became much 
more elaborate than in previous years. In fact, the ideological competition at the time was so 
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intense that many argue that the Cold War a  m e a ba le f  e le  mi d  ha  a hi g 
else284 285.  
 The end of the Cold War and the new technological society in the 21st century marked a 
new chapter in the history of cognitive threats. Much has changed since previous historical 
periods. First, most of the states are now democratic rather than autocratic even though some 
examples with authoritarian countries show how cognitive threats thrive there as well. Second, 
diplomatic and economic connections have uttermost importance in a globalized world in which 
war is a costly endeavor that the liberal world seeks to avoid at all cost. Third, globalization in its 
social, technological and educational aspects brought people closer than ever, even if only to be 
able to argue with each other. Fourth, except for a few instances with increased border control 
and immigration opposition, in comparison to previous eras, isolation of societies from outsiders 
was not so inherent for the 21st century. Instead, the liberal order seeks to remove borders, create 
a sense of common identity and bolster equality between people. Wars are far from being an 
extinct phenomenon, however. They just gained different dimensions in terms of the actors 
involved in them and the entities between which they are led. In this post-modern background, 
traditional human espionage through deception has a decreased role. In spite of this, it is still 
present. Mainly its underestimated role in a world governed by technologies brings back some of 
the simple deception techniques of the past  the figure of the spy deceiving an individual to 
obtain information about the enemy, both in the physical and in the cyberspace. Countries still 
maintain their intelligence gathering units and are aware of possible deception operations. 
Regardless, they know that they are rare because the price if a spy gets caught is higher than ever 
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nowadays. Instead, security measures in terms of training of personnel are adopted in addition to 
efficient cybersecurity practices. Such mechanisms are not preventing cognitive threats 
altogether but just increasing the costs of an eventual attack by enemies in terms of time, strategy 
and resources. Furthermore, if exposed, the identity of an agent in the physical space could 
quickly be linked to working for their country of origin as this could create a series of diplomatic 
problems. Thus, a preferred way for conducting cognitive warfare is in the cyberspace where the 
identity of the perpetrator could remain unknown. Among other strategies for deterrence, 
adopting general international agreements and regulations decreases the chance of cognitive 
threats since they imply free will and voluntary binding. Moreover, the idea of international 
society where negotiations and persuasion will occur openly and in a direct manner makes 
deceptive operations without much meaning. The world in the 21st century, while resembling 
some features of international society, still has a long way to go to fully implement the ideals 
proclaimed by the liberal order. Thus, traditional wars still exist but so do unorthodox ones. 
Democracies are the prevalent form of governance, but autocracies still exist as well. In this 
sense, a transition to the end of history286 but not an arrival to this state still grants many 
opportunities for non-traditional warfare, and cognitive campaigns as being the most successful 
of them.  
 Disinformation. Although the importance of disinformation was recognized early in the 
classical antiquity period, it went through a fascinating transformation over the ages, mostly 
driven by the political, technological and social conditions. Feeding the enemy with 
disinformation was established as a very successful strategy in the early centuries. It was not 
unproblematic as it seems at first glance. In order to be believable, the person conveying the 
                                                           




information has to be trusted or at least not distrusted. Second, the information should be tailored 
in a way that would be believed by the recipient. Along with these complications, the fear of 
exposure, the punishment and the consequences of a revealed disinformation plan also made 
disinformation in the early centuries a useful practice but not ideal as its cost was too high 
sometimes. There were some measures that ancient leaders were using to identify disinformation, 
such as checking the information provided by one source and comparing it to other accounts of 
the same event. While practical, this strategy does not come without some limitations. To 
attempt to verify a piece of information, first, there should be a suspicion that it could be 
possibly untrue. Second, there should be more than just one source available to verify the 
original story. Third, there should be enough time for this investigation to be conducted and such 
time was rarely available in wartime periods. Directly fighting disinformation was not always 
possible because of the reasons I outlined, and deterrence had a relatively limited effect because 
of two main reasons. First, war was accepted as a common phenomenon and moreover, one that 
was inherent and even a desired option rather than a last resort. Second, there was a lack of 
strong diplomatic and economic ties between the entities at the time.  
 In the Renaissance and the early Modernism, disinformation was also present but again  
with limited use in an era with strong monarchies linked to the powerful role of religion. The 
application of disinformation was present mostly in military campaigns and political 
maneuvering. While for agents without established links to the crown, exposed disinformation 
was not necessarily destined to begin a war, for such who were spies of the crown or people in 
official positions serving the crown, war was a possible option. However, in comparison to the 
previous era, diplomacy was more common through marriages, the role of ambassadors and 




countries had other concerns that were consuming significant resources and were thus trying to 
avoid wars and retaliated similarly  with covert actions seeking to destabilize the enemy. It is 
important to be noted that disinformation used not against a foreign country but against a 
c  e le as not common  monarchs had on their side religion and tremendous power 
concentrated in their hands and did not find disinformation of significance in domestic affairs.  
 The World Wars changed the role of disinformation as it gained a central place in 
espionage. Public opinion started to matter more than in previous centuries, and wars had to be 
justified in order to prevent rebellions and other disruptions in the regime as a consequence of 
the decision to go to war. One of the most efficient ways of convincing people of the need for 
war and other extreme measures became propaganda and in some cases disinformation. As 
previously described, the Cold War was the era with blossoming techniques of deception and 
disinformation as diplomatic relations carried little significance to the two blocs. Even 
relationships between allies in the West were sometimes full of suspicion and mistrust. The 
central priority of the time  avoidance of nuclear war and winning the ideological battle made 
disinformation an acceptable tactic that was not threatening to escalate the tension created by the 
fierce competition.  
 In the 21st century, disinformation became a regular practice and was thus recognized as a 
serious problem that has to be addressed. In comparison to other cognitive threats, 
disinformation is the most frequently used, because of the little resources (time and human 
capital) that are invested in producing the intended results. Much has been written on the 
mechanisms that disinformation uses to persuade its addressees. Less in number are the works 
dedicated to battling it. That could be attributed to the quick and easy ways of adjusting 




news is shut down, it could be replaced within minutes with dozens of new websites that have 
the same mission.  
 Efforts are made to combat disinformation operations, but so far there is no ultimate 
solution to the issue. Some of the tactics recommended for dealing with this threat include the 
role of the military, education practices, and legislation. Among the strongest arguments for the 
active role of the military are the ones that underline that information operations typically come 
from military units and should be combatted with such, in response287. For instance, one 
successful anti-disinformation campaign was led by the Active Measures Working Group of the 
1980s288. Another measure that could be employed in the fight with disinformation is education. 
Literature shows that social networks are an excellent example of echo chambers in which 
various like-minded users seemingly agree with each other, but in fact, they only confirm their 
own opinion on a particular question. As users do this, they reaffirm their own stance and avoid 
information that contradicts their convictions  a psychological mechanism that is well described 
in the literature. It is argued that in the digital era, education about information, computers, and 
the Internet is what literacy meant for society in previous time periods289. Oliver Batchelor290 
suggests that librarians and fact-checking services online are crucial in fighting disinformation. 
However, there are various problems with fact-checking as a useful strategy in this regard  one 
d  f T i e  c e a i  h ed ha  i  lag  behi d misinformation both in terms of 
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overall reach and of sheer response time there is a delay of approximately 13h between the 
c m i  f fake e  ie  a d ha  f i  e ifica i 291.  
 Some computer and social scientists devote their attention to solutions to the problem that 
are more technical. A research team developed an algorithm for detecting hoaxes on Facebook 
based on the people who like the posts292. While such detection mechanism is undoubtedly 
valuable, even if Facebook has information about accounts disseminating disinformation, the 
administrators may still not delete them because of two main reasons  corporate interests and 
the right of free speech both in the physical and in the online space. As for the first, some authors 
write that social media companies should be regulated and held accountable as traditional media 
companies293. In terms of the second consideration, most democratic countries treasure the right 
of free speech as essential, and any restrictions to it should be justified. For instance, in the U.S., 
the First Amendment could be suppressed in light of some cases involving defamation. In 
addition, in speech acts that involve threats of violence or represent hate speech, the right of free 
speech could also reach its boundaries. Even if successful in the long run, such lawsuits could be 
not only expensive but also very time-consuming. As a consequence, the recipients of the false 
information may have already manifested some behavior that was intended by the entity 
spreading the false statements  a fact that no sentence can repair. Such considerations, however, 
deserve to be discussed seriously with another purpose  future deterrence - since disinformation 
harms the very idea of the First Amendment which is the autonomy of thoughts, attitude, and 
behavior. Ma c J a ha  Bli   hi  i  de li i g ha  he  he li e e  i  
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deceived by false speech, she is doing something that autonomous and rational people never 
want to do: build their actions upon confidence in false factual premises. Moreover, where these 
false factual premises are fed to her by a speaker who uses them to steer her in ways she would 
never move herself, her autonomy is not only left unsupported, it is undermined, making the 
listener a tool of the speaker rather than an agent forming and acting on her own rational 
deci i 294. 
 Recruitment practices through cognitive manipulations. One of the most dangerous 
cognitive threats is the one used to recruit people for certain political movements through 
appealing to their ideals. While not all recruitments for organizations and movements are defined 
as threats, the ones who recruit people to use them for political causes that involve violence, or 
prohibited coercion of any kind could be definitely labeled as a threat. The mere fact that the 
recruiter knows that the recruited will be used as pawns to achieve the goal of the recruiter is 
sufficient such practices to be defined as threats  for the recruited person and for the entity to 
which harm will be inflicted. In the early centuries, the discontent of the people was skillfully 
used as a mobilizing method of the masses. Discontent alone was not enough, however, if there 
was no ideal for whose name the future actions will be initiated. In this kind of cognitive threat, 
the personalities of the target group members and of the person, who is doing the persuasion 
mattered and still matter a lot  from the early centuries to nowadays. In all cases, for a 
successful persuasion campaign, there should be an echo-chamber with like-minded individuals 
who are dissatisfied by an existing fact that they want to change, and they share the same ideals 
that will be represented in a new status-quo after the previous one ceases to exist. The campaign 
will not succeed without a motivated and gifted messenger who motivates the target audience to 
                                                           




undertake a certain behavior. In the early centuries, in order to fight such recruitment practices, it 
was sufficient that the leader of the movement seeking participants, gets discredited. This was 
not problematic considering that much of the power was concentrated in the hands of the rulers 
and they could incriminate anyone who is trying to dismantle the regime, as long as they have 
knowledge of the movement planning a rebellion. The channels of disseminating a message to 
potential participants in the movement were also very limited. They included mostly physical 
presence at the time of the speech. Such gatherings of people, however, were closely monitored 
by authorities and their leader usually imprisoned, if caught.  
 In the Renaissance and in the Modernism, the powerful meaning of ideals and identity 
became even more important. The channels for disseminating messages for recruitment increased 
in number. One of the weapons for fighting such practices was again the elimination of the 
leader. In addition to this, the Black Chambers added new nuances in the fight against cognitive 
threats in terms of recruiting. Messages were caught, rewritten, resealed and resend back to the 
recipients. Black Chambers caught conspiracies and exposed plots against regimes. Some 
monarchs and nobles used fabricated evidence of allegiance to rebel movements to eliminate 
political adversaries, as was the case with Mary Queen of Scotts and her perceived involvement 
in the Babington Plot.   
 In the era of democratic regimes, cognitive threats for recruiting participants in radical 
movements gained new meaning. While old radical formations aiming to achieve state 
independence and/or recognition were still present, religion and ideologies gave rise to new 
movements, new goals and new type of recruitment strategies with the emergence of social 
networks. The most vivid example of such recruiting practices is the Islamic State of Iraq and 




message but instead, they used it as a central arena for conducting their information operations. 
Numerous studies explored the reasons why ISIS was so successful in recruiting new members. 
Among the most important ones are economic reasons, including unemployment, discrimination, 
a perceived violation of rights, including religious customs and traditions, adventure seeking, 
fame, depression, emotional isolation, confusion, loneliness, and others295 296 297 298 299. In most, 
if not all cases, multiple factors were present in a decision to join ISIS. As some of them are 
micro-level and other macro-level components, they are difficult to be addressed 
comprehensively. Societal phenomena such as racial discrimination and government policies 
prohibiting displays of religious symbols were also not helping in the fight with cognitive threats 
of this kind. It is true that traditional intelligence gathering was successful in terminating some 
efforts for online recruitment, but in general, the anonymity, the easy access and the speed of 
exchanging information were defeating the intelligence gathering agencies in their attempt to 
prevent recruitment. Detection of all online communication, while practiced in some cases, is 
still not accepted as a lawful measure against possible recruitment. In fact, as in the case with 
disinformation, any restrictions imposed on the right of free speech (and by extension the free 
communication), unless specifically proclaimed as illegal, would be a violation of the First 
Amendment. 
 Collection and dissemination of information by companies and governments. Back in 
the early centuries, information had a tremendous value that was recognized. The information 
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about people of interest was also important. Information about regular people was not so valued, 
however, because they had little power to endanger the status-quo. The  e e he le  
subjects, and their voice did not matter as much as in the following historical periods. In the 
Renaissance and in the Modernism, the collective opinion of the regular people still did not 
matter as much as it does in the democratic era. It could be said that the collection and 
dissemination of information by companies and governments is a phenomenon of the Post-
Modernism. The Internet and social media along with the growing need to have an accurate 
perception of the political and cultural views of different social groups led to this new type of 
cognitive threat. Despite the fact that in the 21st century most political regimes are democratic, 
some remain authoritarian. Even in authoritarian countries nowadays, the collection of 
information plays a tremendous role  not for purposes of altering the status-quo, but for 
maintaining it. For instance, the Chinese government collects information from its citizens to 
construct profiles for them in an attempt to measure their loyalty to the regime. Based on their 
individual score, they obtain some privileges or lose them. The construction of the profiles 
happens through the collection of information from the Chinese social media monopolist  
WeChat. Since it combines a multitude of functions available to its users, it also offers the 
government quick and easy access to numerous spheres of the private life of its citizens. Unlike 
the goals pursued by companies and governments in democracies, the target of the Chinese 
government is to retain control over its population, preserve the status-quo, and motivate its 
citizens to be obedient  he egime  al e  a d i i ie .  
 In democratic countries, the goal of collecting information from the users is a more 
complex phenomenon. First, very often the users do not know that they are being surveilled and 




platforms and Internet of Things (IoT) devices is to sell the information to interested parties that 
will then convey messages to targeted groups. The aim of the delivered message is to manipulate 
people to undertake certain actions or abstain from such. The mechanisms through which the 
manipulation is executed is psychological in nature  through the exploitation of cognitive 
vulnerabilities of the human mind. In authoritarian countries, the regime does not hide the close 
observance of its people and their private information because they have little power to protest 
this action. Contrary to this practice, in democracies, companies, politicians and organizations, 
while having enormous power concentrated in their hands, are still liable to lawsuits, protests, or 
missing election or re-election opportunities. Thus, the collection and dissemination of personal 
information of users is a covert operation that in many cases is either on the borderline of being 
illegal or is simply illegal. Interestingly, even if users are presented with a statement announcing 
how their information will be used, they never have the option to continue using the social 
platform without having to authorize their information to be used in the way described in the 
statement. Consequently, the addictive nature of social media including peer pressure and 
suppressing concerns about privacy make users more inclined to share their personal 
information. One study found that if it i  ge e l  ided, limi i g i ac  efe e ce  a e 
hardly used; only a small number of members change the default privacy preferences, which are 
e   ma imi e he i ibili  f e  file 300. In addition to this, the literature on privacy in 
social media c fi m  ha  cial e gi ee i g i  a ell-known practice in computer security to 
b ai  c fide ial i f ma i  b  ma i la i g legi ima e e 301.  
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 Similar to disinformation, this type of cognitive threat is also combatted through three 
different methods  educational, technical and legal302. The first one is intended to limit the 
amount of information that users share voluntarily on social media, the second seeks to 
encourage social media themselves to give their users more control over their own information 
online, and the third mechanism pertains to legislative solutions to the subject matter. The first 
two are in direct conflict with the need of individuals to share information and the need to make 
it visible. The third mechanism is in nature deterring than confronting an already emerged 
problem. While education and technical solutions are helpful, if the entire issue of stealing 
personal information is not addressed, social media will keep collecting and selling data to 
interested parties as long as users post it. Moreover, educating users about the risks of sharing 
personal information cannot guarantee sharing will not occur since it is, after all, a personal 
choice. As for companies forced to provide more freedom to users to control their accounts and 
the access to them there are two relevant factors. On the one hand, companies are not interested 
in doing so because if the sharing goes down so will their profits, and on the other, even if users 
are given more freedom to control how their information is seen and used, this does not mean 
that they will exercise their newly gained rights. The latter is confirmed by a study on Facebook 
e  e f i ac  e i g 303 that showed that 80% of the participants know that they could 
use privacy setting and gain better control over the information and yet only 40% of them 
decided to take advantage of this feature. As similar results were demonstrated by other studies, 
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e ea che  c cl ded ha  he g a ifica i  f i g Faceb k end to outweigh the perceived 
h ea   i ac 304.  
 This chapter outlined various mechanisms for intelligence-gathering, deception and 
persuasion. All of them continued their existence in later historical periods, but within different 
conditions, some of which facilitated the proliferation of cognitive threats even more. Deception 
by infiltrating a particular group through a shared identity, known in the early ages through the 
cases of fake deserters, still exist nowadays in the form of traditional espionage and even through 
social media posts that are not shared by an individual but an entity with political interests, 
disguised as a person. As an antidote to disinformation, much like in the antiquity, fact-checking 
is still an available tool to people but difficult to be used  in the past, because of the lack of 
sources, and in present days, because of the presence of too many sources. The medieval 
informants offering their persuasion and intelligence-gathering skills for remuneration and power 
resemble closely the companies hired by politicians to collect intelligence to profile and then 
influence voters. The role of women also grew gradually through the ages as it is preserved 
nowadays through the presence of many female spies, and many female recruiters and 
influencers. Once difficult, falsification of official documents and correspondence became easy 
with the creation of black chambers and even easier with the digitalization and transparency of 
information in democratic countries. The digital information was manipulated and distributed 
even faster than in the black chambers due to technological innovations and democratization. In 
the post-modernism, the distribution of power was increasingly in the hands of the individuals, 
part of a democratic political entity. The lack of established diplomatic relations between 
countries, laws and regulations governing those between state and non-state entities and 
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individuals made deterrence tactics weaker in previous historical periods but a stronger 
opportunity in present days. Innovations were growing in number but so are threats as well. The 
high cost of wars made entities reluctant to pursue this option and turned to something that 
remained mostly unregulated by states as a battlefield  the human mind. The only possible way 
for cognitive threats to fail was for the perpetrator to discontinue pursuing them, or the victim, 
being aware of the threat, to catch them in time, before any harmful consequences appear. Is this 
possible to be achieved? In the next chapter, I explore four case studies with cognitive threats in 
an effort to outline the reasons for their success. Then, in Chapter 5, I propose strategies to 






 THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE COGNITIVE APOCALYPSE 
 
Stories about cognitive threats 
In this section, I will present four case studies that will help tailor a strategy for 
countering cognitive threats in the 21st century. The selection of these cases was made on the 
principle of their notoriety in media and in the scholarship, and their recognition by both fields as 
a serious problem that has to be addressed. In addition, newer cases were preferred over older 
ones, as brief overviews of the latter are an integral part of the context of the former. I chose four 
case studies from the past ten years (2009-2019) that all share the main characteristics of  
cognitive threats and yet, they are different because they were executed in variety of ways. Their 
divergent characteristics will be elucidated through the case studies as this will contribute to a 
more detailed strategy that covers more than just one type of cognitive threats. All case studies 
represent attacks against individuals primarily. On a broader level, through such persuasion 
tactics used against individuals, these attacks aim to disrupt state and non-state entities as targets 
as well. The case studies do not focus only on one country but strive to exemplify the diversity of 
affected parties. The only exception is the traditional espionage case that was solely directed 
toward the U.S. and other U.S. non-state actors. This case was nevertheless chosen despite the 
fact that represents a threat against only one state and its non-state actors because the nature of 
this kind of espionage imposes a limit of the potential actors against which it could be exercised. 
Regardless, it is an important cognitive threat that has to be analyzed as it is also one of the 




In the literature, the type of cognitive threats that enjoys most of the scholarly attention is 
disinformation and the recruitment of people for radical organizations. However, as described 
previously, the deterrence techniques aimed to eliminate these threats are so far with limited 
success. While disinformation is an important cognitive threat, it is not the only one. Much less 
attention is paid to the oldest type of cognitive threats  the one involving espionage, 
conspiracies, and manipulations, as well as to the newest cognitive threat  stealing personal 
information and treating it as a tradable product. A product used as a weapon for persuasion.  
In Chapter 3, I present the cases of Maria Butina, Russian disinformation, ISIS 
recruitment, and Cambridge Analytica as they were described by the media, state agencies, and 
the scholarship. This I do to introduce the cluster of facts that comprise them and to explore their 
impact on what happened. I begin every case study with background information that will place a 
particular case in a context hence connecting it to other similar cases and underlining the 
continuity in the history of cognitive threats. Further, I make an overview of the case as it was 
reported by a number of resources, both private and state ones. Next, I track what measures were 
undertaken against this threat and how the cases developed further after the damages were 
inflicted.  
 
The case with Maria Butina 
Background. On July 15, 2018, Maria Butina was arrested in Washington, DC on 
allegations of being a Russian spy. In December 2018, she pleaded guilty on charges of 
conspiracy to act as an agent of the Russian Federation without prior notification to the Attorney 
General305. She admitted she conspired together with Alexander Torshin, her political mentor, 
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and her boyfriend Paul Erickson, a gun activist with close ties to National Rifle Association 
(NRA). B i a  alleged ha dler in Russia  Alexander Torshin, who was not named in most of 
he c  d c me   B i a  ca e became a e  f i e e  of the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury even before her arrest. O  A il 6, 2018, he U.S. De a me  f T ea  Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Torshin as one of the Russian government officials 
agai  h m he U.S. ad ed a c i  h gh he C e i g Ame ica  Ad e a ie  
Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)306. On February 7, 2019, Paul Erickson was indicted by a 
federal grand jury for money laundering and wire fraud307. While these charges were not directly 
ela ed  B i a  c i ac  ca e, i  a  e ide  ha  she had some role in his allegations as 
well as he had in hers.  
While this case may seem shocking for the 21st century where everything is digital, 
anonymous and the attribution dilemma makes it easy for attackers to hide their actions, it was 
not even the first case of this kind in the past 20 years. In fact, in 2010, an operation called the 
Illegal  P g am  c ncluded with the arrest of ten individuals accused of being unregistered 
agents of the Russian Federation308. These Russian undercover operatives called illegals e  
time sometimes for an extended period living in the target environment and becoming 
accustomed to their new surroundings, testing their new identities, and perfecting cover stories. 
This time helped them melt into the background and ensure that they could perform their 
i ellige ce mi i  i h  ai i g ici . The  f he  legali ed  hemselves by receiving 
local identification documents, obtaining local employment, and stabilizing their living 
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i a i 309. Then the actual collection of intelligence began, as they regularly conveyed it to 
hei  R ia  ha dle  h gh i ele  h  to pair directly with another laptop and 
communicate information point-to- i  a d ega g a h   hide e i i e da a 
i c ic l  i  digi al image 310. Among the intelligence gathering tasks, other missions 
assigned by the Russian officials also included sabotage operations as well311.  
One of these ten Russian illegals was Anna Chapman  a Russian agent whose story 
became especially popular in the U.S. media. Married to the U.K. citizen Alex Chapman, Anna 
Chapman is a Russian national, born in Stalingrad (nowadays Volgograd) in the family of the 
former KGB agent (later a diplomat in Kenya) Vasily Kushchenko. After her marriage, she also 
received a British passport, which citizenship is later revoked by the U.K. after she got exposed 
and deported to Russia. Alex Chapman later confirmed that at the time at which they were still 
living in London, Anna began meeting with Russians and became very private with her affairs. It 
is reported that after a trip back to Russia, and despite her previously stated dislike for 
Americans, she suddenly expressed her wish to move to the U.S. where after a few financially 
difficult years with her new business, the latter started to flourish, and her living standard 
changed sensibly312. During her time in New York, she was caught communicating with her 
Russian handler. The FBI suspected that she was supposed to infiltrate the political circles in the 
U.S. Soon after that, Russia and the U.S. made a deal to mutually exchange intelligence 
operatives in 2010 and among other Russian agents, Anna was also on her way to Russia. 
Warmly welcomed by President Putin, Anna was offered a position as the leader of the youth 
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i g f P i  li ical a 313. When asked about her time in the U.S., however, she remains 
silent stating that she is not allowed to discuss it, allegedly told so by her handlers in Russia314. 
While the aforementioned cases only outline the features of Russia as a political 
competitor sending undercover agents in the U.S., the Kremlin is not the only government doing 
so. Other s a e  ha  a e Ame ica  li ical a d/  ec mic i al  ha e bee  c i l  i g 
foreign students as intelligence-gatherers. Joseph Augustyn, a former di ec  f he CIA  
Defector Operations Center, a e  ha  Chi e e ec i  fficial  mee  i h ma  f hei  
de  bef e he  g  ab ad  d , a d i  ce ai  ca e  deb ief hem  e 315. Foreign 
students are not the only ones who act as spies for their countries of origin, however. A 
substantial amount of the individuals who are accused of theft of secrets in relation to their 
employment is from China - 84% of the foreign perpetrators of theft of secrets are Chinese 
citizens, according to a study that incorporated data from Department of Justice between 2009 
and 2017316.  However, espionage, defined a  he a h i ed i e a i al c llec i  f 
i f ma i  b  a e 317 in the case of Maria Butina, differs quite significantly from the 
corporate espionage inherent for Chinese citizens working for the Chinese government. Legally, 
even corporate espionage is not as easy to be proven because there has to be a link to the 
government that allegedly ordered the illicit activity. However, in the case of corporate 
espionage, there is a second option for the offenders to be brought to justice  the theft of secrets 
in which the only element that has to be beyond doubt is the unpermitted possession of certain 
information, it, being either a physical or digital copy. That said the case of Maria Butina 
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presents a lot more complexity and vagueness because at first glance she did everything, 
according to the laws. She entered the U.S. with a valid visa, attended meetings and conventions 
organized by an organization of which she is a member, then she became a foreign student in a 
prestigious university from which she later successfully obtained a degree. The harmful effect, in 
this case, is the influence that she wanted to exercise but also another component  the fact that 
she was able to exercise it due to her connections. Mainly this influence is what distinguishes 
cognitive threats of this kind from other types of espionage and makes it a century-long political 
practice with notable consequences.  
The thin line between legal and illegal influence in the context of espionage is 
demonstrated once again in a more recent case in which there is only the suspicion for possible 
espionage but no concrete proof for anything further. The daughter of P i  pokesman Dmitry 
Peskov  Elizaveta Peskova began in November 2018 her internship in the European Parliament 
with the French right-wing member Aymeric Chauprade318. It is claimed that Elizaveta, a law 
student in Paris, does not have access to any confidential information but only to publicly 
accessible one. Regardless, as a former adviser of Marine Le Pen, Chauprade is a vivid supporter 
of the Russian annexation of Crimea. Furthermore, he is currently serving as a member of the EU 
Pa liame  Sec i  a d Defense subcommittee and in this capacity he has access to very 
important documents that could be classified on different levels of security. Unlike the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union does not screen interns and does not 
require them to obtain a security clearance before beginning the internship. Rega di g Pe k a  
internship, there was an expressed concern that the European Parliament elections in May 2019 
may be compromised by Russia319.  
                                                           





From the reports compiled during the years about Russian access-agents and spies, it 
becomes evident that they sometimes act as sleeping cells but get active when a specific task had 
to be accomplished. For years, Ma ia B i a  ca e a  allegedly building the foundations of a 
more significant project that aimed to establish communication between certain circles of 
American political life and Moscow. However, while not charged directly with interference in 
the U.S. Presidential Elections in 2016, it was established in court that she was receiving orders 
from her handler Torshin in Russia even on the election night320. In her plea agreement, there are 
no details about her possible mission to influence the elections, but another case in which 12 
Russians were accused of hacking accounts of Democratic Party members brings some context 
to her case as well. While there was a lot of tension surrounding the U.S. Presidential Elections 
in 2016, for some amount of time, concrete accusations were not made until on July 13, 2018, 
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) officially announced charges pressed against 12 Russians 
accused of hacking members of the Democratic Party321. These 12 Russian individuals were 
agents working for the intelligence unit of the Russian military division. The indictment released 
against them states that they acquired usernames and passwords of various representatives 
affiliated with the Democratic Party, hacked their accounts and obtained information that was 
later posted on personal blogs and websites that supposedl  bel ged  Ame ica  
hack i i 322. All of those acts were committed with the intention of interfering with the 
Presidential Elections, according to the DOJ press release. Days after the indictment, Maria 
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Butina gets arrested for her role in a conspiracy to act as an agent of the Russian Federation 
within the United States without prior notification to the Attorney General.  
Overview. Born in 1988 in Siberia, Russia, Maria Butina becomes one of the most 
controversial figures of contemporary espionage. At an early age, she was introduced to guns, 
claimi g la e  f  a  i e ie  i  2015: F  ch lace  like Sibe ia  f e  f R ia, hi  i  
e i  f i al. E e e ha  a g 323. Her early interest in guns evolves into a passion 
that will affiliate her with many powerful circles both in Russia and in the U.S. In Altai State 
University, she studied political science and education and joined Vladimi  P i  a   
United Russia. Later, she obtained a ma e  degree as well. She also established an 
organization called The Right to Bear Arms that called f  he ale f h -barrelled firearms to 
ci ilia   be made legal 324. Despite some resistance by the opposition in Russia, this 
movement quickly developed and added new members, one of which was Alexander Torshin  a 
high-ranked official in the Russian Central Bank and a member of the Russian Council 
Federation. Mainly this relationship will later be one of the most significant reasons for the 
charges pressed against both. It is reported that Alexander Torshin became a mentor for Maria 
Butina, encouraging and supporting her political career and sharing her passion for guns. Butina 
expressed in an interview for a Russian website tha  he d eam   li e i  a e , highl  
de el ed c , leadi g i  he ld, a d i h  immig a i 325. She a ecia e  T hi  
advocacy for her cause that is to ad a ce M c  l g- e m a egic bjec i e 326. Torshin 
is also a lifetime member of the NRA, as well as Maria Butina who joined in 2012. Interestingly, 
before 2013, Butina was refused a visa to go to the annual NRA meetings multiple times, 
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according to CNN327. After joining NRA in a member capacity, she began traveling to the U.S. 
Prosecutors in her case claim that a Russian oligarch who paid for one of her visits after 
obtaining a visa told her: I a    g  k i h he US,  g   a i  i 328.  
In 2018, it is documented that Butina and Torshin organized a delegation to the National 
Prayer Breakfast in Washington, DC where Torshin requested a meeting with President Trump 
which did not take place after all. However, Torshin previously admitted that he had met 
President Trump in the past at annual meetings of the NRA. At the same time, Butina was also 
active in her intentions to establish connections with U.S. governmental officials. In 2015, at an 
event held by Donald Trump in Las Vegas, she inquired about his stance on the financial 
sanctions imposed on Russia329. Her next step, with the help of Torshin, was to organize a 
delegation from NRA representatives to travel to Russia for a meeting with influential members 
of the Russian political elite. While there is some controversy surrounding the attendance of the 
then-NRA president, Alan Cors, to the meeting, he decided not to go so that this is not viewed as 
an official NRA meeting with Russian government officials. Even without his presence in 
M c , he mee i g k lace. Thi  made a i  Dem c a  he i a  ab  he NRA  
relationship with Russia. When the former asked the NRA if they have used any funds by foreign 
g e me    T m  e ide ial cam aig , he a cia i  aid i  did 330. 
Regardless, they admitted that they receive money from foreign donors, thus suggesting that 
NRA may have been sponsored by Russian oligarchs or directly by the Kremlin itself through 
intermediaries.  
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Not long after the Moscow meeting, Butina traveled to the U.S. to pursue a ma e  
degree in the American University in Washington, DC. Her presence in the U.S. also allowed her 
to be closer to her boyfriend - Paul Erickson  a 56-year-old supporter of the Republican Party 
and NRA - with whom, supposedly, she was preparing to move in South Dakota before her and 
E ick  a e . The couple met in Moscow in 2013, as Erickson and the president of NRA at 
the time David Keene traveled there to meet with Butina - the young activist behind The Right 
To Bear Arms. After officially becoming a couple, Butina frequently traveled to the U.S. to see 
Erickson, where she was introduced by him to powerful members of the gun-lobby at 
conferences and other events331. At the time, Erickson, in his role of an NRA supporter, 
volunteered on multiple occasions, according to reports, to establish connections between 
T m  cam aig  ma age  a d membe  f he R ia  g e me 332. There was a note, 
f d i  E ick  h me ha  a  a ki g he e i  H   e d  FSB ffe  f 
em l me ? , ggesting that FSB either made or may have made a possible offer to Erickson 
to work for them in some capacity. D i g B i a  ial, i  a  a g ed ha  he  ela i hi  i h 
E ick  a  me el  a mea   achie i g B i a  a d T hi  g al  f b ai i g access to 
conservative politicians and activists in the U.S.  something that both have sought to 
accomplish during the years of their acquaintance. In the allegedly unrelated charges of wire 
fraud and money laundering pressed against Erickson, there were a few transactions in which 
B i a  ame a  i l ed. Court documents show that he made a payment to the American 
U i e i , edl  f  B i a  i i  a d a he  a ac i  f $9000  a e  i h 
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initials M.B.333. While being in the U.S., Butina did not cease her communications with Moscow. 
One message via Twitter revealed that the Russian government official with whom Butina was in 
ch a ed he  f he  ale  a d kill : Y  li ical a  ha  i e  i  the sky. Now it is 
im a   i e  he e i h a d  b   (fall) ema el 334. In addition, she allegedly 
shared with an American politician/activist that she had Moscow  a al  ga i e di e  
at which conservative members of the gun lobby will be invited, thus underlining the official 
 f  hi  c mm ica i  cha el 335. In 2018, this task was becoming harder and harder 
as her name appeared in media, connecting her to American politicians and NRA lobbyists, 
attracting suspicion and mistrust to her intentions. She started expressing concerns about 
returning to Russia, stating that she may not be safe there anymore336. Rega di g B i a  
unusually good ties to Capitol Hill, her mentor, and alleged handler, Torshin noted that she had 
aged A a Cha ma 337.  
Applied measures against this threat. Maria Butina was arrested in April 2018 and 
moved to an adult detention facility in Alexandria, VA. She spent most of her time in 
Washington, DC and in Alexandria, VA in solitary confinement for a total of 67 days. On 
December 6, 2018, Butina and her lawyers were presented with a plea offer according to which 
she will admit she was involved in a conspiracy as a foreign agent without the proper registration 
with the U.S. Such crime carries a maximum of five years imprisonment and a fine of $250,000, 
and a supervised release up to three years. In exchange for the guilty plea, the prosecution on the 
case will not further prosecute the case. The recommended sentence in the plea deal is 0-6 
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months of imprisonment (which Butina had almost already spent in detention facilities) and a 
fine ranging from $500 to $9,500 considering that she does not have any prior offenses338. 
Following these guidelines, and as a non-U.S. citizen Butina, agreeing to plead guilty becomes a 
subject of removal proceedings and deportation. On December 8, 2018, Butina and her lawyers 
accepted the deal offered by the prosecution that confirms multiple examples of her 
communication of Alexander Torshin, who remained unnamed but described in a way that leaves 
no doubt that he is the man in question. The communication, mostly in the form of text messages 
shows that Butina was indeed intending to not only influence NRA (named simply Gun Rights 
Organization in the plea offer339) but to later benefit from establishing a channel of 
communication with Russia. In addition to any other details specified by the plea agreement, 
Butina also agreed to cooperate with authorities requesting her assistance. She was questioned by 
the special counsel investigating the interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections. 
However, Butina  c e a i  was predominantly focused on he ca e ha  he U.S. A e  
office is preparing for her boyfriend  Paul Erickson340. Beca e f B i a  e e ted assistance 
on other cases, her sentencing has been delayed  a fact that will make her sentenced to time 
served most likely if the judge agrees and confirms the sentence recommended by the 
prosecution.  
As for Paul Erickson, while his name does not appear concretely on the plea agreement as 
an accomplice in the conspiracy, it is apparent that the prosecution envisions him in particular 
he  d c me i g B i a  ac i  i  he U.S. However, he has not been accused of any other 
crimes different than wire fraud and money laundering so far. In the meantime, Alexander 
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Torshin, the other unnamed individual that appears by de c i i  i  B i a  lea ag eeme  
only suffered financial sanctions from the U.S. but has not been so far accused of any crimes 
ega di g B i a  ca e.  
 The measures that the U.S. has undertaken so far are mostly legal in nature. Even these 
measures were first challenging to be applied because influence is a psychological category 
rather than a material one and as such it could not be easily identified. Maria Butina was accused 
of operating as an unregistered foreign agent mainly because there were no other legal grounds 
to charge her with any other crime  she was traveling to the U.S. with a valid tourist visa to gun-
lobby conferences, after which she obtained a student visa for an education that she in fact 
finished. Contemporary law is not evolved enough to encompass modern threats to liberal 
societies such as persuasion. It is very difficult to draw a line between legal persuasion that the 
law allows, and illegal persuasion that constitutes a crime. Especially in the legislature about 
espionage, such offenses are political and as such are described more vaguely than others. They 
could include many different behaviors when placed in different contexts. As for the implications 
of using legal deterrence against espionage, after the swap of agents between the U.S. and the 
Russian Federation in Vienna, one of the returned captives  Anna Chapman was welcomed as a 
hero in her home country. After her arrival, she was offered a job and enjoyed status of a 
celebrity. That said, if Maria Butina returns to Russia which is more than likely since she will get 
deported after she serves her sentence, she may share a similar destiny as her intelligence-
gathering predecessor Anna Chapman. The deterrence effect that legal measures have in her case 
is limited. The sentences themselves are typically very short if there are no prior offenses and 
 e   R ia, he f me  age  e j  P i  ec g i i  a d  i  hei  f e 




does not have a significant role since the agents may be linked to Russian politicians, oligarchs, 
and even government officials but it could not be proven legally that there is an intentional state-
supported espionage campaign against the U.S. Furthermore, even if the captured Russian agents 
give away the names of other operatives, there will be just more sent to replace the ones whose 
real intentions and missions were exposed.  
 
The case with Russian Disinformation 
Background. In an essay about the Russian (Soviet) disinformation, Herbert 
Romerstein341 writes that as early as in 1972, archives show, that there was a special KGB 
handbook that contained instructions for disinformation campaigns aiming to produce certain 
im e i  ab  eali , i  he e em  mi d, i  de   ke hem  de i e fa able  
the Russian goals, conclusions about facts. Evidence also testifies that within these campaigns, 
there were not only guidelines to disseminate disinformation to vilify and discredit the adversary 
but also to exercise influence over them in any other possible way. 
In order to explain how Russian disinformation works, first, a proper definition for it has 
to be introduced. To begin with, disinformation should be distinguished from another 
phenomenon - misinformation. Misinformation is defined in the literature as an unintentional 
presentation of wrongful information, according to an agreed-upon perception of truth. Contrary 
to this, disinformation stems from incorrectly stated source or from an unreliable one and affects 
the legitimacy of the information in a purposeful and anticipated manner. Disinformation 
practices aim to manipulate the recipient of the message, to provoke them to change their attitude 
                                                           





in a certain way342. From a social psychological standpoint, disinformation and any type of 
propaganda represent echniques which induce the individual to follow non-rational emotional 
d i e 343. They include, first, outreach to the collective and individual entities, second, an 
appeal for identification with the group identity that resists an alleged enemy, and third, they 
seek to conceal the sender of the message as much as possible. That said, only disinformation 
could pursue political gains since misinformation is not a deliberate but rather unintentional 
misrepresentation of information. It is a non-purposeful, erroneous portrayal of facts. While 
difficult to prove, the intent to mislead, in the case of disinformation, could be reasonably traced, 
through three mechanisms: the authenticity of the presented facts, the level of impartiality of the 
reporting style, and the legitimacy of the sources of the reported information344.  
According to its purpose, the disinformation could be divided into two types: agitative, 
that evokes active behavior and integrative, inviting the addressee to get a passive stance about 
an issue345. The former aspect finds expression frequently in the form of an appeal to public 
opinion which causes political tensions leading to the allegedly logical solution to just follow the 
leaders346. The integrative aga da,  he he  ha d, eek  b i gi g the scattered members 
 a  f a a ic la  hi g (bei g) i  a ha m i  h le 347. Further juxtapositions could be 
made based on the content and the source of the disinformation that identify white, black and 
grey propaganda348. The white propaganda reveals an accurate disclosure of the source of 
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otherwise reliable information, but the content is still subjectively represented in a way to 
convince the addressee of a particular idea. A relevant example in this regard is the propaganda 
shaped by the use of patriotic statements. Black propaganda is described as a type of information 
c cealed  c edi ed  a fal e a h i  a d ead lie , fab ica i  a d dece i 349. As 
opposed to this, the grey propaganda does not have a clearly identified source which makes room 
for doubts about the authenticity of the reported information350.  
One of the most vivid examples of a disinformation campaign is undoubtedly the period 
of the Cold War. Regardless of its end, however, such practices are still actively employed by 
Russia in the post-Cold War era even more with the presence of digital technologies that could 
easily disperse the propaganda message to broader audiences. In the years after 1989, Russia 
aimed to maximize its soft-power through defensive strategies and the power of persuasion about 
the positive sides of Russian culture. In 2009, a new mechanism pursuing offensive rather than 
defensive soft-power was enabled by the Russian TV-station Russia Today (RT)351. Along with 
this focal point, the Russian cyber-propaganda became a very active weapon in the hybrid war 
against the West and some former Soviet countries that lean toward the Western cultural and 
economic model352. The 21st-century Russian disinformation could be perceived as a 
c i a i  f he S ie  media  aga da but adapted to the new information age in a neo-
Soviet manner353. These modifications include a heavy reliance on active measures such as 
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intentional placement of strategic content, disinformation, and exercising tactics of influence by 
public figures enjoying popularity and trust354.  
Considering this historical context, the main mission of contemporary Russian 
disinformation i   de mi e We e  ide l g  a d  e g he  R ia  i i  a  a 
cultural, religious and political hegemon through the tools of offensive soft-power. More 
concretely, the Russia-supported project, Eurasianism, as opposed to Westernization, has a few 
distinctive features, according to Aleksandr Dugin, the creator of this strategic vision355. First, 
Eastern civilization does not recognize the liberal values as its intrinsic mindset. Second, the 
a e  g al  h ld be l ca ed ab e libe al al e  i  he hie a ch  f cial i e e . Thi d, 
Russia is a defender of traditional values that are in dissonance with many of the new, Western 
liberal principles. Fourth, the U.S. is the enemy that stays in the way of the Eurasian project. 
Fifth, the Eurasian project should be embracing the former Soviet states along with states that 
reach Central and West Asian territories. In that sense, what would be the strategic mechanisms 
for fulfilling this agenda and why have they been successful? Van Herpen356 claims that among 
the instruments of Russian influence are: direct and indirect distribution of state propaganda to 
the West; change of ownership of Western media companies in favor of Russian businessmen; 
establishing new social networks and websites that spread messages favorable to the Kremlin; 
intensive posting in blogs and forums as well as trolling content undermining Russia or its 
interests; subsidizing political parties and political figures; re-installing espionage practices; and 
assigning the Russian Orthodox Church a vital role as a promoter of soft-power.  
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As for the success of the tools used to disseminate propaganda, Bjola and Pamment357 
explain why such campaigns enjoy fruitful results in many countries. The authors stress three 
main strategies used to accomplish this goal: 1) he eff   e l i  diffe e ce  be ee  EU 
media em  ( a egic a mme ) 358, 2) he a ge i g f di e f a chi ed  l e able 
a die ce  ( ac ical fle ibili ) 359, a d 3) he abili   ma k he ce  f di i f ma i  
(plausible deniabilit ) 360. In addition, some authors361 point to the high number of sources that 
distribute particular news containing disinformation, the alleged diversity of the sources and the 
repetitiveness of the message itself, as well as the community of people that have similar beliefs 
to the author of the propaganda message which helps spread the news even further. As for the 
perceptual mechanisms that increase the trustworthiness of the disinformation message, it is the 
familiar appeal of the message and not the reliability of the information that attracts the audience. 
Furthermore, readers look for evidence supporting the presented information and evaluate it as 
being true if they find any, even if the evidence is fraudulent.  
Another element contributing to the triumph of disinformation in the digital age is the 
presence of online trolls. Their primary function is i i g a d ma i la ing the public 
deba e 362 and engaging in harassment of users that express anti-Russian standpoints. The 
Kremlin School of Bloggers was, in fact, a project intended to undermine critics of the Kremlin, 
oppose anti-Russian content online and post messages and videos supporting Russian policies 
and interests. The Kremlin trolls are supposedly c ib i g  a e age 50 e  a icle  dail  
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a d mai ai  i  Faceb k a d e  T i e  acc , i h 50 ee  e  da 363. In a broader 
context, in the hybrid war against the West, there is a central place assigned to information as a 
weapon. However, as opposed to the Cold War type of propaganda that the Soviet Union used, in 
the 21st century, this propaganda is transformed into information warfare that seeks to achieve 
goals beyond those of propaganda. These goals assume the use of spetspropaganda (special 
aga da), a l ha  embed  c m e  e k e a i , elec ic a fa e, 
psychological operations, a d i f ma i  e a i 364. As opposed to the old goals of 
propaganda that aimed to attract social perceivers to the Soviet ideology, the ultimate goal of the 
new Russian strategy after the fall of the Soviet Union is instead, to la  eed  f d b  a d 
di ;  c f e, di ac , la i e a d dem ali e 365. 
Overview. While some of the Russian disinformation is focused mostly on particular 
populations, their campaigns are widely spread even beyond the borders of the European Union, 
beyond the U.S., beyond continents, cultures, and values. The European External Action Service 
(EEAS) created a resource called EU vs. Disinformation that tracks disinformation articles, 
identifies the target audience and provides facts that disprove the misleading information in the 
original pieces. Archives on this website show that the disinformation wave reached even 
countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Moldova, and Serbia. However, the Top 3 
countries affected by disinformation campaigns were namely the U.S., Ukraine and the European 
Union countries366. Interestingly, a poll in Russia showed that respondents consider these three 
countries/entities as its biggest enemies367. For the purposes of this overview, in the following 
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sections, I will only describe the disinformation practices in the three regions where Russian 
disinformation is most prevalent  the U.S., Ukraine and EU-member states. Though not 
exhaustive, it will give a representation of the political, psychological and social context of 
disinformation threats.  
Some of the disinformation campaigns could be easily traced back to Russia but others 
cannot. In fact, some of the disinformation, especially in social networks, is disseminated by 
users that do not e e  k  ha  a e c ib i g  me e  li ical age da. Tha  i  amel  
what makes disinformation so dangerously powerful and the cognitive threat it represents - so 
detrimental.  
Many were skeptical that the Russian disinformation practices of coercive influence 
could be successful in the U.S.  there is not any particularly large ethnic or religious minority 
that Russia can easily appeal to, nor is there any close relationship that could justify potential 
benevolence of a large amount of U.S. people to Russia. On the contrary, both countries have 
portrayed each other as villains for decades. Yet estimates show that this influence-campaign 
reached approximately 126 million users368. Considering this historical background, it was 
indeed shocking for many to find out that Russian disinformation had entered the U.S. borders. 
This campaign overwhelmed the online space with fake news and ad   Faceb k  create 
chaos, inflame emotions, and polarize a divided public to discredit Hillary Clinton, whom 
President Vladimir Putin expected to win the Oval Office 369. The various advertisements that 
Russians bought include pictures promoting anti-Clinton, anti-immigration, anti-Muslim 
messages and such that directly try to provoke a clash on topics on which public opinion is 
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strongly divided (e.g., Confederate flags, police brutality, and the Black Lives Matter 
movement)370. The disinformation was in these cases mixed with strong messages seeking to 
influence the social perceivers in a certain way. Among all online media, Facebook and Twitter 
appeared to be a central arena for the disinformation campaigns in the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
Elections. The majority of websites reporting false information was housed by Facebook and 
used as a political clickbait371. Facebook was also the generator of more partisan propaganda and 
disinformation than Twitter and other websites. The highly partisan-charged content is also 
de c ibed a  he i ci al i c bator and disseminator of disinformation  and Facebook-
empowered hyperpartisan political clickbait sites played a much greater role on the right than on 
he lef 372. That said it was established that both sides of the political spectrum were using such 
strategies to engage their already committed voters and gain new ones.  
Through circles of allegedly different networks, the same political narrative was 
distributed, confirmed and validated to feed into the agenda of either the left or the right. As 
Facebook contributed significantly to the success of the disinformation spread, Twitter was also 
an accomplice but with a different role. Facebook was a fruitful domain for a variety of external 
websites, but Twitter was a welcoming host to further discussions on political matters presented 
by Facebook. Twitter enjoyed the attention of a variety of users ranging from the far-left to the 
far-right. They were not the only ones commenting on popular topics, however. The Kremlin 
employed numerous trolls and bots who not only increased the popularity and supposedly the 
attention to a particular issue but also disseminated false information and ungrounded 
accusations. If the dimensions of the disinformation attacks against the U.S. were only outlined 
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by the increasingly populist media and their profiting from sensational headlines, an eventual 
solution to the problem would have been much easier. However, domestic political trends, 
values, and interests of various actors in the U.S. matched the Russian ones. And as Moscow  
attitude proved on multiple occasions: The enemy of my enemy is my friend  a phrase that finds 
a licabili  i  R ia   f  a i ali  a d e emi  a ie  h e ie  c adic  
those of the traditional political parties. This complicated scenario identifies a few actors and 
relationships that contribute to disinformation campaigns - first, online media. Second, the 
catalysts that make online media accessible and even imposed on users (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, 
Reddit, and Google) and their interest in profiting through their existence. Third, the reputation 
and the accessibility of established news outlets to readers of all economic backgrounds. Fourth, 
political actors whose interests match those of Russia in one or more than one area. Fifth, the 
readers and viewers of information distributed through traditional and online media that 
i c ea i gl  eed c e  clea l  defi i g i e  a d l e 373 and thus validating choices 
that users make, typically in an effort to reaffirm their identities. 
Another political adversary of Russia, and thus a target of fake news and attempts to 
exercise coercive influence, is Ukraine. The history of Russian disinformation in Ukraine after 
its independence is most intriguing in the period of the Orange Revolution (2004-2005) during 
the disturbances surrounding the election of the pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych, 
whose victory was claimed to be fraudulent. This particular event marked the beginning of an 
intensive post-Soviet Union disinformation campaign that coincided with an increase of Internet 
users particularly of those using social media. At the same time, re-oriented toward a pro-EU 
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path, Ukraine was still struggling with some domestic problems. One of them was the high 
number of oligarch-owned media. Shortly before the Orange Revolution, a new outlet gained 
popularity  Channel 5 and rapidly became one of the most reputable sources of information. It 
is claimed that this channel had an essential role in constructing the narrative that helped Viktor 
Yushchenko defeat Viktor Yanukovych in the third stage of voting that took place374. The 
medium is currently owned by Petro Poroshenko  Uk ai e  e ide  i ce 2014. This 
tendency is not rare in post-communist countries, however, and its influence is proven by studies 
to be decreasing the level of freedom of speech.  
In this political climate and skepticism toward the mainstream media, the digital ones 
emerged as an alternative to the politically tailored by media truth. Somewhat instinctively, the 
people turned eyes toward the digital media as it implied some more objectivity due to the lack 
of control over the distributed content. During the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the new online 
newspaper Ukrayinska Pravda accumulated nearly 700,000 new visitors375 376. While true, such 
digital outlets also have owners and invested interests in the particular representation of facts. 
Moreover, the effortless dissemination of digital information and the numerous potential 
addressees of this information made the solution of the old problem  a new problem. In times of 
societal anxiety caused by popular events, disinformation is used as a weapon mostly because the 
targets are very vulnerable in their thirst for information. Disinformation is not a new 
phenomenon, but the digital media with all of their positive ide  ed eg la  ci i e  i  
propaganda machines capable of spreading disinformation, paranoia and ha ed 377. Moreover, 
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there was another political detail that contributed to the intensified disinformation campaigns. 
After Yanukovych fled the country, the interim government decided to change the law 
guaranteeing the Russian language a status of a regional language, a law adopted in 2012378. 
This way the Russian-speaking population in Eastern Ukraine was left dissatisfied not only by 
the turn of events in terms of the president they elected but also in terms of their own language. 
In this polarized environment in Ukraine, social platforms and online media became outlets for 
the concerns of a very politically divided population. This politically-divided population believed 
and was telling different narratives about the events on Maidan Nezalezhnosti and what followed 
after379. These narratives were not monochromic though but had many shades as the people 
supporting them were influenced by different factors  some of them they perceived as true and 
others as lies  regardless of what was actually accurate and what was a fabrication of the media 
and the powers behind them. 
In the light of these events, the attention to online media did not eliminate the influence 
of traditional media and the disinformation that it produced. Instead, the disinformation became 
even stronger as traditional media started referencing and thus confirming false facts from online 
media and vice versa380. This was true for both Russian and Western media. Referring to the 
quickly escalating situation in Crimea, Western media claimed ha  a  immi e   ac al 
invasion was under way  26 c m le el  e a a e cca i  f m 2 Ma ch  12 N embe 381. 
The political environment was so heated at the time that reporting of false news by the West 
contributed to the spreading cracks of the very fragile peace in the region. Russian 
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disinformation campaigns were not lacking either. For this pattern testifies the following case 
from 2014. The Russian Channel One reported a story of a woman from Slovyansk who was 
grieving her 3-year-old child who was allegedly killed a d ailed  a b a d like Je 382 
by Ukrainian soldiers in order to keep the local population in fear. The authenticity of the story 
was never confirmed, and no evidence proved that the story was real. However, it first appeared 
in a blog post of Alexandr Dugin, the ideologue behind the Eurasianism project and a vivid 
supporter of Kremlin  licie .  
In addition to these practices, another tool in the arsenal of disinformation is the 
intentional misplacing of content. For instance, a picture of a young Syrian boy with an open 
wound was presented as a boy from the Slovyansk region, allegedly wounded by Ukrainian 
troops383. It was later confirmed that the picture originally appeared in an article about the war in 
Syria.  
Another problem regarding the false information distributed through traditional and 
digital media are the paid trolls that generate thousands of comments with explicit content  
typically confirming the authenticity of an article and expressing outrage or refuting some 
content tha  i  i e f idea  a d al e  fa able  R ia  lic . As outlined 
previously, evidence shows that the troll factories not only exist, but verify various speculations 
surrounding their functions, funding, and overall mission. Infiltrating a troll factory in Russia 
hidden under the name Internet Research Agency, Lyudmila Savchuk admitted that she and her 
co-workers were supposed to follow guidelines in their postings defaming Uk ai e  -
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Western government and condemning the violence that Ukrainian soldiers were allegedly 
exercising over the population in Eastern Ukraine384.  
Among other reasons, the annexation of Crimea was a result of Moscow  i e i   
protect its Russian- eaki g la i , li i g ide f he R ia  Fede a i  b de . 
Russia was never hiding its ambition to serve as a leading nation uniting the Slavic countries 
under its wing. Therefore, similarly to the Russian-speaking population in Crimea, other regions 
are also hot points of the Russian geopolitical interests. Some of these countries are now part of 
the EU, others are not. While the EU-alliance has always been seen as a competitor by Russia, 
the treatment of the countries that sustain it is different. It is evident that while the former Soviet 
countries that are now part of the EU, and the Western states are all targets of the disinformation 
campaigns, they are executed very differently due to the way Moscow sees them. The Baltic 
countries, similarly to the Crimean population have a high number of Russian-speaking 
population. It is no surprise that the disinformation campaigns there are particularly intensified. 
In Estonia and Latvia, for instance, they compound more than 25% of the population385. The 
Northeastern region of Estonia with the largest amount of Russian-speaking population is also 
ig ifica l  le  i eg a ed  E ia  cie  a d i  i  al  ec micall  i  a e  a e ha  
he E ia  a e age 386. However, if compared to the economic conditions that the same 
population will be having if potentially this territory becomes Russian, it will turn out that they 
would be worse off than in the conditions they are living under currently. Despite these reasons, 
Russia still appeals to the Russian-speaking population in Estonia in numerous ways. As for the 
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politicians and the people opposing the Russian politics, the Kremlin pressures them with a 
powerful argument  their gas dependence. The unrests related to the Bronze Statue in Estonia in 
2007 and the followed after Russian cyber-attacks also showed that every action that is 
undertaken, consciously or not, against Russian interests will be punished in one way or another. 
In its disinformation campaigns, Moscow seeks to underline the oppression by the Estonian 
government to Russian-speaking population and the attempt to destroy and diminish the legacy 
of Russia in the country. Another focal point in the narrative distributed in Estonia pertains to the 
alleged deg ada i  f cie  m ale a d he fail e f he a e  ide acce able elfa e 
conditions to its citizens. The goal of the disinformation is to cast doubt in the Estonian 
g e me  abili   e e b h he m al a d he ma e ial ellbeing to the Estonian 
people387.  
Somewhat resembling the Russian view of Estonia is the one that it has of other former 
Soviet countries that are EU-members currently. Among the most serious vulnerabilities to 
disinformation in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland is the education 
system. Researchers focusing on this issue point out that the education systems in these countries 
are based almost entirely on memorizing facts rather than interpreting them through a critical 
lens. Moreover, the history books themselves do not contain moments from the world history 
whose importance is widely recognized (e.g., the Cold War)388. Through online media and other 
sources, Russia seeks to convince Eastern- and Central European countries that he hi  f 
Sla  a  diffe e  f m ha  fficiall  e e ed b  hi ia 389. The rationale behind this was 
 em ha i e R ia  le i  b h he eligi , c l al a d a eh d hi  f he e c ie . 
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Additionally, the success of disinformation is bolstered by factors such as weak civic society, 
ethnic and linguistic ties of Russia with some of the population in former Soviet countries390. 
Moreover, Russia has local military dominance over these countries that cannot engage in any 
campaign against it without a NATO intervention and such is hard to trigger because of the 
unidentified legal status of cognitive threats, understood as warfare.  
Another element that carries meaning in the context of disinformation in Central and 
Eastern European EU-states is the non-decisive standpoint of politicians. While some of them 
show a friendly attitude toward Russia, others are very reluctant in labeling Russia as an 
aggressor and the mastermind behind the disinformation campaigns391. This is especially true 
since there is a confirmed pattern of Russian financing for right-wing parties, radical parties 
expressing supremacist, Nazi, anti-globalization, anti-multiculturalism anti-immigrants, anti-EU, 
anti-NATO and anti-U.S. beliefs392. Consequentially, Russian trolls support the agenda of such 
parties that in return support the Russian political goals393.  
Due to the lack of common religious and ethnic background that Russia shares with the 
Eastern European states, the features of the disinformation campaigns in Western Europe are 
different than in the countries with Russian-speaking or strongly pro-Russian population. While 
propaganda and disinformation operations are not missing in other times, they are manifesting 
themselves mostly before important elections in Western Europe. Considered as the heart of the 
E ea  U i , Ge ma  d me ic li ical life fall  de  he R ia  di i f ma i  
attacks. In terms of propaganda, the three central news outlets in German are RT Deutsch, 
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Sputnik Deutsch, and NewsFront Deutsch, as the first two are state-owned and the third one is 
allegedly independent, but with suspected strong ties to the Russian Secret Services394. While 
sensibly less than in the Baltic countries, the population of Russian descent in Germany is 
approximately 2.5 million people and is among the main targets of cognitive threats395. Other 
Ge ma  ci i e , h  a e affilia ed  ha e he idea  f Ge ma  fa -right party  Alternative 
for Germany  also become victims of both propaganda and disinformation due to their 
predisposition to anti-immigrant and anti-globalization rhetoric. Among the disinformation cases 
that gained the most popularity in the media is Our Lisa  a story about a German girl of Russian 
origin who was allegedly abducted and raped by men of Middle-Eastern origin. The news 
provoked protests in different cities in Germany in a time in which the question about refugees 
was severely dividing the German public opinion. In 2017, news about German soldiers raping a 
gi l i  Li h a ia, a  a  f a NATO ea a ce mi i  a ea ed i  media396. Two other 
stories that gained popularity were ha  700,000 Ge ma  had lef  he c  beca e f 
Me kel  ef gee lic  a d ha  ef gee  had de ed he lde  ch ch i  Ge ma 397. 
An intensified disinformation campaign was triggered also in France before the 
Presidential Elections in 2017. A study confirmed the presence of bots that were employed in the 
U.S. Presidential Elections in 2016 and then re-used in the French ones. In addition, it provided a 
potential answer to the question of why the disinformation campaign against Emmanuel Macron 
failed. The results of the project showed that most of the audience for Twitter content with the 
hashtag #Mac Leak  a  he E gli h-speaking American alt-right community, rather than 
                                                           
394 C a e S el e m lle , "The im ac  f R ia  i e fe e ce  Ge ma  2017 elec i ," Testimony before 
the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence June 28 (2017); ibid.  
395 Ibid. 





F e ch e 398  a pattern that was in opposition to the general political discussion in which 
mostly French voters were involved and e e i e f Mac  ca didac . 
Russian disinformation spread even to Sweden  a country that has not been in the 
eyesight of the Kremlin as an important target in the post-Cold War period or at least not until 
2014, as some authors argue399. With increased attention toward the Baltic region, Sweden 
became a zone of deployed active measures by Russia. Similar to other countries where 
disinformation is spread, in Sweden, he openly pro-Kremlin elements in the Swedish far right 
include the fascist organisation Nordic Resistance (Nordiska motståndsrörelsen). Nordic 
Resistance has cooperated with two Russian organisations, the Rodina party and the Russian 
Imperial Movement; their international network is the World National-Conservative Movement, 
which has also donated an unspecified sum of money to Nordic Resistance 400.  
Official Swedish documents are also a subject of manipulations by the Russians. Online 
media report the existence of certain documents supposedly prepared and signed by Swedish 
politicians. Such forgeries often include even a letterhead that gives the document authenticity. 
While they circulate mostly in less-known websites in Russian or Swedish, research shows that 
at least on one occasion a forgery reached the traditional media that reported it401. In the case of 
Sweden, since there is no ethnic and religious background through which Russia can appeal to a 
large number of Russian-speaking population, the target becomes the Swedish public opinion 
and the decision-makers, mainly regarding he c  ela i hi  i h NATO. An instance of 
this is a host agreement from 2016 for easier access of NATO forces to Swedish territories 
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including times of training and crises. Attempting to prevent the ratification, an anti-NATO 
narrative started dominating the disinformation campaigns. It was depicted in the news 
announcing NATO submarines i la i g S ede  e i ial waters 402 and some legal 
c ce  di g he a ifica i , ch a  ha  NATO will be allowed to place nuclear 
weapons on Swedish military bases, use Swedish territory to launch a first-strike attack on 
Russia and enjoy legal immunity for crimes committed by NATO troops on Swedish 
territory 403. 
Applied measures against this threat. Beginning to realize the seriousness of the 
problem with Russian disinformation, states affected by these campaigns launched a series of 
measures  some to deter future threats, others to combat their consequences. These measures 
could be conceptually divided into four groups: legal measures, the establishment of new 
agencies and units, creation of new media channels to prevent disinformation, and drawing 
awareness to the issue.  
The legal measures that are undertaken are dependent upon multiple conditions since 
disinformation is not a crime, and, in the online space, the attribution dilemma makes it very 
hard to establish a connection between content and a user, especially if the user is acting on 
behalf of the government. That said legal measures against disinformation are only possible 
when they are combined with another act that actually constitutes a crime  for instance, hacking 
and posting false statements on social media, as it was in the charges pressed against twelve 
GRU officers404. Even if the offenders are indicted, the chance of bringing them to justice is 
minimal because, if they reside in Russia, they will not be extradited to the U.S. Some of the 
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tactics used in such cases are that the defendants are manipulated to visit a third country with 
which the U.S. has an extradition treaty. Once they visit, they can be captured and extradited. 
However, such scenario would be highly unlikely. As evident, legal measures are severely 
limited to a narrow circle of cases, and even they have a very low likelihood of concluding with 
a sentence because disinformation, by itself, does not entail legal liability unless it pertains to 
cases of defamation.  
Other measures used in the fight against disinformation include the establishment of new 
units and agencies intended to control the spread of fake news and propaganda (e.g., the 
European External Action Service East Stratcom Task Force). In Central Europe, the Czech 
Ministry of Interior presented a new unit that will handle the cases of disinformation and will 
train professionals to combat such threats. A year later in 2017, Slovakian Ministry of Interior 
announced that online media and their content would be monitored by twelve newly added 
officers employed in the Computer Crime unit. Similar statements came also from Hungary and 
Poland. Other government efforts include the Inter-departmental task force at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands, that was launched in November 2015405. While this is a step 
forward toward recognizing the magnitude of the problem, such measures and their effectiveness 
remain out of the sphere of competence of the law enforcement. There are no laws against 
disinformation and taking down websites containing such may clash with laws protecting the 
freedom of speech and the right of information (even if it represents disinformation rather than 
information). In May 2008, NATO created the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
in Tallinn, Estonia. It was created shortly after the Russian cyber-attacks in Estonia that followed 
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after the Bronze Statue demolition in 2007. The ce e  is responsible for identifying and 
coordinating education and training solutions in cyber defence for all NATO bodies across the 
Alliance 406. Some NGO efforts to combat the problem are also documented. In Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Slovakia, and Ukraine NGOs 
use as weapons against disinformation fact-checking websites and resources, and identification 
of tools used by Moscow as disinformation tactics407.  
Potentially much more purposeful and productive is the measure that Estonia adopted to 
deter disinformation. Recognizing the similarities between Estonia and Ukraine in terms of the 
pro-Russian population that resides within the borders of the country, Tallinn decided to deal 
with disinformation not by taking something away, but by offering something new. In September 
2015, he l cal blic b adca i g ha  e ed a e , R ia -language TV-channel called 
ETV+  kee  he R ia -speaking minority in Estonia informed about local and international 
issues (two one-hour programs per day and regular daily news in Russian) and to provide the 
audience with entertainment (such as shows and film purchased by ETV+, such as the TV and 
web programs of Deutsche Welle in Russian) 408.   
The third measure used against disinformation is the awareness of the problem. A study 
of EU-countries exploring three variables - political acknowledgment of the threat, government 
counter-activities and counter-intelligence activities - identifies the level of awareness of the 
disinformation threat and how much is currently being done to counter it409. Its results show that 
most awareness and efforts dedicated to the problem are made in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
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Sweden and the U.K. Some but less awareness and efforts are registered in Poland, Denmark, the 
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Romania, France, the Netherlands, and Spain. Hesitant to 
recognize disinformation officially as a problem and therefore to combat it actively are Belgium, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria, Ireland, and Croatia. Among the countries with least awareness and adopted 
measures against it are Italy, Slovenia, Portugal, Malta, Luxembourg, Austria, Hungary, Greece, 
a d C , a  he la   coefficient is zero, implying that no political acknowledgments of 
the threat are made, and no measures are undertaken to combat it.  
 
The case with ISIS recruitment  
Background. One of the most popular examples of cognitive threats is the one with 
adical ga i a i  member recruitment. While the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria does not 
exist anymore, at least not territorially, such organizations existed long before its emergence 
(e.g., Al-Qaeda) and will surely continue to exist in one form or another. In this section, I outline 
the background of the problem with recruitment in terms of its targets and the factors that 
facilitate this process.  
Among the main targets of the ISIS recruitment were men, predominantly foreign-born 
such as Saudi Arabian students, Tunisian workers, and European adolescents who have quit 
attending school410. Most of those people did not have military expertise but some recruits such 
as ba le-tested Cheche  a d U bek 411 were compensating for the he  lack of skills in 
combat. In 2014, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi appealed to men and women, of all background to 
travel to ISIS and help develop the newly declared caliphate412. Especially valued were 
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preachers, doctors, engineers, and of course, soldiers. Children and adolescents were also viable 
targets since their psyche was still vulnerable to ideological influence. The main part of the 
young recruits was child e  li i g i  i gle famil  h eh ld who have less adult 
supervision or neglectful parents  h  e e ie ce d me ic ab e, e c. 413. Moreover, they 
were valuable recruits, treasured for the long-term plans of the caliphate. The steps of the child 
recruitment process were first, earning he child  , then acting as a mentor figure to them, 
hile a  he ame ime h e i g he e ial ec i  i h a e i , gif , f d, a d m e 414. 
Another example of this tendency is that at the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, six 
Spanish girls of Moroccan origin and between the age of 14 and 19 were arrested for attempting 
to join ISIS415. European teenage girls and young women from other countries are also among 
the ones who wished to join ISIS after they radicalized  they typically come from the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Austria, and Belgium416. However, not small is also the number of women 
who with their children, left for Iraq and Syria to join their ISIS-husbands.  
Among the main factors that contribute to radicalization and recruitment is the 
marginalization and the isolation of many immigrants, or citizens whose parents were foreign-
born or they were foreign-born themselves. Some were citizens of the country against which the 
acts of violence were committed and were representing the concept of homegrown terrorism. 
The latter envisions the residents of a certain country who get radicalized and recruited while 
being in their home or host-country just to return and commit acts of terrorism against this very 
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same country later. It is possible that the notions of immigration and homegrown terrorism 
overlap since many of the citizens of a country, if foreign-born or born by parents who are or 
were non-citizens, are perceived as they do not belong to the community and are therefore 
rejected and marginalized politically, economically, culturally and socially. The rejection turns 
into alienation, alienation into a vulnerability that gets skillfully exploited by radical 
organizations.  
In a social context, the process of acceptance of an immigrant to society goes through an 
assimilation period in which immigrants have to prove that they belong by giving up their 
otherness and by embracing the qualities prescribed by the society as signifiers for sameness. 
However, some authors argue that for effective integration in the era of transnationalism, it is no 
longer mandatory for immigrants to abandon their previous identities and cultural beliefs and to 
replace them with the ones in the receiving country417. Instead, they could preserve their self-
identity and embrace the shared values of their new home country.  
 Regardless of the approach to the issue, the premise of geopolitical and mental migration 
of people assigns a pivotal role of the media, the education system, and the state itself to create a 
framework of openness and inclusiveness to the newcomers 418 419 420. However, societies are 
reluctant to welcome foreigners421. Their fear of a particular problem becomes highly 
generalized when it flows into the mainstream narrative opposing immigration altogether  a 
factor that reflects  child e  ch l e e ie ce  a  ell. Even generations after relocating, an 
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immig a  identity and culture continue to be perceived by some as external to the identity that 
the citizens of the home-country aim to maintain. The multitude of terrorist attacks committed by 
ISIS in 2014-2016 raised attention to immigrants and entailed a rapid securitization of 
immigration, even though some of the perpetrators were born-and-raised citizens422. This 
resulted in suspicion, mistrust, and skepticism to the mobility of people across borders that in 
some cases was even equalized to invasion423. As a consequence of the increasing politicization 
of the debate some anti-globalization parties and organizations advocated vigorously for the 
threat that immigrants, in general, are posing to be eliminated through closed borders policies. 
While proponents of free migration strongly condemn terrorist attacks and designate such 
violence to belong in the realm of securitized problems, they still maintain that immigration, as a 
category not equal to terrorism, has to remain in the non-securitized realm.  
The contrast of identities of individuals that belong to the community, and others, who 
are perceived as external and delegitimized, has transformed into a battle for electoral votes on 
the political scene. These so-called policy narratives succeed to gain followers due to three main 
criteria: plausibility, appealing to the audience tone, accordance with perceived national 
interests424. Accordingly, the narratives for immigration distributed by nationalist, far right-wing 
and populist parties consist of similar elements of emotionally appealing binaries that only 
increase their impact through continuous repetition in the media. Regardless of their 
patriotically-charged tone and their attempts to create a connection between economic instability 
and increased crime rates, these grand narratives are doomed to fail eventually, according to 
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some authors, due to inability to rationalize the fear from the assumption that everyone different 
is a threat425. 
By securitizing immigration, far-right parties not only create a sense of fear through 
speech acts and the power of language but also support discrimination on a racial principle in 
their attempt to mask their unease of the fact that they could not combat terrorism when it comes 
from within the state426. Therefore, voices in these political circles do not only reject the notion 
of belonging to the community of racially-diverse immigrants but also reject children of 
immigrants that were citizens since their birth. Only exclusive citizenship that originated 
generations ago is perceived as a sign of acceptable relationship to the state, and only a shared 
identity in terms of race, culture, language, and ethnicity could entitle the newcomers to truly fit 
into the nation427. Consequently, many of these patterns could be found in speeches and 
proclamations of nationalist leaders, thus making the immigrants feeling marginalized. The 
former endeavor to conceptualize the threat as a more simplified category that could be easily 
eliminated by creating stereotypes for the immigrants and thus delegitimizing them, instead of 
recognizing the complexity of the issue. Although the populist movements are not only strong 
but also represented almost everywhere in the world, some countries remain much more willing 
to accept immigrants than others. Therefore, nationalist moods in their political climate are either 
not significant or almost missing. However, the ones with a visible presence of nationalist/far-
right party/parties create a dominant narrative in terms of the immigrants, despite the fact that 
they do not even hold majorities in the national parliaments. The member-states that do not 
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perceive themselves as countries of immigration see immigrants as foreigners, and even after 
they enter the borders of the state, they remain assessed mainly through their otherness428. 
According to such narratives, immigrants are perceived simultaneously as a h ea   he a e  
physical and economic security thus justifying discriminatory policies and oppressive behavior 
towards them429. 
After leaving their country of origin and settling into the host-state, many families are 
struggling to find employment and means to support themselves. Experiences of ethnically 
different (than the majority) groups in the workplace frequently entail suppression, 
unemployment and underemployment practices that inevitably result in discrimination in terms 
of the economic opportunities for them430. Monetary rewards and other financial benefits for 
joining ISIS were pointed in studies as important reasons mentioned in recruitment and its 
success  the remuneration of an ISIS fighter is approximately $1400. Moreover, fighters are 
predominantly from low-income families, typically earning not more than $200 a month, and 
non-college educated431.  Paradoxically, economic privilege understood as affluence, access to 
good education, and technology could also be among the reasons for radicalization, especially of 
g me  a  he  bec me b med b  he eligi , cial, a d li ical f ce  a d 
overtake their identity. They focus less on hem el e , a d m e  he e e al e i me 432. 
Mainly young women are among the recruitment targets to whom financial rewards appeal the 
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least. Many of them are from wealthy families, living in the West, well-educated and having a 
promising future433.  
The component of acute sensitivity, and longing for adrenaline and adventures, especially 
of adolescents, also facilitates the radicalization and recruitment of ISIS members. 
Vulnerabilities in a mall mbe  f M lim  h  ca  fi d hei  a  to belong to society, feel 
rejected or lack purpose in their lives, who want adventure or to bolster their sense of manhood 
 ma h d,  h  a e a ge ed b  ge li ic  a d i l   hei  eligi 434 are crucial to 
de a di g h  ISIS  ide l g  becomes such an attraction to young people. Among the 
appealing reasons to join ISIS is also boredom that is eliminated by subscribing to the exciting 
alternative that the life as a member of the radical organization presents to the recruit. In 
addition, some women left their countries with intentions to contribute to a humanitarian 
mission. Frequently, such women did not plan to participate in battles435. Others were interested 
in helping the wounded but did not mind being included in combats as well. 
Another important reason for radicalization is the exploitation of religious grounds for 
achieving ISIS  political goals. Radical Islamism has been the engine of the terrorist attacks 
committed by members of ISIS both inside and outside of Europe. While the implementation of 
ideas of the Salafism has been different across the various terrorist groups, its main goals have 
not changed since Sayyid Q b, Sa id Ab d A la Ma d di a d he  jihadi  ide l g e  
developed them. The end-goal of jihadism is the establishment of an Islamic order that should 
replace the existing Western civilization that is perceived as impure, corrupt, and decadent436. 
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The original objective was to create a new Islamic regime after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 
1924, the Western order had to be destroyed first. ISIS declared the establishment of the Islamic 
State before completing the mission of taking down the existing Western culture as their former 
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi planned, unlike Al-Qaeda members who preferred to follow the 
original order of tasks, prescribed by the jihadist literature437. Regardless of the particular 
sequence of executing the different parts of their strategy, the continuing attacks of ISIS show 
support for the fact that they still adhere to the two central tenets of the jihadist school  
eliminate the old order and establish the Islamic one. In order to execute its main goals, ISIS 
recruited members through, among other things, the religious appeal of the utopian narrative that 
jihad offers438. Interestingly, when it comes to women who radicalize, typically he  d  not 
come from particularly religious families, but are students who want to go to Syria to marry a 
devout Muslim or provide humanitarian aid. As a rule, young women are radicalized outside the 
home, due to peer group influence, a preacher in a mosque (masjid) or through religious schools 
(mad a a ) 439. Moreover, the jihadist ideology is appealing to women, especially to the ones 
experiencing insecurity, because of the following reasons - first, the communal conditions 
offered by ISIS. Second, the chance to contribute to broader goals, such as working to create an 
Islamic caliphate. Third, the predictable nature of the patriarchal order, that even if entailing the 
loss of some freedom, would be preferred than the uncertainty of life outside of a strong 
community united by shared goals and identity440.  
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The religious component in adical ga i a i  recruitment strategies was always 
present, but online space made them much more impactful  they became more appealing, and 
their message was reaching much more recipients than before. ISIS  e e ce  cial media 
was evident in Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, Tumblr as well as in communication 
channels that included Telegram, Signal, WhatsApp and others441. The es e ce f ISIS  
propaganda is in the dualistic nature of the content they distribute. On the one hand, it is violent, 
brutal, merciless, and unapologetic, appealing mostly to people who crave excitement. On the 
other, appealing to a different kind of audience, mostly professionally-oriented, it is also 
de ic i g al i m a d g d deed , i h i i e me age , f  ligh i g, a d mili g 
child e 442. Propaganda videos were typically representing the Islamic caliphate as a heavenly 
place to live - a myth to which the lack of actual information reported by alternative sources, 
c ib e ig ifica l . I  fac ,  Faceb k, T i e , a d he  cial media i e , g 
Muslim women, who already live on the territory occupied by ISIS, portray their lives as a sort 
f Di e la d f  M lim  b  i g ic e  a d i i g bl g  f dail  life ac i i ie  a d 
ffe i g hel  a d 443 to anyone who is interested in joining the caliphate. It was not only 
what content they were using and through what channels but also how they were reaching such a 
b ad a die ce. The media a eg   T i e  i cl ded f ll i g e e  da   ha h ag  ha  
were generating a large number of retweets. Once they got the attention of the Twitter audience, 
they were free to incorporate their own message in the tweets. An example of the skills with 
which they were operating in social media is the case with World Cup 2014, in which hashtags 
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#B a il2014, #ENG, #F a ce a d #WC2014 e e ed  gain access to millions of World Cup 
T i e  ea che , i  he h e ha  e  ld f ll  li k   he g  aga da ide 444. 
Overview. The following case study was selected to represent ISIS recruitment because 
of its unique characteristics. First, the targets were women, instead of men, as the latter are more 
likely to be recruited and join the organization. Second, the recruits were not the stereotypical 
vulnerable targets, according to most risk factors such as isolation, low performance at school, 
lack of social contacts, lack of prospects for better life and poverty. 
The story I am using for this case study describes the path of the then 16-year-old 
Khadiza Sultana and her two school friends  Shamima Begum and Amira Abase who traveled 
from their homes in London to Syria to j i  ISIS. De c ibed a  j f l, ciable, f  a d 
ki d 445 Khadiza Sultana pretended to go to school one day and got on a flight to Turkey from 
where the girls took a bus to Syria. When she did not come home after the end of the school-day, 
her relatives started worrying about her. Not suspecting any reasons why Khadiza would like to 
become a member of ISIS, her mother and sister found out that she was reportedly in Turkey, 
with her two friends  a fact of which both women were made aware by the Metropolitan Police 
unit that deals with terrorism. Khadi a  fa he  had a sed away, but unlike other cases with 
personal tragedies, the girl was not introverted and isolated from the world. Khadiza was 
described as very intelligent, very gifted girl who was not only exceeding the expectations of her 
teachers but was also tutoring students having troubles with their school preparation. Another 
evidence for her social environment is that she was having a sleepover with her niece and a 
friend at her house, right before she departed for Syria. The latter could not have been attributed 
to some whim, however, but to a carefully executed plan for which the following facts testify. 
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First, Khadiza did not take all of her clothes, but most of them, leaving some, as to look like she 
has not left at all. Moreover, she used tote bags instead of suitcases to gather her belongings in 
order to avoid suspicion. Second, she told her relatives she was going to school, as she usually 
does. Third, when she left, allegedly for school, she only took a small backpack with her, as she 
would have if she had actually gone to school. The overall purpose of the trip was to join ISIS, 
but it is not entirely clear what particular goals she had in mind for her life in ISIS. Some of the 
girls who left for Syria state that they were looking to join a cause, to discover meaning in life 
and to reconnect with religion and spirituality. As women are generally not allowed in battles, 
they a me he le  f i e , m he , ec i e  a d me ime  li e chee leade  f 
i le ce 446. If there is any stereotype surrounding the male supporters of ISIS, indicating a low 
educational level, this is certainly untrue for the women who join the organization. They are 
typically much more educated than men, much more goal-oriented, as this is found to be true for 
various women who traveled to Syria across economic class, ethnicity, and nationality. 
Khadi a  friend Amira was also an example of these characteristics  she was very intelligent, 
an advocate for Muslim women, a gifted athlete and public speaker with a vivid interest to 
reading. She mentioned before her departure that she feels like she does not belong in the 
conditions that the West offers. The decision to abandon their life in the West and join the 
caliphate is perceived typically as an example of a rebellion, engendered by teenage impulsivity 
and immaturity, a result of oppression of Muslims, anxiety about arranged marriages from a 
g age, ch a  he e f Khadi a  i e  he  he  e e as old as Khadiza was when she 
left.  
                                                           




De i e he gi l  allegia ce  ISIS a  a e ial f m f e  agai  cial 
conditions and cultural norms, there was also another factor that probably contributed to the 
g me  de a e. Khadi a  cl e f ie d, Sharmeena, then 16-years-old, also left for 
ISIS after experiencing a personal tragedy  the loss of her mother from cancer. She radicalized 
in her views a  he a  g i g m e a d m e eligi  af e  he  dea h. Sha mee a  fa he  
remarried after the death of her mother and she then began to visit the mosque regularly and to 
defend ISIS in class, sometimes passionately and relentlessly. A change in Khadi a  beha i  
also was noticed before she left for Syria. She began covering her hair, sometimes at school but 
also at home. Her brother remembers a conversation with her about Syria in which his younger 
sister asked him about the political situation there. His response was that it seemed that most 
people were against Bashar Assad  egime. Sha mee a  de a e for Syria influenced Khadiza 
and the other girls to do the same, even though, officially the girls did not disclose anything 
ab  Sha mee a  l ca i  a d e  life a d e e ded he  had  k ledge f ea  f  
her disappearance. The original plan was that Khadiza and three more girls, not two, travel to the 
caliphate. Allegedly, the fourth girl decided to stay because her father had a stroke. Soon after 
the police discovered the note suggesting the planned trip of the four girls along with a few items 
he  a ed  b i g al g a d hei  c , a j dge c fi ca ed he f h gi l  a . In the 
meantime, be ee  Sha mee a  di a ea a ce, and the time the other girls left for Syria, their 
school work became delayed and worsened  a sign that both parents and school staff missed. 
Af e  he gi l  de a e, e ide ce f Ami a  fa he  bei g e e  a  I lamic allie  a  hich he 
American flag was burnt, surfaced. Amira was sometimes accompanying him at these rallies, 





Perhaps among the most important questions in this case is whether the girls received 
some help in fleeing the U.K. The fact that the plane tickets themselves, along with the other 
expenses that had to be made for the trip were beyond what the girls could have saved or 
obtained, makes it very likely for them to have been recruited and even sponsored financially for 
the trip. Khadiza, allegedly, had not have taken the necessary money from her family as she only 
took some jewelry that was not of high value. As for Sharmeena, she had received an inheritance 
af e  he  m he  dea h, possibly enabling her to be able to travel to Syria. Another fact 
suggesting the girls had an inside help was that a Turkish network reported that a man was 
waiting for them by the Syrian border and giving them passports. The footage showed him 
l adi g he c e  f hi  ca  k and saying something to the girls. Even before they 
reached Turkey, their lawyer suggested that they may have been a target of a recruitment 
network that operates in their London neighborhood  a conservative Muslim community  
which is why the network potentially enjoys the protection of some of the locals.  
Shortly after their arrival in Syria, allegedly in Raqqa, Khadiza got in touch with her 
sister to tell her she is safe, they are eating pizza, French fries and fried chicken and are staying 
at a place that had chandeliers, supposedly a hostel for single women in Raqqa. While not 
explicitly stating her intention to get married, Khadiza shared with her sister that she considers 
doing so. She also indicated that further communication should be initiated by her, a detail, 
suggesting that her external communications may have been controlled. After some time passed 
from he gi l  fi  each to their relatives, they got married to Western men and have moved 
out of the hostel to begin living with their husbands. One of them, Amira, became allegedly, a 
recruiter as well. An undercover journalist posed as a potentially interested in joining ISIS girl. 




the day in which she plans to flee, and then fly to Turkey from where she should be smuggled to 
Syria. There was also mentioning of a person who would help her start her journey in London, 
e idi g a  a cl e di a ce f m Ami a  f me  ch l  the Bethnal Green Academy.  As for 
the third girl who traveled with Khadiza and Amira  Shamima, she married a Dutch citizen, 
Yago Riedijk, shortly after the girls arrived in Raqqa447. Allegedly, she requested an English-
speaking husband between the ages of 20 and 25. The couple has three children, two of whom, 
died. The third one was born in a refugee camp in northern Syria after she left ISIS. Shamima  
British citizenship was revoked, as government officials in the U.K. stated that she would not be 
stateless as her mother is Bangladeshi and she is entitled to citizenship in this country, a 
possibility that was later denied by the Bangladesh  Foreign Ministry. While Shamima  
husband is still technically allowed to return to the Netherlands, he may face a long sentence for 
his involvement in ISIS. Moreover, the Netherlands already revoked the citizenship of a person 
who was an ISIS member. Considering these circumstances, it is unclear where Shamima, Yago 
and their newborn baby would live and whose citizens they would be. 
 Applied measures against this threat. Politicians, practitioners and law-enforcement 
officers from all over the world are puzzled by how to successfully counter recruitment for 
radical organizations. Since such organizations are a threat themselves, the easiest solution to the 
problem would be to destroy the organizations. However, especially, with the case of ISIS, 
radical groups merge, split, join efforts or differentiate from each other but they never disappear 
entirely because their ideology is still alive, as well as their ideas and goals. The defeat of Al-
Qaeda did not prevent the emergence of ISIS, nor the end of ISIS will probably eliminate 
cha ce  f a he  adical ga i a i  rise. Realizing this, Western governments developed 
                                                           





measures to combat the war for minds. Overall, they could be divided into three different groups: 
disruption, diversion, and counter-messaging strategies448. The first set of methods include 
cyber-operations that seek to take down accounts of ISIS-member that contain propaganda. In 
2013, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter started deleting and blocking such accounts449. 
Regardless, the nature of social media allows for a quick generation of multiple websites, 
multiple accounts, hashtags, posts and tweets for every single one that has been deleted. 
Moreover, the use of bots that could further facilitate the spread of a message leave efforts to 
disrupt ISIS online agenda without the anticipated results. Some scholars even argue that such 
strategies could push the ISIS digital recruitment and propaganda to the darknet  which will 
make di i  f ch c mm ica i  e e  ha de  a  he ch ice f h m  m i , a d 
de  ha  c di i , emai  m k  a d e iall  f ll f legal h le 450.  
 Another campaign aims to redirect potential ISIS-recruits to other community-significant 
tasks to divert them from the appeal that the broader goals of ISIS pursue. In 2012, the State 
Department launched such program intended to prevent young people in Southeast Asia from 
radicalizing451. Similar efforts were devoted to the American youth but in the physical, rather 
than in the online space.  
 A third measure to combat and deter the aggressive persuasion tactics of ISIS is 
countering their messages through counter-narratives that are mainly two types. The first sends a 
message through Imams and other scholars interpreting Islamic religion properly, highlighting 
ha  killi g a d icide mi i  a d b ali  a e a a hema  adi i al I lam 452. One 
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downside of this approach is that many ISIS recruits do not interact with Imams, they do not go 
to mosques, and may not be religious at all. The second narrative distributed as a counter-
measure to ISIS propaganda is debunking the myth that life in ISIS equals life in paradise, as its 
supporters promise. Instead, through videos depicting the violence, the brutality and the 
bloodsheds of the terrorist organization, the social perceiver should get convinced that the life 
described by ISIS members is an illusion. As this could potentially serve as a strong deterrent to 
ISIS recruits, a notable issue in such campaigns is that the number of Muslims involved in these 
efforts are not high. In addition to this, the anti-Muslim environment in some Western countries 
could devalue the message of inclusion and support for diversity that is in the core of the 
counter-narrative strategy453. I  hi  ega d, Ai e e  ha  he c edibili  defici  e ed  
by the tension between rhetoric and practice in the US War of Ideas should serve as a cautionary 
example for Western governments seeking to address ISIS social media recruitment of their 
d me ic la i 454.  
 In terms of military measures, it is evident that physically defeating the radical 
organization is a step forward toward future deterrence. Punishing its members too. However, the 
legal measures aimed at deterring future threats are minimal. The numerous ISIS soldiers, who 
are detained in Iraq, are a subject of vigorous international negotiations. The question that is in 
the center of these negotiations is what to do with the prisoners. Iraqi prisons are claimed to be 
full455, and other countries are reluctant to take the prisoners for their due process. That said, 
concrete legal measures undertaken to deter this threat in the future, are subject to disagreement 
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between the different stakeholders in this issue. Therefore, implications for deterrence are with 
limited potential. 
 Another suggested measure of punishment and future deterrence for being associated 
with a terrorist organization is the stripping of citizenship that some countries, such as the U.K. 
have already enforced. Other countries, such as Sweden, have discussed the measure at a 
government level but it was concluded that the cumbersome legislative process of implementing 
this measure would take years and is therefore considered to be inapplicable456. Germany is also 
planning to introduce measures for stripping ISIS fighters of their citizenship in case they 
possess dual citizenship457. This consideration is engendered by the principles of the 
international law according to which people cannot be deprived of citizenship in case they will 
remain without one and will become stateless. Therefore, stripping of citizenship would only be 
legally supported if the individual is a citizen of more than one country. The American President 
Donald Trump, for instance, declared that he will oppose the return of people who have been 
involved with ISIS, and will revoke their citizenships of naturalized Americans, even if they  
resided in the country their entire life before they pledged allegiance to ISIS458. 
 When it comes to child-soldiers and children of ISIS-members who started returning 
from Iraq and Syria, there is not a large number of measures that are supposed to reintegrate 
them into society. Moreover, placement in a Western-system that is foreign to them after years in 
the ISIS-environment proved itself to be even counterproductive. The characteristics of the 
ISIS  educational system would make their adjustment to a secular, Western environment 
particularly difficult and traumatic. This experience could potentially result in depression, 
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isolation, and even more radicalization. The following sections identify why and provide an 
example of the consequences that the lack of awareness of the problem brings.  
 In 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi established a new order in the ISIS schools that 
underlines three tendencies. First, the female students and teachers were divided from the male 
ones as the former were obligated to wear a mandatory niqab. Second, classes in arts, social 
sciences, music, philosophy, and philosophy were eradicated from the curriculum459. Third, new 
classes such as Islamic jurisprudence and Biography of the prophet have been implemented460. 
S ce  e  ha  ISIS cha ged he i e a i all  ack ledged ma hema ical mb l f  
adding (+), e laci g i  i h a e  mb l e e e ed b  he le e  ( ). The I lamic S a e  
reasoning for these actions was that the (+) sign indicates the cross, which is used worldwide as a 
symbol for Christians: using a plus sign would be imitating infidels, and was thus forbidden461.  
 In addition, these new subjects and the alterations of the commonly accepted scientific 
language along with the overall atmosphere in the schools of the Islamic State resulted in 
a e  ef al  e d hei  child e   ch l. They were trying to protect them from the strong 
propaganda disseminated there as this could easily lead their children to become fighters in the 
ISIS  a m . Rega dle , ma  child e  e e ill e   ch l a d e e he ef e ai ed i  
traditions of hatred and aggression. Outside of the school doors, public executions were a 
common practice that children observed as well. After the age of nine, boys had to start military 
training and girls were considered old enough to marry.  
 Considering this background, placement in a completely different school environment 
than the one that students used to have in ISIS, could be confusing, frustrating and full of 
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uncertainty and potential for further radicalization. Charlotte McDonald-Gibson describes an 
instance in this regard, depicting a case of a boy trained in the ISIS culture of violence: The 9-
year- ld b  did  like ch l. He did  like he he  child e , beca e he k e  ha  he  
really were: evil unbelievers who deserved to die. So he did what he was trained to do  he 
a acked hem. He a  em ed f m he b ildi g  hi  fi  da  back  462. Another former 
child- ldie  i  ISIS e  ab  hi  e e ie ce back i  E e: Whe  I e ed, me e 
aid  me: 'Y e a l e  a d if I e e  I ld  ha e d e ha  e d e,  h ma  
bei g ld. Thi  i  called fail e'. I ca  f ge  he d 'l e '"463.  
Much criticized but offering an utterly different approach to the problem of radicalization 
and re-radicalization is presented by the reintegration programs in Denmark and Belgium. Both 
countries offer resources to help former jihadists with job search, integration, and inspiration for 
getting education464. While some see such treatment of former ISIS fighters that returned to 
Europe as full of reasons for skepticism and suspicion, others emphasize that this approach is not 
applied without the necessary screenings and conversations initiated on behalf of the authorities. 
A reintegration strategy could only benefit he a e s security in terms of the threat that former 
ISIS members pose when they return home. Regardless, its current outreach remains highly 
limited since approximately two countries in the EU are offering such programs. Furthermore, 
while a potentially positive influence over the lives of former jihadists is possible, the social 
stigma and the rejection, the lack of inclusion and the still powerful narrative about immigrants, 
Muslims and terrorism could play a significant role that may outweigh the efforts of the 
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reintegration campaigns. To that conclusion contributes the following relationship as well: the 
higher the antagonism against Muslims on a neighborhood/community level, the higher the 
likelihood for support for ISIS expressed on social media465. Clea l , ISIS  li e recruitment 
operations turned out to be a very successful tool in the arsenal of weapons that the organization 
has on its disposal. Being aware of this, Western governments have been facing unusual 
difficulties combating the propaganda spread by ISIS. The main reason for this is the problem of 
limiting such content distributed online since the freedom of speech is one of the most celebrated 
and fundamental tenets of democracy. Thus, restricting the online access of ISIS and other 
groups suspected to have connections with terrorist organizations could have damaging 
repercussions on the right of free access to information  a paradox that poses an important 
dilemma466. 
 
The case with Cambridge Analytica 
Background. Ever since its creation in 2004, Facebook was becoming more and more 
popular to users. It kept adding different features, along with a messaging function and at one 
point even other, third-party applications started being offered through the platform. The core 
idea of Facebook was for people to share information and connect. And this is what they did. 
Various elements such as convenience, desire for developing and maintaining relationships and 
enjoyment467 contributed to posting large amounts of personal information with, supposedly 
friends. What users did not know was that they were sharing and connecting (or being 
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connected) to a lot more people than just their friends. They did not know, because they were not 
asked. Users unsuspiciously shared more and more of their personal information and 
increasingly with people who they do not consider friends or even acquaintances. Moreover, 
unknowingly, they were sharing locations, feelings, experiences, hobbies, and stories with 
complete strangers as well.  
Facebook was not the first social media with millions of users, and it probably will not be 
the last. In fact, neither social network was the first place from which personal information of 
users was stolen, used without permission or even manipulated. The case with Cambridge 
A al ica a d Faceb k a   e e  he fi  e i  hich e  e al i f ma i  was 
used by political entities to gain leverage in elections. While there are numerous examples in the 
U.S. about deceased people surprisingly voting on elections468, this tendency is global, especially 
in countries with authoritarian regimes or countries with high corruption levels469. Clearly, it is 
not the deceased who vote but someone using their personal information, typically, to support a 
particular political party. Fraudulent use of personal information always existed. With the 
emergence of social media, it only became more common online than in the physical space, 
because of the favorable digital conditions for personal data collection.  
The fi  ig  f e  l  f c l e  hei  i f ma i  e e e ide  i  2006 he  
Faceb k i d ced Ne  Feed  he e e e  ac  de ake  b  hei  F ie d  i hi  he 
system  who befriended whom, who commented on whose Wall, who altered their relationship 
a   i gle , h  j i ed ha  g  a d  470 was on display. Users were outraged and 
began joining groups opposing Facebook. To prevent users from leaving the platform, Mark 
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Zuckerberg explained that the information that was displayed on the News Feed section was 
public anyway. What he missed to say was that it should not have been displayed without the 
e  e mi i  at all. However, a compromise was reached and in further Facebook updates, 
News Feed no longer contained that detailed i f ma i  ab  e  a d e  f ie d . Thi  did 
not mean it stopped existing, it stopped being public or that it stopped being collected. It was just 
not on display. Users, on the other hand, were happy that their personal information no longer 
appea ed  hei  f ie d  Ne  Feed which was, at the time enough for their relative sense of 
privacy on Facebook. One study found that users on Facebook do not even realize how their 
information is exposed and what consequences this may have for them471. In addition, another set 
of findings points to the conclusion that even when given more privacy settings control, the users 
are not always sure how to use them accordingly because they are simply not designed in a user-
friendly manner.  
In 2018, with a new privacy settings update, Facebook allegedly allowed users to have 
more control over their information on the platform. It gave them the chance to opt-out in case 
they do not want their information to be collected by third-party applications and companies. 
This opportunity not only intentionally skipped to resolve the big problem with data collection 
and data selling but was, in addition, unnecessarily tedious, time-consuming procedure in which 
users have to uncheck all of the boxes of the applications/companies collecting their information 
one by one472. Also, every time Facebook identifies a new interest of the user, the latter should 
go to the privacy control menu and opt-out. However, Facebook does not provide an indication 
of when a new interest is added  he e  file , mea i g ha  he e  ha e  idea he  
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their information is started being shared so that they can discontinue this process. A corporation 
with that many resources and employees as Facebook should be able to offer a more user-
friendly way for users to opt-out from personal data collection all at once, but it did not, leaving 
the impression that the option to opt-out has been made so difficult only to make users not take 
advantage of it. In fact, such universal opt-out option existed in the past but for a very short 
amount of time because it was removed by Facebook, just to be replaced with much more 
restrictions on the u e  c l e  hei   i f ma i . Thi  i e al -out existed in 
early versions of Beacon  Faceb k  la f m ha  ge e a e  a d  ad e i eme  ba ed 
on items a user purchased or browsed on the websites of some forty-four partner sites and shared 
this information with a user's friends via the News Feed 473. Later modifications of the platform 
in favor of more privacy were implemented in Beacon, but the platform ceased existing 
altogether in 2009 after a class action lawsuit for $9.5 million.  
F he  da e  i cl ded cial l g-ins (which added "like" and "recommend" buttons 
to third-party websites without clearly indicating to users when and how their profile information 
migh  be ha ed i h he e eb i e ), a d instant personali a i  ( hich all ed a fe  select 
partners to personalize their web pages by using personal information that Facebook disclosed 
without a user's explicit consent) 474. After targeted advertisements started being posted on the 
e  Timeli e , as a consequence of tracking the e  click   he Like button, another 
lawsuit followed, and another settlement, this time with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). Zuckerberg declared that Facebook would i d ce m e mea e   ec  e  
information. What he missed to say was that Facebook also created even more conditions for 
                                                           
473 Ira S. Rubinstein and Nathaniel Good, "Privacy by design: A counterfactual analysis of Google and Facebook 





digital entrapment of e  personal information. Facebook has a long history of promoting 
digital marketing on its platform whose initial motto was to bring people closer together. At one 
point, it started bringing marketing content closer and closer to the users, at the expense of their 
privacy. It was just a matter of time for political marketing to enter the Facebook scene as well, 
again, at the expense of he e  privacy, their independent choices and the democracy, as the 
case with Cambridge Analytica showed. 
Overview. In the early months of 2018, news outlets broke the story of Cambridge 
Analytica and its collection of personal informa i  h gh e le  Faceb k acc . 
Questions started to arise as the most central one was whether Cambridge Analytica violated any 
rules, or it was Facebook that allowed the controversial data collection. As Cambridge Analytica 
was not a well-known company, at least not to most people, including those whose data was 
collected, the case became even more confusing and shocking  it was revealed that it gathered 
information from 50 million Facebook users. Cambridge Analytica was a political firm engaged 
with collecting data for companies, aiming to influence public opinion and behavior. One of the 
owners of Cambridge Analytica was Robert Mercer  one of the most generous donors of the 
Republican Party. Another stakeholder was also Stephen Bannon  D ald T m  li ical 
advisor in his 2016 election campaign. Allegedly, the firm offered its services to a variety of 
companies including Mastercard, the New York Yankees and Joint Chiefs of Staff475. They were 
also involved in the campaign advocating for Brexit  Leave.EU.  
Cambridge Analytica claimed that it collected e  i f ma i  i  a  eff   c c  
psychological profiles that consider patterns of what they like, who do they communicate with 
(based on their friends on social media) and identifiable personal information, including the 
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e  l ca i . Then, it would use these profiles to make marketing more efficient by designing 
advertisements and other online content tailored specifically to the target audience. As the 
company was not able to accomplish this mission on its own, it sought to collaborate with some 
psychologists from the Psychometrics Center at Cambridge University. The latter developed in 
2014 a study in which Facebook users were asked to fill out a survey about themselves and then 
to download an application that handed over the information from their profiles to the 
researchers. This process was something that was not forbidden by Facebook at the time, as it 
claimed users were informed about their data potentially being used for academic purposes. 
However, the official position of the Center for the potential partnership with Cambridge 
Analytica was to decline the offer. This was not the end of the story, though. Aleksandr Kogan, a 
Russian-American psychologist at Cambridge University, agreed to work with Cambridge 
Analytica on this project. Previously, he has been receiving grants from the Russian government 
to study psychological states of users in social media476. He designed an application for 
Facebook, executing similar functions to the one built by the Psychometrics Center and together 
with Cambridge Analytica began collecting the data of the Facebook users.  
From the beginning of this partnership, it was clear that the gathered e  i f ma i  
was not going to contribute to any academic agenda, or at least not only, as Cambridge Analytica 
is a firm whose main service is to use data for profit, selling it to clients for marketing and 
political marketing purposes. The users, both those who took the survey and consented to their 
information being used and those who did not, were told, that the data will be used for academic 
purposes. That led to the accumulation of massive amounts of data that totaled approximately 50 
million users, only 270,000 of which, consented to their information being used for academic 
                                                           





(but not other) purposes477. Violating the social platform  lic  ha  he e  da a must not be 
sold to for-profit organizations, Facebook announced in 2015 ha  he e  i f ma i  a  
deleted by Dr. Kogan and Cambridge Analytica. In the meantime, however, it became clear that 
Dr. Kogan could not discuss any details of the case as a clause of a non-disclosure agreement 
with both Facebook and Cambridge Anal ica. Sh l  af e  Faceb k a ced ha  he e  
information was deleted, it turned out that copies of this information were still in existence.  
On March 2018, Alexander Nix, the CEO of Cambridge Analytica was fired. His 
suspension was, among other things, a result of a story that the British Channel 4 News aired 
earlier in 2018. One of their reporters posed as a potential client to whom Nix, through 
Camb idge A al ica  b idia  c m a  SCL G , offered variety of techniques that would 
win an election, including hiring Ukrainian women to seduce the opponent and to extort them for 
the footage, or simply videotaping them in a compromising scene in which they allegedly take a 
bribe478. Nix was also caught discussing that among the clients of the firm were politicians in the 
Ca ibbea  a d Af ica  c ie  where privacy rules are lax or nonexistent and politicians 
employing SCL have been happy to provide government-held data, according to former 
employees 479. Additionally, Nix mentioned that some of their clients were reluctant to hire a 
foreign firm as a consulting agency for elections, thus they could pose as students, tourists, and 
he  le  he  c ld a me   ai e ici  beca e, a  he him elf aid: he m me  
you think ha  aga da,  the next questions is, Wh   ha  ? 480.  
Nix also declared that the company does not possess and use data collected through 
Facebook. Directly confronting this statement is a dossier, presented to the National Crime 
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Agency in the U.K. by Christopher Wylie, a Canadian who was at the time involved in the 
Camb idge A al ica  da a c llec i . The d ie  e ealed a la ge am  f Faceb k e  
data, belonging mostly to U.S. registered voters481. Regarding the main focus of the company, 
W lie ha e  ha  he  e l i ed Faceb k  ha e  milli  f e le  file . A d b il  
models to exploit what we knew about them and target their inner demons. That was the basis the 
e i e c m a  a  b il  482. Some of the Camb idge A al ica  b i e  a  al  li ked  
R ia  il d ce  L k il, h e CEO i  e  cl e  Vladimi  P i . Lukoil, the second 
biggest oil producer in Russia, is also popular in other parts of Europe, typically used to spread 
Russian influence in gas-dependent countries. Records show that Cambridge Analytica has been 
a ked  li e h  hei  me h d  c ld k a d L k il  age da. The presentation that 
was prepared by Cambridge Analytica was almost entirely focused on election disruption 
techniques483 through psychographic messaging484. 
 Applied measures against this threat. The measures undertaken as a result of the 
Cambridge Analytica case could be listed in two groups: legal measures and policy measures. In 
May 2018, Christopher Wylie was questioned before Congress. He has been cooperating 
previously, providing evidence to both the U.K. and the U.S. regarding the case, the former 
through its National Crime Agency and the latter through FBI. Most of the questions during the 
hearing aimed to explore the relationship between the disinformation that the Russian 
government agencies were spreading in the U.S. before the 2016 Presidential Elections and the 
data collection of U.S. voters. Witnesses in the hearing were also academics that testified that 
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even if Cambridge Analytica had some effect on the results of the election, it is still unlikely that 
their actions pre-determined them entirely485. Regardless, in his previous interviews, Wylie was 
convinced their psychological profile-modeling had a e i  im ac   e le  e ce i  a d 
decision-making. In addition, he admitted to another controversy that was officially 
acknowledged also by the U.K. electoral commission  that the Vote Leave campaign broke the 
electoral laws in the country as i  a  fi a ciall  li ked  e f Camb idge A al ica  
subsidiaries in Canada. However, Wylie underlines that despite these revelations, there were 
ab l el   c e e ce  f  hi  illegal cha ge  he c i i al e leme  f he 
c 486. Interestingly, while the companies and the people involved in this conspiracy could 
be liable, Brexit cannot be reversed based on the fact that the Vote Leave campaign broke the 
law by exceeding the spending limits determined by the Electoral Commission because the 
referendum had merely advisory character487. Moreover, it would be very difficult a causal 
ela i hi  be ee  he e  elec al beha i  a d he cam aig   be e abli hed, e e  if 
reasonable suspicion of this effect is beyond doubt for many people, scholars and politicians. 
Similar to the other cognitive threats discussed in this study, it is almost impossible to prove that 
ce ai  ac i  eeki g  i fl e ce me e  beha i  e e ac all  cce f l beca e f 
these actions, and not because of an allegedly independent decision of the social perceiver.  
 At the same time, changing its position multiple times, Cambridge Analytica accused one 
of their contractors for stealing the Facebook data in question but firing their CEO, Alexander 
Nix in the meantime488. In the second half of May 2018, they filed for bankruptcy. Facebook was 
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the next in line for hearings. Mark Zuckerbe g  e im  before Congress did not deliver the 
expected answers. Moreover, the evidence made it clear that Facebook knew about the privacy 
breach and did not notify the users whose data were stolen. Instead, they decided to conduct their 
own investigation not informing the authorities and the affected users. The initial statement of 
Facebook was that it requested ha  he e  i f ma i  be dele ed immedia el , but later it 
turned out that the information in question had other copies that were still in existence. 
Z cke be g  e e   C g e  e e blema ic i  a he  a  a  ell: me f hem 
were statements contradicting some of the evidence. Zuckerberg claimed that Facebook provides 
f ll e hi  f e  c e  li e to the users and the company did not and does not sell 
their information to anyone. Contrary to this, Facebook permitted variety of companies, whose 
mbe  a  m e ha  150 allegedl ,  ie  i a e e  da a, i cl di g i a e me age 489. 
Among these companies were American ones (Amazon, Microsoft, and Spotify), but also a 
Chinese one (Huawei) and a Russian one (Yandex).  
 While digital privacy protection remains a grey area for the U.S., mostly due to extensive 
lobbying by companies, the EU took decisive measures even before the incident with Cambridge 
Analytica. Regardless, the legislative measures were adopted after the scandal broke out so the 
fines that Facebook had to pay were much lower than what it would have, had the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) been adopted earlier than May 25, 2018. This way, Facebook was 
only fined £500,000, which was the highest possible fine that the previous data regulation act 
from 1998 set, instead of the roughly £1.4 billion that GDPR stipulates for such violations490. 
After the news about Cambridge Analytica became public, Facebook tried to bring some clarity 
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to its users about how it collects information and for what purposes. In April 2019, it introduced 
its updated policy that was supposed to be understandable and accessible to users. Despite the 
efforts, the policies remained lengthy, inaccessible and incomprehensible to many users. 
Moreover, Facebook still preserves some of its rights to share e  i f ma i  i h I ag am 
and WhatsApp, and other apps as the account-holders have two options, as a result: they can 
either accept this or just leave the social platform to avoid future unpermitted data collection.   
While the popularity of the case when the news about Cambridge Analytica and 
Facebook first made the headline was high, it slowly started to fade away. The same happened 
with the investigations in the U.S., and in the U.K., except for the fine that the latter imposed on 
Facebook, as it violated an EU-regulation. In both countries, strong political campaigns (Donald 
T m  cam aig  a d he U.K.  V e Lea e cam aig ) k ad a age f Camb idge 
A al ica  algorithms and the data they obtained from Facebook. As Donald Trump is now the 
U.S. President and the U.K. chose indeed to leave the EU after its referendum, changing the 
status-quo will be undesirable for the people and institutions with interest in preserving it. 
However, there are some efforts by senators to alleviate concerns about privacy491. They are 
preparing a bill that will enhance the privacy protection of users. It is unclear, however, if it will 
pass, considering the strong lobby of social media and companies collecting and using personal 
data. While changing the current situation is not impossible, the attention to the issues at hand 
has  g  back, a  i  i  c e l  l  af e  he Camb idge A al ica  ba k c  a d he 
relative loss of trust in Facebook. The case with both, while unique, is just symptomatic of a 
bigger problem in society that is still unresolved  the lack of regulation for coercive persuasion 
attempts, especially in the online space.  
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As the issue seems mostly related to corporate and political interests, headlines fail to 
underline another tendency, inherent for the academia, for which Vito Laterza is alarming. In his 
testimony, Ch i he  W lie c fi med ha  a l  f he a e  hat eventually became the 
f da i  f he me h d  ha  e he  ed all came  f e ea ch ha  a  bei g d e a  he 
University of Cambridge, some which was funded in part by DARPA, for example, which is the 
US mili a  e ea ch age c 492.  As Laterza states, a significant amount of the researchers and 
professors who are relatively new in their academic positions are required or strongly 
encouraged to secure external funding for their projects. Even for senior professors, seeking 
grants outside of their i i i  i  a ig  f i fl e ce a d e ige 493. However, when a 
fe  i i  a d f e fe i al de el me  i  de e de   e e al f di g, he  
seek to secure it, regardless of the potential application (and its ethics) of the e ea ch  results. 
Laterza advocates for a conversation among academics regarding the integrity of research 
produced with external funding, as the latter appears to be almost mandatory element in the 
reputable academic  e me. 
The four case studies described in this chapter point to different actors who intend the 
threat. They also show a variety of political reasons that give room to psychological ways of 
executing these threats. The perpetrators in these scenarios view differently what they have to 
gain and lose, and so do the victims as well. The case studies reveal a range of conditions, 
relevant for all three levels of analysis, that makes the cognitive threats possible. What unites 
them is that they are all pertaining to the human psyche as an engine for certain changes in 
society and its political life. They also demonstrate that the existing measures aiming to prevent 
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future cognitive threats are with limited significance. Therefore, in the following chapter, I offer 
a detailed examination of the factors composing them, and how they can inform various 





CHAPTER 5  
CONNECTING THE DOTS:  
STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING COGNITIVE THREATS 
 
 As evident from Chapter 4, fighting cognitive threats after they produce their adverse 
consequences does not generate meaningful results. Considering this insight, another option to 
confront them becomes more promising. As opposed to fighting the threats, attempting to block 
the threat before it occurs or before it delivers damages, appears to be more viable strategy. It 
consists of some elements of deterrence as a state policy, and some other complementary 
elements that serve the same goal but are instead focused on actions by individuals, the 
community and non-state actors of significance. As a state policy, deterrence is fit to counter 
elements of cognitive threats that are made by state actors and to a lesser extent by non-state 
actors, as the relationship between state actors and non-state actors is not regulated as well as 
those between two or more state actors. State policies would be more efficient against another 
state-actor sharing the same political mindset as the deterring entity, and less effective against 
those that do not share the same democratic values. In addition to this, deterrence state policies 
aimed at non-state actors over which the state actor has control are more productive than those 
aimed at non-state actors that are outside the scope of control of the state actor. State deterrence 
policies have some effect on the psychological experiences of the individual, but there are other 
measures with a deterrence effect on individual and community level that are better equipped to 
influence the human psyche. This is true especially since the impact on individual and 
community level will be more direct as the democratic state cannot enforce limitations on some 




could be complementary to the state policies as their meaning is underlined through the close 
connection the individual has with others, first, and second, as they are all part of a collective 
entity that state policies can influence on a broader, more abstract level. 
 The following sections analyze the characteristics of the case studies described in Chapter 
4 in an effort to construct deterrence strategies for a variety of cognitive threats. It will also seek 
to capture common deterrence techniques for all of them if any. The analysis is divided into two 
sections for each of the case studies. The first cluster focuses on the actors and the factors that 
are part of the cognitive threat. Mainly, who is the perpetrator, who is the victim, what is the 
relationship between individuals, state- and non-state actors, what is the perpetrator winning or 
eeki g  i  a d ha  i  he ic im l i g/ha e  l e, acc di g  he ac   
perception, is anyone else involved in the case and how, and what are the factors influencing it. 
The second set of questions that will help elucidate characteristics of a prevention strategy 
pertain to the nature of the problem and the suggested solutions. In particular: does the threat 
represent any potential for war or not, does the threat entail rules and weapons inherent for wars, 
what is the political mechanism/explanation for the threat, and what is the psychological 
mechanism/explanation for the threat. 
  
Countering cognitive threats in Russian espionage cases 
 In the case of Maria Butina, the direct perpetrator is Ma ia B i a  he self. To some 
extent, her handler Alexandr Torshin could also be counted toward the direct perpetrators since 
he was actively involved in the mission to influence U.S. politics. As the case study revealed, 
Maria Butina is not the first female spy, who gained popularity for her espionage missions. Anna 




in the U.S. While undoubtedly, among the Russian agents, there are many men, women are 
particularly influential and successful in their missions as they raise less suspicion and their 
intelligence-gathering can go undetected for years. As for the victim(s) in this case, the 
persuasion was mainly directed toward members of the gun-lobby in the U.S. as well as toward 
some other influential politicians from the more conservative political circles. However, they 
c ld be c ide ed ic im  a  l g a  he  had  k ledge f Ma ia B i a  allegia ce  
work as a foreign agent in the U.S. on behalf of Russia. There are some indirect perpetrators and 
victims in this case as well. Maria Butina would not have been acting as a spy, perhaps, if she 
was not stimulated, recruited or even ordered by Russia to do so. While difficult to prove, it is 
also likely that except for Vladimir Putin, Butina and Torshin, other people also knew about her 
mission and contributed to making it successful. In this group of people would also fall 
Americans, if any, who knew and supported Butina in her task. The list of indirect victims in 
Ma ia B i a  ca e i  l g. I  ld ha e i cl ded e e  ci i e  a d U.S. resident who would 
ha e bee  affec ed b  B i a  a em   e ade e f l li icians in becoming closer to 
Russia, complying with the interests of Kremlin and implementing them in the U.S. in various 
ways. The immediate target of Butina  mi ion was he  di ec  a ge  cognition, particularly its 
decision-making mechanism.  
 As for the relationship between perpetrators and victims, it could be described as existing 
on multiple levels. The first relationship is the state-state one in which the antagonistic 
relationship between the U.S. and Russia underlines the desire of each actor to influence the 
other in a manner beneficial to their own goals. Had these two countries not been rivals, the 




 Probably the most important relationship dyad of all is the individual  individual 
relationship without which the entire cognitive threat would not have been possible. Maria 
Butina actively interacted with other individuals conveying her ideas and making room for even 
more influence in the future. Presumably, her boyfriend, Paul Erickson also did not know about 
B i a  eal i e i , as she was c i ci g him g ad all   k a d he  a d R ia  
cause. It is also likely that Butina only simulated a romantic interest to Erickson so that she could 
benefit from his contacts and his own influence in the gun-lobby circles.  
 Another interesting set of relationships is the one between individual and state  on the 
e ha d, Ma ia B i a  ela i hi  i h he U.S., the country that she was spying, and on the 
other hand, her relationship with Russia, the country on which behalf she was committing the 
espionage. Accepting the risk of being caught, Butina probably sees the U.S. as an enemy, the 
same way Russia views it. At the same time, her actions and the communication she maintained 
with her handler showed that she had a strong sense of duty to Russia and its political interests. 
In addition, her strong sense of identity and loyalty to Russia was questioned when she started 
wondering whether she will be able to return and live safely in Russia after her mission was 
about to be exposed. That could be attributed to the fact that the disruptions in the individual-
state relationship also brought ontological insecurity. It is not quite clear by the evidence what 
a  B i a  c ce  ab  Moscow  eac i  to her potential exposure, but evidence suggests 
that she was feeling afraid of negative actions against her. Another relationship between 
individuals and the state is the one between he di ec  ic im  f B i a  e a i  with Russia, 
and with the U.S. For Butina to penetrate so deeply into the political circles in the U.S. meant 
that the politicians with whom she was interacting were not suspicious of the fact that she was 




boyfriend who was a U.S. citizen. However, despite the dividing factors between the politicians 
that Butina was seeking to influence and Russia, they still had a very important common interest 
 the gun laws, their expanding use in both the U.S. and in Russia and the increased profits that 
would logically come from this. Considering this component, for the politicians to be open to 
B i a  a g me , he  f c ed m e  hei  c mm  i e e  a he  ha   he a ag i ic 
and full of mistrust relationship between their two countries.  
 Non-state actors, while not completely recognized as influential entities in international 
relations, carry the meaning of a catalyst in this case. Not directly named in court documents, 
though evident that the described facts pertained to them, the NRA played a key role in the case, 
as an intermediary between Butina and the conservative U.S. politicians supporting the gun-
lobby on one side, and between the U.S. and Russia, on the other. Undermined by IR-scholars, 
non-state actors, in this case, made possible all the other interactions in this scenario  on an 
individual level, on a state level, and on an individual-state level. The NRA  goals were the 
overlapping point for the connection between all of the parties involved in this case. Regarding 
its own relationship to Maria Butina, she was a vivid supporter of the organization, being a 
member herself, making possible multiple meetings between them and high-ranked Russian 
politicians. Simila  a  he NRA  ela i hi   hei  e  i  he U.S. a  ell. I  e m  f 
their relationship with state entities like the U.S. and Russia, it was a little more ambiguous than 
their relationship with individuals from these countries, mainly because they interacted with such 
who  NRA  g al . NRA  ela i hi  i h he U.S. i  e  c e ial. While he 
organization has multiple supporters and a very strong lobby that earns policy-make   
f  NRA  i e e  a d g al , he ganization also has fierce opponents - citizens, activists, 




even more criticized. NRA  ela i hi  i h R ia i  al  i e e i g beca e a  a -state 
entity, NRA is driven by profits as a main goal, rather than by concerns typical for states or 
individuals. Therefore, what is most conducive to NRA   e l  f ie dl , b  not unfriendly 
relationship with Russia is an interest, expressed in terms of profits. Evidence for this is the 
meetings that NRA members attended in Russia. Ambiguous was the position of the then-
president of the organization, as he was possibly concerned that the closeness with Russia would 
inflict a serious harm to their reputation in the U.S., which is after all the core market and the 
core reason, through legislation and culture, for the profits that their products bring.  
 Considering prevention strategies, it is essential to outline what the sides involved in this 
case have to win and to lose, what they perceive as a win and as a loss. It is essential to mention, 
however, that wins, and losses cannot be identified categorically, as there are different levels that 
could be reached in both categories. A win, in its entirety, may not be achieved, but there may 
have been steps toward it that brings benefits which could still qualify as gains. Then this would 
be if not a complete success, then at least relative one. The same goes for losses as well.  
 Russia has been unequivocally described in the literature as interested in weakening the 
enemy, as opposed to the ages of the Cold War when their tactic was to defeat the enemy 
altogether. This intention has changed ever since, and it now reflects Moscow  f c   
disruption and controlling the adversary through cognitive mechanisms, rather than through 
traditional military force. Therefore, for Russia, a win would be to manipulate U.S. politics in a 
way, favorable to them. In the case of the 2016 Presidential Elections - against Hilary Clinton 
and supporting Donald Trump. Another important threat in the Russian espionage plan is to gain 
information that they can further use to manipulate certain people of power to serve Russian 




politicians beca e f Ma ia B i a  ac i , i  i  clea  ha  he m e fa able  R ia 
candidate won the elections, and to that extent, Russia scored a win. A loss to Russia would have 
been exposing Maria Butina long before she connected to Paul Erickson and high-ranked U.S. 
politicians. However, the meetings between Russian officials and NRA members have taken 
place, a fact that testifies for another win that Russia scored  establishing a relationship between 
the countries, one that was carrying the potential for even further influence over the U.S. political 
life. F  he e ec  f R ia  la , Ma ia B i a, i di id all , hi g  e e   black-or-
white. While she succeeded to make connections and potentially persuade U.S. activists and 
politicians to be more favorable toward some of the Russian interests, even if they have not 
realized that these interests are Russian, she was exposed and convicted. It is still unclear, as her 
sentencing is still pending as of April 2019, whether she will return to Russia as a hero or will 
have another fate. Considering the example of Anna Chapman, it is likely that Butina will follow 
her steps, and will be warmly welcomed in Russia. 
 In terms of what the U.S. has to lose, the answer is clear  democracy and independence, 
both political one, and one pertaining to choices. Russian campaign against the 2016 Presidential 
Elections was conducted on multiple fronts and the extent to which the particular case with 
Ma ia B i a  i fl e ce affec ed he ge e al c me f he elec i  is not entirely clear. 
However, if there was any influence at all, this should be perceived as a loss for the U.S. 
democracy even though she was exposed and brought to justice. This assumption is supported 
by previous cases of Russian espionage in the U.S. in which the agents were caught and 
sentenced but the information they reported back to their handlers, the influence their exercised 
could not have been reversed. Besides, more spies were sent, with new missions, bringing new 




al  l  he c g i i e ba le, a mi g he  e e  a a e f B i a  eal i e i . Had he  
known about them, they would have also risked a trial and a sentence for helping her with her 
plans.   
 Va ie  f fac  al  la ed hei  le i  Ma ia B i a  ca e. Fi  a d f em , 
culture. The American openness to the world, especially in terms of education kept Butina out of 
suspicion initially, as she was a student in a prestigious university from which later, she 
successfully obtained a graduate degree. Other countries, mostly authoritarian, are much more 
suspicious of foreigners, regardless of the occasion on which they are traveling. Another element 
in the U.S. is the gun-culture that opened the door to an intensified communication between 
Butina, Torshin, and other Russian politicians, on the one hand, and Paul Erickson, NRA, and 
members of the Republican Party in the U.S. The support that the gun-lobby enjoys in the U.S. 
both by politicians, and people, made the interaction between Russia and the NRA and their 
supporters, somewhat permissible from both political and moral point of view. Ma ia B i a  
attachment to guns is also an indicator to a broader phenomenon. In one of her interviews, she 
admits that growing up in Siberia, guns were an absolute necessity for survival. As this is most 
likely the case indeed, it is intriguing that Butina sees herself and other people from the region as 
solely responsible for their own survival, not mentioning  ec g i i g he a e  le f  he e 
conditions. Many residents of democratic countries would try to require the g e me  
actions to ensure safe living conditions. At the same time, the Russian identity is very strong as 
one of its main characteristics is the responsibility of the citizen to the state, as opposed to the 
he  a  a d. Thi  c l e ha ed Ma ia B i a  hi ki g a d, to a large extent, her 
determination to execute missions assigned by the Kremlin, even if they pose a severe risk of her 




 Another component that has its place in this case, is profits and power. For the 
relationship between Butina and Russia, and NRA and conservative politicians supporting it, 
there has to be a mutual interest. The NRA saw an opportunity for market expansion in 
collaborating with Russian officials, and the latter saw a possible way to influence U.S. politics 
through the NRA. The tripod profits-power-i fl e ce i  a ic la l  i he e  f  Ma ia B i a  
case. Other espionage cases, while similar, typically do not include intermediaries that are, on the 
one hand, a  f he ad e a  li ical life and on the other, maintaining open channels of 
communication with entities perceived by the state as enemies. Interestingly, he NRA  le i  
the U.S. regarding the Russian interests resembles the one that far-right political parties have in 
Europe. Through them, Russia attempts to influence adversarial countries, especially in cases of 
disinformation.  
 Espionage is a traditional practice during war; it being hot or cold. After the Cold War, 
the Russian espionage did not disappear, it simply continued in the form of sleeping cells and its 
mission transformed into exercising influence to change the political course of the adversary. 
Despite Russia executing espionage-campaigns in the U.S. and in other countries in peacetime, 
even when exposed, such cases do not raise concerns about any potential war actions but instead 
just reaffirm hostility that has always present between the two countries. This fact is a double-
edged sword, however. On the one hand, politicians feel certain that even if espionage cases are 
revealed, this will not escalate into a war. On the other hand, this is very bad news for deterrence 
f he e em  beca e he la e  k   f he  ac i  ill be de ake  e e  if a  
identity is exposed. The rules inherent for this peacetime conflict resemble the ones in wartime, 
mainly regarding the exchange of prisoners, as the one in Vienna between Anna Chapman and 




exchange of prisoners, another reaction to exposed espionage is political signaling through 
judges, U.S. attorneys, politicians and activists that aim to convey to Russia that their campaigns 
failed. The truth is, however, that, as I explained earlier, a win in espionage cases is a flexible 
notion because every intelligence-gathering task reported to handlers constitutes a little win for 
R ia a d a li le l  f  he U.S. J  beca e, af e  me ime he age  e a i  e e 
terminated, and they were sentenced this does not mean that harm has not been inflicted by them, 
even if it ended, eventually, with a court ruling, prison time and extradition, in cases in which the 
spy is a foreign national. 
 From a political point of view, the influence that Butina and Russia exercised could be 
attributed to a few reasons. First, the antagonistic relationship between the U.S. and Russia. 
Second, the state-supported espionage campaigns of the latter and the f me  overall openness 
to foreigners, especially for educational purposes. Third, the overlapping points of interest 
between Russia and U.S. entities mostly related to the gun-lobby and the conservative circles in 
the society. 
 A e  im a  eleme  i  he a al i  f Ma ia B i a  ca e a e he ch l gical 
mechanisms that made the espionage and its success possible. The factor that probably unites all 
the agents working for the Kremlin is their identity. The Russian identity before and during the 
Cold War was predetermined by imperialistic ambitions and thus having an imperialistic 
character494.  After the end of the Cold War, Russians underwent a new identity formation that 
could have either assumed imperialistic characteristics from the past or reorient toward a more 
liberal understanding of the world in which Russia would have had its place among the other 
nations, brought closer by international institutions and norms. In 1996, Chafetz wrote that if the 
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statist and authoritarian powers in Russian politics take prevalence over the more liberally 
i cli ed e , a  i  ha e ed, he  hi  will reduce Russia's dependence on the West and 
deprive the West of leverage against possible Russian violations of international norms. Moscow 
under the statists, for example, is far more likely to intervene unilaterally against its neighbors to 
protect the Russian Diaspora than it would be under the leadership of the liberals 495.  As this 
vision in 1996, becomes a reality in the two decades after this, central to the Russian identity 
remain imperialistic longings, also supported by the rhetoric that a key-influencer of the Russian 
identity has  the Russian Orthodox Church496. According to its narrative, traditional values have 
to be preserved at all cost, especially in times in which they are so severely endangered, mostly 
by the West, seen as an enemy bringing decay to the morality of all Slavs that Russia seeks to 
protect. Such narrative patterns, while not identical to the ones that the Soviet Union distributed, 
still strongly remind such ideas. Therefore, generations of Russians, either born in the Cold War 
era or afterwards were a product of identity formation that to a large extent retained the 
dimensions of the one inherent for the years of the Soviet Union. An example of this is the fact 
ha  A a Cha ma  fa he  a  a f me  KGB age , a d Cha ma  he elf a  a Russian spy. 
Among the central elements of this Russian identity are a i i m a d l al , a  i  he R ia  
tradition, the notions of state and civil consciousness do not match, therefore a civil identity 
mea  bel gi g  he a e 497. Evidently, the idea of the state in the mentality of Russian 
society has a very important role and is placed on a pedestal. Considering these insights, it is no 
wonder that so many young Russians are willing to put themselves in service to the Kremlin as 
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spies, risking exposure, being brought to justice, and sentenced in a foreign country. For them, 
this is simply a patriotic duty, an honor, part of who they are, in some cases, part of who their 
parents and relatives are. I  Ma ia B i a  case, there was also another element that contributed 
to her mission  her persuasiveness that helped her avoid suspicion for a long period of time. 
Additionally, from a social-psychological standpoint, there was something about Butina  a ge  
audience that facilitated her mission. Mainly, it was an element of a sub-identity that Butina and 
her targets all shared  the support of gun rights.  
 Measures toward the indirect perpetrator – Russia. The first and the potentially most 
effective and invasive mechanism through which the Russian espionage could be countered 
pertains to a campaign that the U.S. can launch as a form of potential retaliation that could deter 
Russia. It should seek to inform Russian citizens about opportunities for civic engagement and 
actions to make the state itself more involved in domestic issues. Moreover, in some 
impoverished Russian regions, it is evident that the Kremlin has not done much to assure its 
e le  elfa e, i  e ms of socio-economic and political conditions. As the Russian espionage 
is an old strategy from the Cold War that just adapted to the new environment in the 21st century, 
the U.S. can also successfully employ some of its old weapons against the Soviet Union, 
weapons that led to the end of the Cold War with the symbolic victory of the U.S. What led to 
this victory was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which, among many other reasons was caused 
by e le  de i e   bei g isolated, economically, politically and informationally. Offering 
Russian people information that will empower them to be more politically and civically engaged, 
and to advocate for improvements in their welfare will be a step forward toward less 




 The brutal repression of the Russian opposition and violence used against political 
protesters, especially in urban areas498 is a clear sign that while Putin does not seem intimidated 
by many things, including the financial sanctions of the U.S., he fears a strong, active society 
that demands changes and a better future. The information campaign could be implemented in a 
variety of ways including VKontakte  the Russian version of Facebook. It is important, 
however, that the language used in the campaign is Russian and not English because the 
information may be regarded as false just because of the source, allegedly a foreign one, since 
the used language is not Russian. Once the U.S. shows Russia that such campaigns can be a 
credible threat, they could be used as a deterrence against future espionage cases, assuming that 
Russia unambiguously understands that the campaign is a result of another wave of captured 
Russian agents in the U.S. In terms of any concerns that this campaign may violate international 
law, the official UN language used to regulate interventions in foreign states constitutes that UN-
membe  h ld  intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state 499. A non-coercive influence as a result of an information campaign could not be 
de d a  a  i e e i  i  hi  e e, e eciall  i ce he R ia  e le  i de e de  
formation of civic position does not fall under the Russian jurisdiction. Moreover, an information 
campaign, c ai i g eal a i ical da a ab  R ia  ec m , is not a crime. Instead, it is an 
expression of the democratic right to receive, send and exchange information. Even the proven 
Russian cyber interference in the U.S. Presidential Elections in 2016, for which Russian officers 
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were indicted, is unlikely to have any consequences, mostly because both U.S. and Russia have 
repeatedly interfered in foreign elections during the Cold War500. 
 Measures toward the direct perpetrators – the Russian agents. A second mechanism is a 
variation of the one described above, but its target will be the Russian people, convincing them 
in that while they are loyal to the state, the state also has some responsibilities to its citizens that 
it does not execute very successfully. The reason for the poor welfare conditions should be 
a ib ed  he a e  fail e  ide hem a he  ha   a  e e al e em , he defea  f 
which will bring prosperity and solution to internal state problems. Thus, the goal would be that 
e ial R ia  age  a  e i i g he e e   hich he  c ld be ed i  R ia  
political maneuvering against the U.S. It is true that people  ide i ie  are difficult to change but 
they are, nevertheless, not perpetual but a subject of possible alterations. An example of such 
identity changes are the events that led to the Jasmine Revolution501. 
 Measures toward the direct victims – the individuals. A third mechanism that considers 
the direct victims of espionage  the targeted U.S. individuals should envision the expansion of 
the awareness of the problem. In particular, the media have to pay more attention to summarizing 
cases of Russian espionage, the success of women who conduct it, as well as cases involving 
men. Another component that Americans, especially those assuming a public office or having 
political influence over the government should be vigilant for are foreign nationals, especially 
such from Russia, who are either too observant and silent or too active and engaging. Lastly, 
such U.S. politicians, activists and people of influence should be aware that even if they share 
some common interests with foreign nationals, seeking to establish friendly relationships, there is 
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a caveat. By working toward the common goal that Americans and Russians have in mind, the 
former may not be aware that they will unknowingly fulfill a lot more than just the agenda of the 
collaborating individuals but the one of an entire country seeking to destabilize another. 
 Measures toward the indirect victim – the U.S. A fourth mechanism with a focus on the 
U.S. will be to change the narrative about Russia in an effort to stop vilifying it and therefore to 
present itself to the Russian people not as an enemy. Another long-term option will be that the 
U.S. attempts to change the antagonistic relationship with Russia. Regardless, considering 
decades of antagonism and the current political climate, the best course of action could be 
changing the narrative about Russia, rather than the relationship itself. Changing the relationship 
with Russia will be better than changing the narrative but very unlikely if the political status-quo 
in Russia and in the U.S. persists. In addition to this, the U.S. should be aware of potential points 
of contact between U.S. entities and Russian ones as it is evident that Moscow uses 
i e media ie  f m he ad e a  d me ic li ical ce e ha  d   mi d c mm ica i g 
and collaborating on shared goals with Russia. 
 
Countering cognitive threats in Russian Disinformation cases 
 In terms of the perpetrators, similar to the case with Russian espionage in the U.S. is the 
one with the Russian disinformation campaigns. As these operations were supported by Russia, 
through the creation of the Internet Research Agency, the number of the state-actor victims from 
this campaign is much wider. Russia is the power behind the operation but the people executing 
the orders were not volunteers, but instead, paid to spread disinformation through social media 




St. Petersburg, more than 600 people were engaged with the spread of disinformation502. They 
worked 12-hour shifts, as the related duties were continuing for the full 24-hour cycle of the day. 
Their mornings began with an e-mail with links leading to websites where the disinformation 
was supposed to be placed. Some of the employees were incentivized by the relatively good 
salary and the fact that they would have been, otherwise, unemployed. While the U.S. was 
among the main targets of such campaigns, it was not the only one. The EU-member states were 
also targeted. The countries in Eastern and Central Europe are more vulnerable as they still have 
some Russian-speaking population within their borders or a significant population that has pro-
Russian political views. The Russian disinformation campaigns were tracked even beyond the 
EU and the U.S. as they reached some other countries as well such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Finland, Moldova, and Serbia. Despite that state targets are the main actor that Russia intends to 
harm in the disinformation campaigns, the direct victims are the individuals who read the 
disinformation content and react in a certain way, typically in a manner that Russia intended  
behaviors that express protest, anger, sadness, division, and exclusion of particular groups of the 
population. An interesting paradox is the dual capacity in which individuals who perceive the 
disinformation act. On the one hand, they are victims but unconsciously they also act as 
perpetrators themselves, spreading the disinformation, not knowing that it falsely represents 
facts. 
 The relationships in the cases of disinformation are mainly three, one that concerns the 
state-state ties, another that pertains to the one that individuals have with a state, and a third one 
that represents the one between the different individuals involved. The relationship of Russia 
with the countries in which it disseminates disinformation is generally antagonistic, though, there 
                                                           




are various degrees to this. The most intensified campaigns were conducted in the U.S., Ukraine, 
and in the EU, as these three entities were also outlined a  R ia  bigge  i al , acc di g  a 
survey conducted in Russia503. When it comes to the EU, not all of the member-states are targets, 
but only the most influential states that have a greater role in maintaining the EU itself, and the 
ones in which Russia has geopolitical interests at stake.  
 In terms of the relationship between individuals and states, it should be mentioned first 
ha  i  R ia  ela i hi  i h he i di id al  aid  di emi a e i f ma i , and also what 
is its relationship with the ones for which the disinformation was intended. Information from 
former employees in the so-called Troll factories in Russia shows that among the most important 
reasons for people to seek employment in the Internet Research Agency was the lack of 
sufficient financial means or unemployment. Some of them were not aware about the nature of 
the job and quickly became disappointed by their daily duties. As opposed to the case with 
Russian spies, who were motivated among other things by patriotic duty and sense of identity, 
he em l ee  i  he I e e  Re ea ch Age c  e e   dedica ed  im leme i g R ia  
strategic goals but were inclined to participate purely for the monetary compensation. As for 
R ia  elationship with the people to whom it was conveying the disinformation, it could be 
claimed that the Kremlin sees individuals living in political rival countries as targets, vehicles for 
a desired change of the democratically established status-quo. As for the attitude of victim state-
actors, such as the EU and the U.S., they treat the individuals posting disinformation posts in a 
dehumanizing way for which the multitude of articles repeating the noun trolls testifies. While it 
is true that these individuals are indeed doing a lot to make the disinformation campaigns 
successful, they also undertake these functions because of their employment, their need of 
                                                           




income. Many of these individuals quit working for the Internet Research Agency after they find 
out about the nature of their duties. At the same time, while they are harming states with their 
online activities, it should not be forgotten that it is not volunteering that drove them to the 
Internet Research Agency, but financial incentives. The relationship between the direct victims 
of the disinformation operations and Russia also deserves some attention. Many of the social 
perceivers of disinformation are predisposed to trust such content because their own beliefs may 
overlap with the values that Russia seeks to promote  anti-globalization, a comeback to 
traditional values of the Orthodox Church, anti-immigration and anti-liberal values. Some 
victims of disinformation content do not share these values but may believe in the accuracy of 
the claims simply because a friend of theirs who happens to have views identical to those in the 
article shared or liked it in the social media. That said, individuals who have pro-Russian views, 
or interact with people with pro-Russian views may be much more vulnerable to disinformation 
and thus the main targets of these campaigns.  
 The last relationship that is going to be explored in this section concerns the individuals 
in this case  the ones who are victims of disinformation and the ones who disseminate it. Since 
the employees engaged in disseminating disinformation execute their tasks, as assigned, it is 
likely that they do not realize the full effect of their actions. Moreover, since their job is mostly 
in the online space and they do not see the recipients of their messages, their reaction and the 
broader effect it has, this anonymity helps them detach from what they are required to do and to 
depersonalize their victims504. At the same time, many of the disinformation recipients are not 
aware that what they read is not produced independently by journalists or independent bloggers 
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but instead is manufactured by a state-sponsored disinformation/propaganda factory seeking to 
polarize societies. 
 Analyzing what the sides involved in this conflict have to win and lose in the 
disinformation campaigns, it is easy to discover similarities between the case of Maria Butina 
and the disinformation ordered by the Kremlin against the Western allies and some Eastern 
countries with geopolitical significance. In particular, Russia seeks to destabilize these countries, 
weaken them and ideally, when the disinformation operations are conducted during important 
elections, to bolster the candidate that is friendly to the Russian interests. Moreover, in countries 
with a large Russian-speaking population, there is also another factor that was already mentioned 
previously  the attempt to erase their history and to convince them that Russia has a major role 
in it. Through the narrative change, the Kremlin seeks to expand its influence in Eastern and 
Central Europe but also to undertake even further actions, if possible, as the case with Crimea 
showed. In this context, since Russia seeks to destabilize, a win marked by the disinformation 
campaign will indicate varying degrees of weakening the rival, as an ultimate victory could be 
identified only in cases in which the disinformation helps the pro-Russian candidate in an 
election win. Another possible scenario of an ultimate win would be a civil war to break out in 
one of the countries with Russian-speaking population thus opening space for Russia to intervene 
in other ways, including militarily. The losses of countries - targets of the Russian disinformation 
could be derived by what Russia has to win with this approach. It should be underlined, however, 
how a win looks like in the eyes of the affected by disinformation countries. This would be a 
situation characterized by lack of disinformation campaigns or lack of effect of the 
disinformation campaigns on independent decision-making, on the civil peace, and on important 




as well as there are in losing it. For instance, a decrease in the number of fake news or in the 
successful Russian influence over independent decision-making will also mark a win, even if not 
an ultimate one.  
 Next, I would like to dedicate a few sentences to the effect of disinformation to the direct 
victims of it  the individuals who perceive it. Probably the most serious caveat hidden in 
disinformation is that the recipient of the message thinks that the newly perceived information 
actually benefits their decision-making by enhancing the amount of information that they have 
on their disposal. Contrary to this, it clouds the independent decision-making by imposing a view 
on a particular topic. This view is, in fact, the view of the sender of the message as the latter has 
the clear intention to coercively influence the perception of the recipient, thus making their 
judgment anything but voluntarily and freely formed. In an ideal scenario, a victory for the 
individual decision-maker would mean access to perfect information based on established facts, 
without external interpretations that inevitably reflect a particular point of view. While difficult 
to prove if this is the case at hand, an ultimate loss for a social perceiver would mean that they 
formed a decision that was expressed through their behavior only on the basis of the 
disinformation planted in their cognition. 
 The last section discussing the wins and the losses for the participants in the 
disinformation conflict is focused on the direct executors of the disinformation program. As the 
situation could be described in more concrete terms for other participants, many of the 
employees in the Internet Research Agency felt ambiguous about their activities, thus what 
would constitute a win for them is difficult to be defined. However, as the central incentive for 
what they are doing is money, a win would be to perform their job duties and receive the 




the damages that their posts inflict. If they realize them and from this realization sense of guilt 
surfaces, then the win will be mixed with some moral losses as well.  
 While it is evident what is the chain of actions and results in cases of disinformation, 
somewhat peripheral remain the intermediaries that make the disinformation so successful. To 
some extent, it is known that websites, social media companies, and online search engines, have 
a crucial role in making the disinformation process possible. However, legally and morally, they 
mostly remain blameless because first, they do not want to exercise censure over content, and 
second, are not legally responsible for the type of information shared through their platform. 
Gradually, with the spread of disinformation, public opinion and policy-makers forced social 
media to enforce some limitations to the spread of disinformation. There were some boundaries 
to these restrictions because the central premise of creating a company is so that it can make 
profits. The e fi , i  he c e  ma ke  c di i , a e made ible h gh he attention 
economy where the most valued content is that which is most likely to attract attention 505. 
Therefore, it could be reasonably argued that disinformation was not hurting social media but 
just the opposite  it entailed more clicks, more attention, more shares, more likes, more 
discussion, and more profits. Having these facts in mind, while social media and the websites 
related to it are definitely part of the problem, they could be difficultly influenced as part of a 
solution. In the market economy, they are allowed to seek profits, the same way that public 
opinion and policy-makers seek restrictions to the spread of disinformation. These conditions 
shape a dilemma that makes any deterrence strategies focused on the intermediaries in 
disinformation cases likely to fail because of the conflicting interests of the actors involved. As 
f  he cie  le i  he di i f ma i  ca e , i  eagerly absorbed the attention economy 
                                                           
505 Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis, "Media manipulation and disinformation online," New York: Data & Society 




culture that slowly established itself as the dominant culture in the free market countries. As even 
reputable media started using more and more alarming and attention-provoking articles, the 
readers were paying less and less attention to headlines that merely stated facts without any 
implicit emotion-provoking agenda. This led to even more profits generated by the use of 
emotion-inducing headlines and entailed a decreased awareness of disinformation-disseminating 
articles that have almost the same alarmist character as the mainstream media.  
 Disinformation being one of the oldest weapons in warfare, it is not surprising that is still 
used in present days, even in peacetime, as channels and opportunities for communication grew 
exponentially in the past few decades. As an ancient and already known weapon, disinformation 
does not carry a risk of retaliation involving military means. Moreover, disinformation does not 
even constitute a crime, unlike espionage, for which the perpetrator can be punished, unless the 
disinformation opens the door for a defamation lawsuit. The process of Russian disinformation 
typically exploits the freedom of speech and of free information exchange through channels 
offered mostly by private companies, supposedly with no political interest invested in the 
opinions shared through them. As opposed to the years of the Cold War, when some of the most 
common sources of disinformation were the government-owned media, in the post-Cold War 
period, the disinformation spread by the Kremlin relies on the exploitation of democratic 
freedoms with the goal to make them work for an undemocratic agenda. While disinformation is 
not a crime and it is not a reason for war actions by itself, it is not considered unproblematic 
because it utilizes allowed means to achieve a forbidden result  interference in the domestic 
affairs of a foreign country. Considering these characteristics, the rules inherent for conflicts 
caused by disinformation campaigns should not be the same as those inherent for war conflicts. 




international law that will not lead the antagonistic relationship between Russia and its 
disinformation victim-states to escalate into hostilities.  
 The political mechanism that makes the Russian disinformation operations possible is the 
inimical relationship between Russia and some countries (such as EU-member states and the 
U.S.)  e ha d, a d c ie  ha  a e bjec  f R ia  ge li ical i e e  (c ie  i  
Eastern Europe and Asia, envisioned as part of the Eurasian project), on the other. In the 
disinformation campaigns, Russia sees the readers of disinformation content as a means to an 
end  to disrupt independent decision-making and influence the public opinion in a favorable to 
Russia manner. Disinformation is also made possible by the difficult economic conditions in 
Russia and the fact that many people do not have sufficient means for survival, which turns them 
to seek employment by the Internet Research Agency. Highlighting these circumstances, the 
following chain of actors and their actions becomes evident: Russia hires employees 
disseminating disinformation, they use social media to spread it, readers perceive the 
disinformation from social media and subsequently demonstrate attitudes consistent with Russian 
foreign policy goals. While influencing the outcome of elections in rival countries are among the 
most central goals in M c  strategic plans, disinformation is not and should not be 
perceived as a phenomenon that is only limited to such events. Disinformation seeks to cast 
doubt in values, to discredit politicians, to alter the course of decision-making on significant state 
problems, to polarize societies and plant the seeds of mistrust and contempt. 
 The three main mechanisms that could best explain disinformation are persuasion tactics, 
the confirmation bias and the preference to social networks constructed of like-minded 
individuals. The first mechanism is a broad category that includes the psychological tools to 




eci ie  j dgme  a  he c e ed i f ma i  c ea e  a  a i  a e i  he i di id al  
mind. In this crisis state induced by the alarming headlines, they look for more information, 
typically found in the article itself, thus automatically considering it as more trustworthy than it 
actually is. Moreover, the disinformation articles, in order to appear more credible, have some 
evidence supporting the inaccurate facts presented in the text. In the previous chapter, it was 
mentioned that, according to studies, even if false evidence is provided to support a particular 
false claim, the claim immediately becomes more reliable in the eyes of the reader. The topics 
that Russian disinformation exploits are proven to have a more notable impact on audiences that 
already have a predisposition to believe in the facts offered in the article, which tendency could 
be attributed to the confirmation bias  the inclination of people to interpret new information in a 
way that simply confirms their already formed views on a particular issue. Research also 
provides an evidence for another component that makes disinformation possible and rapidly 
expanding across social media  e le  cial e k . The h ma  che i  c c ed i  a 
manner that seeks to create relationships with like-minded individuals. A reason for this is the 
inherent desire to avoid cognitive dissonance (the opposition between attitudes and expected 
behavior). Thus, individuals seek to create social networks in which the members of the group 
typically share similar views, or at least for the most part in order to avoid cognitive dissonance. 
Therefore, if one of the group members perceives disinformation as reliable information and 
shares it with like-minded group members, it is likely that the latter will consider the information 
as reliable. This phenomenon occurs because first, the secondary recipients learned the 
information from a person who they trust, even if this person is not the original source, and 
second because the information overlaps with previous knowledge that the individual holds in 




 Measures toward the indirect perpetrator – Russia. Focusing on the fact that Russia 
targets mostly countries that it considers rivals or such that are slipping away from its influence 
and moving toward the West, diplomacy measures are among the first ones to be mentioned in 
order to alleviate the tendency for Russia to feel threatened. Especially useful in this regard may 
be c l al ie  ha  e e  he We  a ecia i  of Russian culture and art and their 
ig ifica  lace i  he ld  hi . Thi  a eg  ma  be e e  m e critical in former Soviet 
states about which Russia feels that they are escaping from its influence, denying its importance 
and the values it treasures. Through such diplomatic means, a strong message could be sent that 
im lie  ha  R ia  im a ce c ld be ec g i ed i h  i  ha i g o erase the influence of 
the West. Thus, Russia will receive some certainty about its position in the minds of European 
people, and at the same time will begin to see some of the countries, if not all, less as enemies 
and more as entities that acknowledge R ia  c l al legac . Additionally, this way it will be 
harder for Russia to portray the West as an enemy that demeans Russian importance in Europe 
and in the world. Evidence that shows support for the potential success of this strategy is the fact 
that Russia perceives the EU as a coalition that refuses to acknowledge and treat it as a European 
state when it comes to discussing matters pertaining to the continent506.  
 As opposed to this defensive, diplomatic step, a more offensive measure that could be 
undertaken regarding Russia as disseminator of disinformation is for state leaders of affected 
countries to officially recognize disinformation as an imminent threat with severe consequences, 
and Russia as a perpetrator, along with other entities that support its activities (nationalist parties, 
etc.). It is essential that in official statements, the people executing the disinformation, the so-
called trolls, are not vilified but humanized and described through their involvement in these 
                                                           




operations mostly because of monetary and not political incentives. Currently, by vilifying not 
only Putin and disinformation, as his weapon, but also the Russian people who generate it and 
spread it, the West confirms its negative attitude toward the Russian nation and its population 
rather than expressing disapproval only toward its leader and the oligarchs close to him.  
 The public statements distributed by state leaders should also be bolstered by evidence 
h i g R ia  i l eme  i  he cam aig   ha   d b  i  lef  i  he mi d  f he 
citizens that what they read in less-reputable sources may be a misleading content distributed as 
part of the disinformation operation of Russia. This method will also serve as a prevention 
strategy directed toward the consumers of disinformation, as it will increase their awareness of 
the ongoing cognitive threat against them and their countries. Paul Goble advises that state 
leaders expose disinformation as it represents al a  a c ci  lic  a d a  f a la ge  
policy agenda [and] not simply dishonestly of this or that official in response to a particular 
e e 507.  
 Another weapon in the arsenal against disinformation is the information campaign that 
was suggested as a measure in the fight with espionage. Maintaining a state that could be hardly 
described as a democratic one, Putin has proven on many occasions that he fears democracy and 
liberal rights for his citizens. The examples als  i cl de he e i  e e ci ed e  P i  
critics. In an effort to silence them, he even resorted to violence, as there are multiple cases 
involving poisoned dissidents508. Since democratic thinking and strong civic society are an 
unwanted obstacle to Putin  g al , according to his treatment of the opposition and the activists, 
then this could be a key to a stable strategy to counter the problem. There is one difference 
between the information campaign recommended for cases involving espionage and those 
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involving disinformation. In the latter, there should be an emphasis on the Western consumers of 
disinformation as victims, and not enemies, which will humanize them in the eyes of Russian 
society. The information campaign may also focus on real stories of people reading 
disinformation content: how they happened to read it and how it changed their thinking about 
issues. Such accounts may lead to the Russian people making a parallel between their own 
e e ie ce  i h P i  di i f ma i  a d propaganda machines in the face of state-owned 
media, such as Russia Today (RT). Moreover, for this strategy, it will be crucial that Russian 
Internet Research Agency employees are not vilified but portrayed, together as the consumers of 
disinformation, as victims of P i  illibe al egime. The narrative should include that, on the 
one hand the government forces people to take part in state-sponsored cognitive manipulation 
campaigns against independent thinking because many Russian citizens are left without a job or 
with an insufficient income, as this lack of choice leads them to join the Russian Internet 
Agency. On the other hand, the victims of disinformation, innocent people who are involuntary 
participants in political games, also suffer from Puti  a egic g al , j  a  m ch a  he e le 
employed to cause this harm, part of an operation designed by the Kremlin. 
 Measures toward the direct perpetrator – Internet Research Agency employees. A 
continuation of the solution to the disinformation problem focuses directly on the Internet 
Research Agency employees and mainly on the reasons they had to become part of it  money. 
This strategy can be labeled as neither offensive nor defensive. It aims to deprive Putin of hiring 
even more people who will execute his disinformation plan. NGOs and the private sector may 
directly target employees of the Internet Research Agency through advertisements in Russian, 
offering them alternative employment with a better compensation than what they would obtain if 




Internet Research Agency made around $700 per month509  a salary that is below the minimum 
wage in the U.S. for the same year ($1,160), for instance. Even if most of the employees have no 
qualifications at all, their minimum wage, if employed by a U.S. entity will be higher. Evidence 
shows, however, that not all of the labor in the agency was unskilled. Among the employees 
working there were well-educated people such as journalists and writers510. Moreover, if it is 
assumed that an information campaign for Russian people is indeed a viable strategy undertaken 
by the West and its allies, then Russian-speaking people who know the Russian culture and the 
primary sources of communication will be an essential part of the campaign. Thus, Internet 
Research Agency employees would be discouraged from continuing to work for the Kremlin by 
Western employers offering them better remuneration. Furthermore, these same employees can 
be hired in campaigns to inform their co-citizens for their rights and benefits if the Russian 
regime was more open to the world. 
 Measures toward the direct victims – the disinformation consumers. As digital 
information and digital communication have become an integral part of life in the 21st century, it 
would be reasonably expected for educational systems to reflect the changes in technology and 
society. While many countries already developed traditions in information literacy, it is still 
mostly at the higher-education level rather than on an early-education level, especially in 
countries with lower GDP. Moreover, as it was previously emphasized, Central and Eastern 
European education systems rely more on memorization rather than on critical thinking. 
Additionally, the post-Soviet influence in these countries is still active and seeks to change the 
history in a way that assigns Russia a more prominent role in these societies, their history, and 
their culture. Therefore, a vital step is implementing information literacy courses, lectures, 
                                                           





activities and awareness in schools as these educational methods should begin at an early age  
possibly when children start using computers, other devices, and social networks. Students 
should be taught what disinformation is, how it differs from other phenomena, how to recognize 
potential disinformation and what to do with it. This way, the children will be capable of 
recognizing the seriousness of the problem and react in a civically responsible manner. As for the 
education systems in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU, NGOs and other entities should 
vigorously encourage implementation of critical thinking and a more comprehensive approach to 
teaching history and other subjects. Quality education is especially important since many of the 
textbooks, produced in the first years after the end of the communism, were written in a way that 
does not reflect major world events (e.g., the Cold War). In countries with a large Russian-
speaking population, it is also important consumers of all ages to be offered reputable media, 
traditional and online, in Russian that will compensate for the disinformation and the propaganda 
of Russian-owned outlets such as RT. An example of this practice was already given by Estonia 
 a country that according to external evaluations is doing a lot to deter disinformation, 
moreover, successfully. In a broader context, the population i hi  R ia  b de  should also 
ha e a  al e a i e ce f i f ma i , f  i a ce, a a elli e di ec -to-home television 
broadcasting so that the US and the West can deliver messages to the peoples like the Russians 
h  a e  ca i e  f hei   g e me  di -i f mi g media 511. Such a strategy will 
follow the one from the Cold War times, mainly Radio Free Europe  an informational tool that 
proved itself very successful for the mission it set forth512. 
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 A measure that can also bring some clarity regarding facts that are part of narratives of 
Russian propaganda and disinformation would be the implementation of a state-owned website 
in countries affected by disinformation. It should contain facts of significance that were falsely 
presented in disinformation websites. This way, the state can establish a firm position on the 
accuracy of reported as news facts, explain others, that are left vague and discredit propaganda 
content that appears online. These tools can be concentrated in state-owned media that already 
have established credibility and enjoy popularity among the domestic population. In addition to 
the news reported by these media, there should be a section that focuses concretely on facts that 
were inaccurately represented as part of a disinformation content. Such efforts are already 
initiated by various countries, both on NGO-level and on state-level. However, with that many 
resources, consumers may get confused as to where to double-check certain information. 
Therefore, it is crucial for the source to be supported and maintained by the government, to enjoy 
credibility, and to be already known to users. After adding the fact-checking section on the state-
owned media website, the new implementation should be promoted as an accurate method of 
delivering the news and simultaneously disproving any wrongful interpretations of them. 
 Measures toward the intermediaries – the traditional and social media. In terms of 
restricting the Russian disinformation officially distributed through state-owned media (RT), the 
U.S. made some particular steps already, however, with limited success. The Department of 
J ice f ced he RT  U.S.-based company T&R to register under the Foreign Agent 
Registration Act (FARA)513 a  a f m f a i g  RT  ie e  a d eade  ha  he media i  a 
propaganda outlet. Legislation from the U.K. concerning impartiality of the media led to the 
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courts fining RT514, as a result of inaccurate reporting, thus serving a similar deterrence purpose 
as FARA. Regardless, neither of these state-enforced mechanisms are very efficient because they 
are time-consuming and it is challenging to keep track of all disinformation outlets, especially 
online. Therefore, a strategy different from the premises of FARA may be better even if it means 
the implementation of an entirely new system for monitoring digital media. In particular, this 
system should envision that the reputable news outlets should be invited to register, rather than 
the ones disseminating information. With a state-registration, the media will receive a license 
and the obligation to demonstrate through its website that is certified. The registration should 
include information about the media ownership, other companies with which the owners are 
associated and when the media was originally established. This way, monitoring the history of a 
medium may be an indicator for its credibility. Newer media should be an object of close 
observation until they establish themselves as renowned in time. State legislation should adopt a 
definition of the term news outlet that will differentiate between websites with news content and 
others (e.g. blogs) in order to delineate which websites are supposed to register and which do not 
have to undergo a registration process.  
 In case a medium fails to register and fraudulently uses the certification logo that the state 
will give to registered media, the legislation should incorporate fines. Moreover, websites that 
are not registered as news outlets should be obligated to disclose on their website in a visible 
way that they are not news agencies and the content does not necessarily have to be a subject of 
journalistic standards for accuracy and objectivity. Non-compliant websites who present news 
without registration or disclosure that they are not news sources should be deleted and the 
owners fined. The registration of the media should be free of charge so that equality between 





them is guaranteed and any chance for discrimination eliminated. Thus, readers will be 
immediately aware that they are reading content from either a registered source or one that is not 
certified. The role of intermediaries such as Facebook is also vital. Social media should only 
accept advertisements from other media that are compliant with the rules for digital news outlets.    
 An additional measure should be a state-sponsored campaign that seeks to discourage the 
evolution of the attention-economy culture. Headlines that adopt a more neutral tone should be 
preferred over such that subtly lead the reader to a conclusion directly with the headline, not 
leaving them any room for independent fact-assessment and decision-making. To this campaign 
should also be invited companies such as The New York Times and The Washington Post, who, 
among other media, set the tone of the entire information culture. While both companies are 
considered as renowned sources of information, they do not come free of charge. Instead, when 
the online reader exceeds a certain number of articles per week, they are asked to pay a certain 
fee to continue reading. Discouraged by the paid access, naturally, readers may turn to 
alternative sources that are free, but not reputable, accurate, or complying to journalistic 
standards. Therefore, it is essential that the states engage in a conversation about how to make 
the content of reputable news agencies accessible to readers so that they do not resort to sources 
that lack credibility.   
 The last measure that can have impactful consequences pertains to social media 
advertisements. Political or issue advertisements concerning election candidates on social media 
should be restricted unless they disclose the source of their funding clearly and directly through 
social media515, without having to click on the specific advertisement. Furthermore, 
political/issue advertisements funded by foreign sponsors or donors should be prohibited, the 





same way that funding from non-native donors/sponsors/citizens is not allowed in elections, 
because ultimately both phenomena have the same effect  bolstering or diminishing a 
ca dida e  cam aig  by a foreign entity. Also, social media should be obligated to track and 
report to a state communications commission the number of clicks that political advertisements 
receive so that the importance of social media as an arena for election campaigning is assessed, 
at least approximately. Such regulation would be particularly useful so that their accountability 
for election disruptions is out of doubt. Among other tracking measures that can be adopted, this 
one can serve as proof for the major impact social media companies have on independent 
thinking, voting, and democracy. 
 
Countering cognitive threats in recruitment by radical Islamic organizations  
 While non-state actors appeared in cases of espionage and disinformation, along with the 
main state-actors, in the case with the recruitment by ISIS, the central actor is a non-state one, 
and the state-ones are playing a secondary role. The caliphate could be labeled as the main figure 
in the recruitment process, but it is important to delineate who was executing the recruitment 
operations in the name of ISIS. Those were mainly individuals who pledged allegiance to the 
terrorist group and, of course, its leaders who made direct appeals to people to join the caliphate 
and help develop it further. The case of ISIS recruitment is another example of how perpetrators 
could be, initially, in the role of the victims. Many of the recruits were victims of manipulations 
and deceit before they became recruiters themselves after they traveled to Iraq and Syria. Among 
these perpetrators who were victims at first, were men, women, and children. However, the circle 
of the victims does not end with just the people who chose to join ISIS. The families of all these 




tremendous emotional shocks after discovering that their sons, daughters, sisters, brothers, nieces 
and nephews joined the terrorist organization and pledged allegiance to its leaders. Moreover, 
there is another figure among the victims in the case of ISIS recruitment  the states from which 
the fighters came, and in many cases against which acts of terrorism were committed by their 
own citizens. The number of state victims in recruitment cases is very high since almost every 
country has anti-terrorism laws that could have been enforced against a captured ISIS-fighter, 
exemplifying that the war against terror was multilateral, regardless of the concrete victim. The 
state victims were not only professing Christianity and Judaism but were also Islamic and Hindu 
countries516. Therefore, the hypothesis that ISIS declared war only on Christian countries is not 
ed b  e ide ce f he e i  ga i a i  ac  f i le ce. 
 The three main conceptual relationships that surface are the non-state actors  state 
actor(s), non-state actor(s)  individuals, and state actors  individuals. First, the relationship 
between non-state actors and state actors. It is represented by ISIS, on the one hand, and the 
states to which its violence was directed, on the other. These state actors include populations 
with different religions. They are located on different continents and represent different socio-
economic conditions, and culture. As an enemy, ISIS was very dangerous mostly because it had 
a practically unlimited number of enemies that could have been affected by terrorism at any 
point. Moreover, since it was not officially recognized state entity but rather a state-like 
organization without official recognition, diplomatic contacts and negotiations were not a 
possible solution to resolving or alleviating the issue. Deterrence as a state policy is also a 
limited option. Other non-state actors with significance in this case were the companies whose 
products ISIS was using to communicate and recruit new members  Facebook, Instagram, 
                                                           




Twitter, WhatsApp, etc. While in other circumstances, these social media companies would have 
been responsible to some extent for facilitating the recruitment process, in this case, the ISIS 
recruiters were taking advantage of the main service these companies were providing. Their 
primary purpose is interaction and exchange of information, something that neither the 
companies nor the legislation are capable of restricting without any serious damages for the right 
to information and free speech, except in cases involving examples of hate speech and 
propaganda that were discovered by these companies and/or the law enforcement.  
 The next relationship is the one between the non-state actor(s) and individuals. The dual 
capacity in which ISIS recruits acted makes this relationship particularly interesting. The victims 
of ISIS in terms of cognitive manipulations began being the manipulators themselves after their 
recruitment ended successfully as they joined ISIS. Attempting to provide services and goods as 
a real state, ISIS resembled one a lot  it had a territory, population, some administrative 
apparatus even if not well developed, schools, hospitals, and profits. However, it also lacked 
various things, among which, the most central one was, the opportunity to provide to its people 
citizenship, passports and stability, especially considering the fact that it was spending a lot more 
than it could afford to pay. ISIS  mai  f ding came, according to the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF)517 from profits gained from the occupied territories; ransoms from kidnappings; 
donations, fundraising and material support in other forms518. As stated above, the difference 
between Osama bin Laden  i i  f Al-Qaeda a d ISIS  de  i  leade  a  ha  he f me  
aimed to destroy the Western order and to establish a strong caliphate only when it has already 
gained local support and have built solid grounds for future development. As opposed to this 
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strategy, ISIS rushed into declaring the Islamic State with an imposed order based on brutal 
force. It had the mission to provide the survival of the caliphate and to simultaneously destabilize 
the West. This was an ambitious task that, according to estimates, in the early years of ISIS cost 
nearly $10 million per month only for the remuneration of 20,000 to 30,000 fighters, compared 
to Al Qaeda's operations in Iraq from 2004 that were evaluated to roughly $10.4 million per 
year519. De i e ISIS  de i e to be perceived as a state, it was not, and this fact brought a lot of 
legal issues when it was defeated, and its fighters had to return home with no passports and no 
documents proving their identity, after destroying their old ones.  
Other individuals who suffered from ISIS recruitment were the parents and the relatives 
of the people recruited. They experienced emotional trauma after realizing their beloved ones 
joined the organization. This shock came as a result of the little suspicion they had that members 
of their households have any attachment to ISIS. Moreover, evidence shows that most likely 
none or limited conversations were led at home about the radical organization before the 
radicalization occurred. At the same time, the active ISIS propaganda on social media switched 
he ec i  edi i i   e fa able  he ga i a i . U d b edl , social media 
played an essential role in the recruitment that could not have been limited without censorship, 
potentially unjustified persecutions, restriction of connections and possible lawsuits. Facebook 
and similar channels for communication were very appealing to young people, they spent a lot of 
time engaging with them, and this made them easier targets for recruitment.  
 The third relationship that could be observed in the ISIS recruitment case is the one 
between state actors and individuals. It represents a complicated and challenging question: why 
citizens of a particular country would leave it to join an organization that commits acts 
                                                           




potentially against this very same country. The reasons embrace a multitude of cultural, socio-
economic and political factors, as it was discussed previously. Summarizing them leads to the 
conclusion that some states failed to provide enough certainty and comfort to their citizens and 
made them targets to recruitment. In addition, it is likely that the citizens did not feel attached to 
the state to a degree that made the recruitment and the violence directed against the state, an 
acceptable option. Further problematizing this question is another relationship that the states 
have with the victims of terrorist acts executed by ISIS. The grief and the trauma from these 
terrorist attacks gave rise to nationalist voices that demanded the state adopts further acts of 
repression against Muslims worldwide and Muslim communities in the state itself. As the far-
right parties gained more and more supporters and seats in the national parliaments, many 
popular state narratives started transitioning from a fight against terrorism to a fight against 
Islam, which further alienated Muslims and exposed them to more opportunities for 
radicalization and recruitment. Moreover, after the world declared a win against ISIS and its 
members started returning home, many states refused to allow them to enter and even revoked 
their citizenships  a measure that has an ambiguous meaning for deterrence. It sends a clear 
message that for those who join terrorist organizations, there will be no coming back. While this 
may deter to some extent potential recruits that are still hesitant about joining ISIS, it also makes 
it impossible for newly added members to redeem themselves, to reintegrate society and to be 
motivated to stop seeing their former state as an enemy.  
 It was clear since the establishment of the Islamic caliphate that the next goal of ISIS will 
be to destroy the Western order. Its leaders sought this as well as its members. At the time, a loss 
in the eyes of ISIS members was a defeat that led to territories lost, decreased incomes from 




the more significant the losses were in every regard including reputational, as the abilities to the 
state-like formation to continue existing were under question. Another phenomenon that could be 
considered a loss for ISIS, in a non-material sense, was the loss of supporters and the decline of 
the faith in the ISIS ideas and goals. However, while non-material, it was still a very important 
one, because ISIS may continue existing, at least ideologically, even without territories, funding, 
and profits, but if it loses credibility and supporters, this would mean that the organization is 
dead indeed. From another perspective, ISIS members suffered losses translated into the 
disappointment of some ISIS-members by the fact that the conditions promised by the caliphate 
did not match with reality. Moreover, for the families of the ISIS members, the losses of being 
away from their children and potentially not seeing them again represent a significant emotional 
burden, added to the realization of the fact their beloved ones joined a terrorist organization 
responsible for many deaths and other atrocities. The shock in the community from the news that 
people who previously did not express any attachment to ISIS or its ideas abandoned their 
everyday lives and their families abruptly to support terrorism also brings disappointment, 
sadness and even more questions.  
 As for the individuals or their close ones who were victims of ISIS violence, a win in 
their eyes was mostly getting their beloved ones back home. Among other desirable scenarios 
was the elimination of ISIS. Unfortunately, they did not realize that even without territorial 
presence the ideas of ISIS may still survive. A loss for these people meant even more terror, 
death and devastation. In terms of state wins and losses, the most significant damage is 
e a i al babl , ca ed b  he de a e f ma  f he a e  ci i e   j i  ISIS. Thi  
is, of course, in case the state has not suffered any terrorist attacks that will also bring losses of 




is something that does not heal easily and could persist across generations. To this extent, not 
only the population of a particular country that has been victimized suffers a loss but potentially 
humanity in general. While different individuals in a society will have different views on how an 
ultimate win against ISIS looks like, in a broader context, a win for everyone opposing ISIS 
would be every loss, in its varying degrees, for the radical organization  from decrease in 
donations and profits from kidnappings to loss of territories and supports, and new recruits. 
 As already mentioned, the social media, in this case, had a supportive role as it 
facilitated, unintentionally, the recruitment of new ISIS members. However, aside from the 
social media and its consequences, a few other figures, who remained mostly in the shadows 
during the investigations of missing people who allegedly joined ISIS, are also present in the 
case. Studying ISIS recruitment shows that there was most likely a network of people who were 
responsible for recruiting new members, support them materially and with guidance, provide 
forged documents, and detailed itineraries for the trip to Iraq and Syria. Moreover, smugglers 
who were not necessarily connected to ISIS or its goals also emerged as facilitating factors in the 
recruitment operations, as their motivation to provide support was purely financial. The 
opportunity that some smugglers were ISIS-affiliates should not be excluded. Regardless, the 
focus of the investigations and the stories the media reported was on the ISIS recruits, rather than 
on the numerous people who made the entire process possible. More media and scholarly 
attention should be dedicated to such underground networks because, if their members remain 
anonymous or at large, then they will continue working for dangerous clients like ISIS. 
 Most of the factors that influence the case of ISIS recruitment strategies were already 
mentioned previously but still deserve to be highlighted to extract implications for prevention 




Muslims, in particular. Second, the family environment that shows in various cases with 
radicalization that some tragic event happened in the family  typically the loss of a parent. 
Another component that is also evident in the cases regarding the family environment is the 
possible views of a parent who expresses support toward radical Islamic groups. Thus, the 
parental example and the experienced trauma to a large extent set the conditions for the future 
radicalization of the household members. Interestingly, money is not among the most crucial 
factors for radicalization, even though in some cases it is present as a powerful incentive. In 
others, it was just a catalyzer that on the one hand, allowed young people to focus on spiritual 
rather than monetary issues, and on the other, to make the trip to Syria and Iraq financially 
possible. 
 As opposed to other cases described in this study, the one with ISIS recruitment could be 
c ide ed a  a  f a a . Tha  i , m l  beca e f he ga i a i  e i  ac  a d he 
war declared on terrorism. As recruitment is a direct source of human resources added to the 
ISIS capital, it could be said that the states fighting ISIS have declared war implicitly on 
recruitment as well, as the latter was recognized officially as a security threat of high importance. 
The rules of wars were applicable in this situation which was further facilitated by the fact that 
ISIS resembled a state-like entity but was, nevertheless, not an officially recognized state. Thus, 
any legal justifications about military measures undertaken against them as a response to their 
aggression were not necessary. However, as the destruction of ISIS could be perceived as a 
powerful weapon against future recruitment and a hit on the ISIS reputation and ideology, the 
recruitment itself cannot be fought only with conventional weapons, as many have already 
realized since the physical defeat of Al-Qaeda did not stop recruitment or the ideational existence 




 The political mechanism used in the case of ISIS recruitment is closely related to the 
ga i a i  primary goal  to destroy the Western liberal order and replace it with one 
dominated by the Islamic norms. As this assumption appears in works of radical Islamic 
ideologues, it was originally accompanied by another one  to create a caliphate after the end of 
the Western value system. While Al-Qaeda planned to dismantle the Western order and then 
create a caliphate, ISIS declared the beginning of the caliphate and turned eyes toward the 
second task assigned by radical Islamist doctrine. Both Al-Qaeda and its somewhat similar but 
ideological continuation  ISIS included recruitment as an important activity upon which the 
future of the radical formation is dependent. Both Al-Qaeda and ISIS still have supporters, 
although they have been defeated, at least territorially. The fact that they gain material and non-
material support for their goals despite their losses over the years shows that recruitment is still a 
threat and will be as long as radical Islamic leaders believe in their idea and see the potential for 
support in populations across the globe. The latter use religion, along with other factors, as a 
main driving force for achieving political gains  the creation of a state that will fight against 
other states in order to impose its, perceived as superior, ideological principles.   
 The recruitment operations led by ISIS were enjoying success mostly because of a few 
psychological mechanisms. In all of the cases examined by researchers, and in the ones that I 
used for this work, there is one element always present  the perceived loss f c l e  e  
life. The loss of control can be in one or more regards, including financial, spiritual, cultural, 
emotional, etc. In some cases, this pattern was a result of a loss of a loved one, a crisis of 
identity, and in others a cognitive dissonance produced by the conflict between the liberal 
environment and conservative expectations in terms of cultural norms. Undoubtedly, the 




members to the ISIS-army of men, women, and children. However, the victims of recruitment 
were vulnerable to this persuasion because some or all of the psychological conditions that I 
mentioned have been present in their lives. For instance, in cases of recruitment of women, it 
was at first glance evident that they were almost perfectly integrated into the Western way of life 
 they had good grades, they were even outperforming their peers, they were engaged in 
extracurricular activities, they enjoyed the company of friends and family. Nevertheless, their 
religion and their culture were composed of more conservative values, based on modesty and 
obedience to senior family members who determined to a large extent the life of their children, 
including marriage. At the same time, the West offered a sharp alternative to these traditions. 
With the realization of how significant the contrast between Western society and e  
conservative community can be, the cognitive dissonance in people who later became victims of 
ISIS recruitment started to grow. Psychological studies show as I outlined previously, that in 
ime  f c g i i e di a ce a d a e cei ed l  f c l e  e  life, he eed f  
information needed to provide a solution to the problem increases. The human cognition when 
operating under stress searchers for more information, as this often happens at the expense of 
quality information. At the same time, ISIS recruiters offered pieces of information connected in 
a narrative  a desirable alternative for regaining control by rejecting the discomfort from 
clashing values and lifestyles.  
 Measures toward the indirect perpetrator – ISIS. While the defeat of ISIS was a 
powerful step towards future deterrence, ideologically, ISIS still exists and has supporters. In 
peacetime, rather than when ISIS or similar radical organizations are on the rise, states should be 
consistent with their deterrence tactics. Mainly, they should focus on discrediting the leaders of 




altogether. The counter-narrative should be distributed through the same sources and using the 
same means as ISIS when disseminating their messages  social media, hashtags that ISIS use, or 
any other way through which the target-audience could be reached. The core nature of the ISIS 
counter-narrative should be the illusionary picture that is drawn by ISIS recruiters, in material 
and non-material terms. In this message, the main reasons for people to join ISIS should be 
carefully considered. They should be addressed in a way that exposes the fallacy of the promises 
made by ISIS. The goal of this campaign should be that potential recruits realize that they will 
not regain control over their own life, but just the opposite  joining ISIS will be just a different 
path leading to even more loss of control. 
 Measures toward the direct perpetrator and victims – current and potential ISIS 
members, and the indirect victims – countries of origin/former residence of ISIS members. 
Due to the highly intertwined nature of the problem, in which perpetrators are victims, and vice 
versa, the measures focused on the remaining actors involved in the case will be listed together 
in this section. 
 To counter cognitive threats that result from recruitment operations, it is essential that 
ISIS members do not join the organization and do not become future recruiters themselves. 
Among the strategies that could be used in this regard is the development of religious education 
programs that will clearly distinguish between Islam and radical Islam. For this effort to be 
successful, participants from academia, community, religious institutions, and policy-makers 
should join efforts and work together. Religion by itself is not the force making radicalization 
ible. I  i  icall  acc m a ied b  me l  i  he ec i  life a d i  he e m me  f 
desperation, many people turn to religion, as a way to heal. Compensating for this loss of control 




monetary and emotional support for people who are vulnerable of becoming radicalized. 
Moreover, individuals who have gone through a similar path and have considered joining radical 
organizations should be included as an example of the illusionary world that ISIS promises. 
Former ISIS members should not be deprived of citizenship because this way they will know that 
they cannot re-integrate into society under any circumstances and may re-radicalize after they 
returned from ISIS and found no place to go, no place to which to return. Re-entry programs 
should be offered to such individuals, but not without the necessary caution. Making an enemy 
of the West was the central premise on which ISIS commits violence by claiming it declared war 
on Islam. To refute this assumption, the West has to prove that it has not declared war on Islam, 
or Islamic people, even those who were misled by ISIS. If a way of re-integrating back to 
Western societies is not offered, then any narrative portraying the West as not seeking to create 
enemies will fail.  
 Especially for children who were raised in the West but spent time in the ISIS system of 
terror, there should be resources for re-integration. Many immigrants, even those who have not 
joined ISIS, have seemingly accomplished a successful physical adaptation to the environment 
that their new location offers but not a mental one which reflects on their identity - the way they 
see themselves. Policy-makers and societies should recognize the importance of the struggle for 
mental migration that many immigrants experience in terms of culture. It is also one of the 
central reasons why so many allegedly integrated young immigrants with impeccable school 
records were easily victimized by ISIS recruitment. Their physical adaptation to the conditions of 
the West was completed but not their mental one. These young people had questions, doubts, and 
concerns that remained unaddressed. Therefore, a successful strategy in this regard will begin 




Through such re-connection, older family members will be informed of the experiences of the 
younger ones and thus will be alert if there are any signs of intended life-transitions such as 
joining a radical organization. Moreover, since there may be an inevitable clash between the 
liberal culture of the West and the more conservative culture of the East, family members should 
be the ones to helping with the balance in the mind of their young sons, daughters, and siblings. 
A balance that will eliminate the cognitive dissonance with which many of them struggle through 
a secure channel of communication that will lead to openness, conversations and compromising 
thus reducing vulnerability and potential recruitment by radical organizations.  
 Measures toward the intermediaries – people engaging with document frauds and 
human trafficking. As smugglers and individuals issuing false documents are not among the 
main actors in recruitment operations, they are still important figures for facilitating this process. 
As most of the attention of the law enforcement, the scholars and the media is focused on 
perpetrators and victims, somewhat peripheral remain figures of people who make the 
recruitment possible. That said the law enforcement should engage in campaigns to identify, 
discover and capture anyone who is involved in the recruitment chain from smugglers to those 
h  aid a d abe  e i  ga i a i  in any other way. Special laws should impose more 
severe sanctions for these crimes. The issue is that some states have weak law enforcement 
apparatus and judiciary. Therefore, the individual communities that are among the most 
interested sides in preventing recruitment have to take responsibility for providing information 
about smugglers and human traffickers to local but also international law enforcement agencies. 
Traditional and online channels for communications between the communities and these 
agencies should be established, especially in states that are corrupt and lack resources.  




agencies, but when it comes to terrorism, this should be framed as an international problem and 
capturing such individuals and preventing them from making recruitment possible  a global task 
of high importance.   
 
Countering cognitive threats in cases of political profiling by companies 
 The case with Cambridge Analytica reveals events in which leading figures were non-
state actors, similarly to the case with ISIS. As opposed to the latter, however, the Cambridge 
Analytica one involved not radical terrorist organizations but corporations, democratically 
established entities in compliance with the existing laws. Moreover, Cambridge Analytica was 
not looking to recruit people to help them achieve the c m a  goals. The people were already 
recruited, or more accurately - they voluntarily posted their information on Facebook, from 
where Cambridge Analytica obtain it contrary to regulations established by Facebook. 
Cambridge Analytica could be identified as the main non-state perpetrator in this case, with 
some help, to some extent by Facebook as the latter did not provide strong guarantees that the 
e  da a will not be exploited by third-party applications. Interestingly, in this case, the direct 
victims were deceived in not one but two ways. First, their information was stolen and used 
without their permission. Second, this personal information was then skillfully used for the 
construction of psychological profiling of political advertisements whose targets were the very 
same people from which the information was stolen. While there is no obvious direct state 
victim, in this case, the consequences from the cognitive victimization of individuals reflect on 
the democratic processes in various states, mainly through disruption of the independently 
formed political attitudes and behaviors. One of the central arenas for Cambridge Anal ica  




h  ffe ed f m he c m a  e a i  also includes European and African countries as 
well.  
 The role of the individuals, in this case, is also particularly intriguing. As some of them 
were victims of the profiling, others were involved in the profiling algorithm and the marketing 
activities of Cambridge Analytica. After the news about the political profiling broke, some of the 
people collaborating with the company showed remorse ab  he c m a  strategies, and 
others did not. Aside from potential political motivations for their involvement in Cambridge 
Anal ica  ac i i ie , heir primary incentive was undoubtedly financial, as all of them had been 
associated with the company through employment or grants. As for the Facebook employees 
who were aware of possible adverse consequences resulting from third-party applications, they 
were m i a ed b  he c m a  mai  g al,  i c ea e fi . It is unclear what amount of 
Faceb k  fi  i  ge e a ed h gh ela i hi  i h ad e i e  a d hi d-party 
applications, but they are likely significant, considering the company reported around $40 billion 
revenue from advertising in 2017520.  
 There are three levels of relationships existing in this case: non-state actors  individuals; 
non-state actors  state-actors; and individuals  state actors. The first relationship represents the 
dyad perpetrators  victims, except for when individuals were employees of the non-state actor 
(the corporation) involved in the case. The non-state actors perceived the individuals in this 
scenario as a means to an end, and the individuals, while realizing that companies benefit from 
the services delivered to them were nevertheless enjoying the free product left on their disposal  
the social media platforms. However, as privacy concerns have always been a serious issue in 
social media, it never escalated to the extent to which the users completely abandoned social 
                                                           




media. Some of the users agreed their information to be utilized by third-party applications, for 
research purposes, as suggested by Facebook, but the majority had no idea how their data will 
actually be used, and they never consented to give it to anyone. The second relationship  that 
between non-state actors and state-actors is a very complex one. The non-state actors typically 
lobby before the state actors so that more comprehensive privileges are afforded to them, 
assumingly leading to more profits. At the same time, democratic countries are free-market 
societies in which companies, their development, and competition are encouraged officially by 
the state.  Considering this context, the specific legislation limiting the freedom of social media 
la f m   e he e  i f ma i  a  a e i i e i e. S a e  e e el c a   im e 
strong measures out of fear of being accused of authoritarianism and censorship. Moreover, due 
to cial media  g l bb , li icia  e e el c a   d a  limi  to the social media  e 
of personal data, because this could restrict a lot of their income from advertisements. The third 
relationship illustrates the interaction between individuals and state-actors. Countries are 
generally obligated to adopt laws in protection of the rights of the citizens, as they are cognizant 
of its tremendous popularity among the users. They are also aware of the thin line between strict 
measures and censorship, when it comes to media, and especially digital media  a grey area that 
is still not very well regulated even in developed Western countries. Individuals, recognizing the 
role of the state as a protector of their privacy and social media  ima  goal of profiting from 
the services offered, were caught unprepared for a unanimous position on the issue. Most of 
them blamed Facebook directly for the violations, that led to Cambridge Analytica collection of 
their data for political goals521. For others, leaving Facebook turned out to be a much more 
difficult task, as many users have deleted their accounts only to go back to the platform soon 
                                                           




after, realizing what significant part of their lives it occupied522. Much like an addiction. An 
addiction that studies confirm to exist. One study on the topic showed that correlations between 
symptoms of addictive technology use and mental disorder symptoms were all positive and 
significant 523. Meanwhile, the voices of users that accused the states of lack of regulations that 
led to the scandal were very few, perhaps realizing that the state was put in a very peculiar 
position, as the digital privacy laws are still immature, and the freedom of speech and free 
market economy initiatives should be protected at all cost. The states themselves were caught 
somewhat unprepared at how easy it is for huge data breaches to occur in social media. A proof 
for this is that the fines for them were, before the Cambridge Analytica scandal, 
disproportionally small in comparison to their profits from advertisements.  
 When discussing what constitutes wins and losses for the sides involved in the 
Cambridge Analytica case, the interests of the three central figures have to be considered. First, 
non-state actors (Cambridge Analytica and Facebook), second, states whose ci i e  e  
information was stolen and who were consequentially targeted by aggressive political 
advertisements aiming to influence elections outcome, and third, the individuals who were the 
direct victim of the data appropriation. For Cambridge Analytica, a win will mean to gain more 
clients and popularity while at the same time maintaining a low profile regarding the c m a  
preferred methods for winning elections, political disputes, and generating profits. As for 
Facebook, their main end-g al i  he ame a  Camb idge A al ica  a d imila   hem, he  
have to maintain their clients (users) satisfied with the offered product in order to keep making 
profits. That said Facebook skillfully maneuvered be ee  e  c ntent with the platform, its 
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regulations for privacy protection, a d he i c me f m ad e i e  f  h m e  da a i  a  
invaluable tool for their own goals. In that sense, a loss for Cambridge Analytica and Facebook 
will mean loss of profits, which could be a consequence from loss of clients (users) or from 
another reason leading to the same effect. For states, wins and losses in this case would be 
defined differently than the ones for the non-state actors. A win for states would be a well-
balanced environment in which companies thrive but not at the expense of selling users  
information to third parties who will, in turn, use the information against them, turning them into 
victims of coercive political persuasion. A loss for states, in this context, would be to lose the 
balance between non-state actors and citizens, especially when this influences outcomes of 
elections or other issues of national importance. As for the individuals who were victims of the 
profiling a win would mean their privacy to be guaranteed on social media, to have control and 
ownership over the content they post. A loss would be if social media withdraw or limit any of 
these rights or mislead the users to believe their information will be used in a particular way 
when it is in fact used for entirely different purposes.  
 Two of the figures that are not central for the case with Cambridge Analytica but still 
have some role are the ones of politicians and researchers. Many politicians were more lenient to 
Facebook because of lobbying. They were also the ones who were clients of Cambridge 
Analytica or one of its subsidiaries and benefitted from their profiling methods. Furthermore, the 
politicians using Camb idge A al ica  services were not only from one country but from 
different countries almost on every continent. Without politicians profiting from Cambridge 
A al ica  alg i hm , he e ld be  ma ke  f  li ical fili g a d h  business for 
companies like Cambridge Analytica. The other figure mentioned previously that has to do with 




A al ica  em l ee  admi ted, contributed to a large extent to the development of the profiling 
tool later used for the design of the digitally distributed advertisements. As e ea che  mai  
task is to produce knowledge on a subject matter, very often circumstances lead to the production 
of knowledge that serves to achieve undemocratic goals. Researchers produce science benefitting 
all people, but i  he Camb idge A al ica  ca e, hi  cie ce was used against them.  
 Am g he i e fe i g fac  i  he Camb idge A al ica  ca e a e c l e, cie , 
corporate profits, and politics. The creation of Facebook stimulated the growth of a culture of 
oversharing in the digital space. As this was still a new environment, many users were unaware 
of the results from posting online a large number of personal details and thoughts. This culture 
got slowly incorporated into societies and gained the dimensions of an addiction that was 
controlled by social media corporations. This dependency was created, stimulated and 
perpetuated by Facebook in order to keep its current users and gain new ones. Having more users 
generally translates into more profits for the company, as they form a broader audience that 
could be easily reached and influenced by the right tools of persuasion. From the dawn of 
political thinking and politics, persuasion has been the driving force between uniting and 
dividing people over different issues of social interest. The case with Cambridge Analytica is a 
bright example of the interaction between culture, society, profits and politics and how they are 
intertwined in a way that reveals a long-known pattern: the losses for one actor are gains for 
another thus leaving very little space for a compromise between the political interests of state, 
non-state actors and individuals. 
 As this case represents one of the most recent types of cognitive threats, and currently 
lacks even legal regulation, it can be claimed that it does not constitute a reason for war. None of 




cases of profiling for political purposes remains the adoption of laws and regulations serving as 
deterrence. Moreover, because persuasion is still perceived as a non-invasive weapon that can 
only slightly, if at all, influence thinking but not predetermine it altogether, targeted political 
advertisements are still not defined as a serious threat. As argued previously, this could be 
attributed to the difficulty of proving that independent decision-making could be violated by 
coercive persuasion to the extent to which the decision make  beha i  cha ged c i e l  
with what the author of the persuasion message desired. A lack of conclusive proof for this 
causal relationship does not mean, however, that the causal relationship does not exist. It is just 
difficult to be proven beyond doubt since it pertains to psychological processes. The fact that a 
domestic or foreign entity has an invested interest in affecting the process of independent 
decision-making by voters is a fact concerning enough to provoke concrete measures to counter 
this threat. The fact that the perpetrator is a non-state entity (corporation), be it Cambridge 
Analytica, Facebook or other social media platform, leads to the conclusion that the most 
effective means to combat profiling for political purposes may be administrative, legal and 
psychological, rather than military or foreign-policy oriented. 
 The political mechanisms making the case with Cambridge Analytica possible are the 
following. First, for Camb idge A al ica  ge  acce   e  da a, the latter existed within 
Facebook, and the company collected them. Next, after Cambridge Analytica was in possession 
of the data, it used them i  a a  ha  led l ima el   e i g he c m a  clie  a d h  
generating profits for itself. At the same time, the individuals whose data were exploited for the 
production of political advertising campaigns were losing the battle for control over their 
personal information. As Cambridge Analytica scored wins, financial and reputational, so did 




As individuals were losing more and more privacy control over their own personal information, 
the democratic process and independent thinking became endangered more and more. 
 As for the psychological mechanism for influence that led to the success of Cambridge 
Analytica, there are few aspects to be considered. As mentioned, Facebook and other social 
media created a culture of oversharing that gained quickly the dimensions of an addiction. 
Addiction, that was orchestrated by social media and its tools to subtly persuade users to spend 
more and more time on their platform so that they share more and more of their life. Getting 
users to agree on posting something once, leads to them agreeing even more in the future. This is 
a phenomenon in social psychology related to attitudinal commitment and behavior 
consistency524. According to these principles, people want to preserve some consistency in their 
future behavior. Thus, getting them to commit to something once, would predict a possible 
pattern in their behavior for the future. That said Facebook initially asked users to provide basic 
information about themselves, and as time went by, it was asking for more and more information 
to be shared, with which most users complied. Moreover, Facebook was constantly offering its 
users potential contacts, labeled as friends by the platform in an effort for the user to increase 
their level of intensity of the communication and people outreach. This outreach also increased 
Faceb k  de h f k ledge ab  e le  cial ci cle  a d ela i hi . A  e  al ead  
shared a lot of information and had access to so many of their friends and acquaintances, leaving 
Facebook was not so easy because it meant leaving commitment, leaving information flow, 
leaving contacts.  
 While so many other means of communication exist, Facebook was connecting people in 
a way that no other media did. Once adjusted to receiving and providing an increased volume of 
                                                           




information from and to friends and acquaintances, it was difficult for users to delete their social 
media profiles and resist the instinct to seek and exchange information. Facebook knew this, so 
did Cambridge Analytica as well. The latter sensed that social circles on Facebook reveal 
patterns that could be exploited for political gains, if appropriately conceptualized. Their 
algorithm had hundreds of elements that were used for micro-targeting, a campaign that aimed to 
send an individually designed message to a social perceiver, that will evoke a predictable 
reaction in them, typically benefitting the sender of the message. Based on the likes on social 
media, Camb idge A al ica  alg i hm a  able  e ac  i f ma i  ab  e le  ba ic 
characteristics, name, age, race, income, and sexual orientation but the capabilities of the 
profiling strategy were not limited only to this. Surprisingly, they could also predict attributes 
such as childhood trauma, intelligence, political views, and other elements of a psychological 
portrait that included e e   e e ie ce, c cie i e , e a e i , ag eeable e  
a d e ici m 525. In terms of its role in the U.S. elections, the accuracy of the model was very 
high too, ranging from 85% accuracy for distinguishing between Democrats and Republicans 
reaching 95% accuracy for distinguishing black users from white users526.  
 E e  i h he e high le el  f edic abili  f e  beha i , i  i  difficult to believe 
ha  Camb idge A al ica  alg i hm c m le el  cha ged e  li ical edi i i   e 
for one candidate or another. What is not difficult to believe is that influence over particular 
groups of the population was exercised in a way that made them more likely to prefer a particular 
candidate and to vote for them  a fact that in close elections plays a significant role. Regardless 
of the levels of exposure to Camb idge A al ica  li ical fili g m del i  he U.S., i  he 
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U.K. a d i  he  c ie  i  hich li icia  ed hei  e ice , e  fili g a  b  a  
a strategy in political marketing, and threatens to stay and expand its influence, if measures are 
not undertaken. As Facebook is undoubtedly part of the problem, it is not the only company that 
makes profiling possible. Others, such as Netflix, Amazon, Google, and Uber527 also develop 
their own prediction algorithms ba ed  e  da a. The common denominator between all of 
them is the information that consumers themselves provide through their online searches that 
give companies clues about their interest in different products. Such hints are often used across 
multiple companies. It is only needed for a user to search for a single keyword in one search 
engine/retailer so that others, with which this search engine/retailer collaborates, begin to micro-
target the user with tailored advertisements based on the keyword entered.  
 In the following sections, I will address a few possible strategies to counter these threats 
that are focused on the different participants in the case. First, measures toward the indirect 
perpetrators in this case (Facebook and other related social media). Second, measures toward the 
direct perpetrator  Cambridge Analytica. Third, measures toward the direct victims (the social 
media users). Fourth, actions toward the indirect victims (the states whose democratic processes 
were violated). Fifth, measures toward the intermedia ie  ha  made he e l i a i  f e  
data possible. 
 Measures toward the indirect perpetrator – Facebook and other social media. One of 
the most reliable strategies pertaining to Facebook and other social media is that the state, 
through regulations and sanctions forces them to provide more freedom for users to control their 
information and how it is used. This control should be given through opt-in functions rather than 
through opt-out functions, so that users are in charge of who sees their information at all times. 
                                                           





Moreover, all guidelines and regulations of  e  ivacy should be explained in an easy, 
understandable manner. Also, Facebook has to provide guarantees that chats between users 
through the Messenger application are not recorded and used for any purposes by Facebook or 
third parties.  
 Measures toward the direct perpetrator – Cambridge Analytica. As for measures toward 
Cambridge Analytica and other companies using similar techniques for political persuasion, it is 
needed that legislative measures regulate specifically the boundaries of their activities. State 
authorities should obligate companies engaged with political campaigns to obtain written (digital 
as well) consent from every user who receives targeted political advertisements through social 
media, as this consent could be withdrawn at any time. Moreover, both social media companies 
and those working on political campaigns should develop advertisements in a way that clearly 
shows if the user seeing them is a subject of targeted advertising. An opt-out function should also 
be provided.  
 Measures toward the direct victims – the social media users. Studies show that social 
media users generally do not take advantage of more privileges presented to them regarding 
online privacy. So far, however, these privileges have not been given in a way that makes them 
practical to most users. The process of opting-out of some of the functions leading to marketing 
and political marketing profiling is complicated and has to be executed every time a new interest 
of the user was discovered and automatically added by Facebook. Thus, Facebook should be 
bliga ed  clea l  i dica e he  a e  i e e  i  added  he e  file, and such should 
be identified only if the users add themselves a specific interest to their profile. Another option 
for defense against political profiling is that digital users develop civil consciousness that 




and guaranteed by state- and non-state entities. Moreover, users should require legislative 
changes that will lead to more control over personal information. They should also be prepared 
to boycott social media in case the practice of selling and exploiting their data is not terminated. 
Social media corporations know that their products are highly addictive, and they rely on this to 
keep their users, even if they are not satisfied with how their data is being handled. Facebook 
became so popular and hard to leave because people increased in number and 
interconnectedness. If this is true, the same process can diminish the role of Facebook when 
users start leaving and become less connected through Facebook. The latter will lose popularity 
and usefulness. Moreover, as the need for communication and maintaining relationships is 
apparent, an alternative to the known free social media should be developed. It could be paid or 
free of charge, but offering users guarantees that their data will not be collected, sold or used in 
any manner. Such transitions are not surprising considering MySpace  Faceb k  edece . 
People claim they left MySpace and migrated to Facebook because they found something that 
the former did not have, but the latter offered528. Considering this tendency, Facebook  
shortcomings may also be the reason for another rising social media platform that will 
c m e a e f  Faceb k  mi ake  ega di g da a i ac  a d he  ela ed ca dal  damagi g 
its reputation. However, it is in the hands of the politicians to create conditions and in the hands 
of the people to create the demand for a social platform that is better for both their needs and 
rights than previous ones. 
 Measures toward the indirect victims – states whose democratic processes were 
violated. As states have most power concentrated in their hands over both individuals and 
companies, their obligation to limit the damages that political profiling inflicts should be 
                                                           




commensurate to their ability to influence changes. As argued before, the fines for violations that 
are made by companies are not proportional to their gains  thus devaluing the quality of the 
future prevention measures. Consequently, fines should be designed in a way that reflects the 
profits the companies register. Also, profits generated through the violation should be 
c fi ca ed, de i e h  diffic l  i  ma  be  e abli h h  m ch f he c m a  fi  came 
from the prohibited activities. This principle should be established as a law standard in all 
countries in which political profiling is present. Moreover, in serious violations, substantial 
personal responsibility should be envisioned for senior executives in these firms, who knowingly 
disregarded the law and allowed or encouraged the violation. Prosecutors and the courts should 
carefully examine the extent to which senior executives knew about them. 
 Based on all of the described factors facilitating political profiling, it is evident that 
contemporary society is in a desperate need of state regulatory apparatus of social media and 
online communications in general. Such agency, on national, or on supranational level should be 
engaged mostly with monitoring social media and if they comply with the norms regarding 
privacy laws. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission executes similar functions, but its range of 
responsibilities includes a lot more than just controlling media companies. As they are expanding 
and growing stronger, there should be a regulatory agency established specifically for the digital 
space, as it has been increasingly becoming an arena for political warfare.  
 Measures toward intermediaries – politicians and researchers. A few words about the 
prevention mechanisms focused on politicians and researchers also have to be mentioned. First, 
Cambridge Analytica was profiting from its algorithm that exploited Faceb k e  da a 
because it had clients who requested this service. Therefore, politicians emerge as a figure that 




influence voters on political issues, laws should mandate that political targeting based on 
i di id al  da a ed i h  hei  e mi i  h ld be i hable. M e e , companies that 
help with political campaigning should be obligated to inform their clients (politicians) about 
h  he e  da a f  he fili g a  ga he ed. If i  i  e abli hed ha  he li icia  k e  ha  
the data was gathered without the permission of the user, then they should be criminally liable, 
along with the company providing the service. As for researchers, especially junior faculty 
members, they are a vulnerable target for companies needing their services because of the grants 
the latter offer to the former. External funding is known as a highly treasured asset for a 
successful career in academia. As the pressure for securing grants by faculty members increases, 
the more agreeable they will become to contribute to studies whose results will be used for 
unethical purposes that may represent violations or even crimes. Using science for unethical 
purposes is not a new phenomenon in the history of humanity. It has been so far and to some 
extent limited, however. For instance, a lot of the science behind me f he ld  most 
devastating weapons is publicly available, but this does not mean that people use it on a regular 
basis to do harm. There are many reasons behind this, among which an appreciation of the threat 
that such weapon can produce, and laws prohibiting even attempts for constructing or using these 
weapons. Therefore, if legislation restricts the use of personal information in political profiling, 
the knowledge produced by scholars working on grants will be still benefitting society. At the 
same time, it will be in the public domain but not used for unethical purposes that could violate 







CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND THE ROAD AHEAD 
 
 Currently, Google shows more than 5 million results produced by the search of the phrase 
cognitive hacking. While it refers mostly to hackers taking advantage of psychological 
vulnerabilities of the human cognition, it shows that the problem has gained alarming 
dimensions. Some identify it as a public health crisis529, others as an issue of the cybersecurity 
field530. However, very little attention the problem gathered as one of the overlapping points 
between the public health discipline and the cybersecurity  politics. Cognitive threats have 
always been present in the world history, and they were so well integrated and common in 
warfare that there is almost no research that linked ancient espionage and deception practices to 
political profiling of voters whose information is used against them in a way that exploits their 
greatest fears. The problem has always been the same, but because of the level of technological 
and political development of societies, it was manifesting itself differently. This psychological 
exploitation of the mind was continuously present in peacetime and warfare because humanity 
was helpless against threats that come from within the individual. Public health cannot label 
influenced thinking as a disease because even the healthiest cognition is exposed to threats due to 
the way it is constructed and how people are socialized. At the same time, legally, perpetrators of 
these cognitive attacks are not committing a crime by influencing other individuals because this 
has always been part of the interaction between people. It almost seems like cognitive threats are 
not a problem at all or at least they are not officially declared to represent one. Yet they are, and 
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have always been, even if the causal relationship between an outcome of affected by coercive 
persuasion decision-making and the coercive persuasion itself cannot be established beyond 
doubt. The harm that has been inflicted by cognitive threats over the different historical epochs is 
obvious  lost wars, executed monarchs, thousands of recruits of radical organizations, millions 
of online users whose data and whose fears were used for material and non-material profits of a 
politician, political party or even companies.  
 As adverse as the consequences of cognitive threats can be, I aimed to prove in this study 
that through prevention strategies, their effects could be mitigated to some extent. To summarize 
the findings, I followed the sequence of the questions from the analysis chapter. First, regarding 
the perpetrators in the cases, as main actors appear states, non-state actors and individuals. In 
a ic la , i  Ma ia B i a  ca e, the state was a perpetrator through the individuals who were 
politically motivated to collaborate with Moscow. The state also conducted disinformation 
campaigns through individuals, but here, they were not politically but financially incentivized. 
The case with ISIS reveals a non-state actor as a perpetrator through individuals who were 
politically motivated to collaborate and undertook the roles of both victims and perpetrators. As 
for the case with Cambridge Analytica, the main perpetrator(s) were non-state actors, as they 
achieved their goals through individuals who were not politically or financially motivated to 
collaborate. Instead, they had little to no knowledge of how they contributed to the non-state 
actor(s) goals. The individuals who voluntarily posted their data on Facebook were unknowing 
c llab a   he e e a  aim b  also victims in this case. That said, all of the 
perpetrators were achieving their goals through individuals who acted driven by different 
motivations or no motivations at all as they were contributing unknowingly. Half of the 




 In terms of the range of victims in the case studies, in the case of Maria Butina, the direct 
victim was the U.S. as well as the individuals through which the damage was inflicted. In the 
case of disinformation, the range of direct victims expanded to include other Western states, in 
addition to the U.S. and such that are objects of Russian geopolitical interests. The following 
case, that with ISIS recruitment showed an even enlarged circle of victims that practically 
included countries of all religions, from the West, from the East, the North and the South. 
Similar to the almost unlimited range of victims of ISIS recruitment is the case with Cambridge 
Analytica as well. Victims were whatever countries and individuals a politician who hired 
Cambridge Analytica wanted to influence. The number of victims, in this case, includes also the 
Facebook users who, despite those who deleted their profiles in the social media, are still 
billions. 
 The perceived wins by the actors could be summarized in the following way. In three out 
of the four case studies that I explored, the gains of the perpetrators were related to the 
destabilization of the enemy, establishment of influence over them, and achieving more power. 
In the fourth case, involving Cambridge Analytica, the wins of the perpetrator were related to 
profits, m e e , a d e abli hi g i fl e ce e  hei  clie  a ge  a die ce. As for 
Facebook, the wins still meant profits that could translate into power to lobby to maximize 
profits even more. Losses, for all mentioned perpetrators, would mean any perceived outcome 
that leads to decreasing the chances of wins (power/profits). 
 The analysis chapter in this study also included sections for other figures involved in the 
cases, typically with a subsidiary role. Among them, emerge mostly individuals who knew what 
the perpetrator wanted to achieve, and either supported them actively or implicitly through 




delineated the factors that had a role in the case. In this regard, elements such as the pattern of 
digital oversharing, the attention economy culture, overconfidence or insecurity in terms of 
identity, the influence of the famil , em i al a ma a d e e f c l e  e  life a ea  
as essential reasons for the success of the cognitive threats. 
  Another aspect that informed the prevention strategies pertains to whether the cognitive 
threats represent any potential for war actions or not. The majority of the case studies do not 
reveal any potential for military measures because of the following reasons. First, in the case of 
espionage, this cognitive threat is used both in wartime and peacetime. Second, in the case of 
Russian disinformation, the threat is not even a crime. Third, in the case of Cambridge Analytica, 
their actions were in the grey zone between legal and illegal. Only in the case with ISIS, the 
cognitive threat represents some war potential but only because of the terrorist attacks of ISIS, 
and not because of the recruitment itself.  
 Next, as I explored the political mechanisms making the cognitive threat possible, I 
discovered that in three out of the four case studies, they are related to the antagonistic 
relationship between perpetrators and victims, and because of overlapping interest between 
individuals living in the enemy-state, and the perpetrators themselves. The only case that does 
not correspond to these conclusions is the one with Cambridge Analytica, in which the political 
mechanism, driving the cognitive threat is the desire for profits and the lack of legislation 
eg la i g he c m a  allowed tactics for making these profits. 
 In terms of the psychological mechanisms bringing cognitive threats to life, the results 
showed that in the case with Maria Butina, it was the concept of identity, that was among the 
reasons for the infiltration along with persuasion and the ability to deceive and avoid suspicion. 




along with the power of the confirmation bias and the construction of social networks that 
contain predominantly, if not exclusively, like-minded individuals. In the case of ISIS 
recruitment, the psychological mechanism was the ic im  perceived loss of control over their 
life. The addictive nature of social media, the culture of oversharing and psychological profiling 
were the mechanisms through which Cambridge Analytica became successful in their political 
campaign services. Except for persuasion, that was possible because of unique factors inherent 
for each case, there is no other overlap between psychological techniques that were used in the 
listed cases of cognitive threats.   
 Based on the findings from this research, some policy recommendations should be 
outlined. The concrete prevention strategies against cognitive threats, produced by the analysis of 
the case studies showed measures that have to be adopted in six categories. First, state and non-
state actors, supported by local communities should create alternatives to the incentive (e.g., a 
product, a content, lifestyle or employment) offered by the state or non-state perpetrator of the 
cognitive threat to the victims, or even to some direct individual perpetrators who are employees 
of the state/non-state perpetrator. Second, the narrative about individuals who were either victims 
before they become perpetrators themselves or the ones who were forced to collaborate to the 
state- e e a  g al   f fi a cial ece i  ha   be cha ged. The  h ld t be vilified 
but described as victims of particular circumstances and political goals. Moreover, the narrative 
should illustrate the downsides and the potential fallacy of the promises the perpetrators made to 
the individuals in an attempt to fulfill their agenda. Third, the stakeholders involved in cases of 
cognitive threats, especially states, should have unequivocal positions on what happened, why it 
happened, who did it, and what will be done to prevent the threat in the future. Fourth, strong 




They should aim to regulate the actions in the digital space, including disinformation, political 
targeting and any other adverse effects on the free, democratic processes. Besides, some 
administrative agencies, such as a regulatory commission responsible for the digital space, could 
also be established, as a result of introducing new pieces of legislation on a state or supranational 
level. Fifth, another critical element in preventing cognitive threats is education about the digital 
space, religion, and misinterpretations of religious readings and premises. Another component 
that has to be addressed through education pertains to immigrants in the conditions of the 
expanding globalization. Mainly, how to achieve a harmonious balance between physical and 
mental migration, how to address differences between conservative and liberal cultures, between 
emotional trauma that may lead to radicalization and grief that makes room for a healthy way of 
healing. The sixth mechanism for countering cognitive threats is the awareness of them that 
should be promoted by state and non-state actors (including the media and the academia). In 
particular, they should address how cognitive threats occur, why they are harmful, and what are 
their consequences for the individual, the community, the state and the democracy itself.  
 A few paragraphs should be dedicated to the limitations of the proposed strategies and the 
conditions under which they have the potential to be effective. First, creating alternatives for the 
victims of cognitive threats requires a large amount of funding that has to be invested in this 
prevention mechanism to be successful. As states are the units with most authority to implement 
measures against cognitive threats, and assuming they should be the ones investing the material 
resources for this strategy, they may be incapable of allocating such funds or just reluctant to do 
so. This outcome could be due to personal interests of politicians and their party affiliations with 
various state and non-state actors, pressure by different lobbies, unstable economic conditions of 




such significant amount of resources. Regarding the cultural aspects of creating alternatives for 
the victim of cognitive threats, communities and families may be skeptical to having open 
conversations about some conservative norms that older generations expect younger generations 
to obey without any resistance or without questioning their rightfulness (e.g., religion, arranged 
marriages at a young age, conversations regarding controversial events in the world). 
Additionally, the strategy for creating alternatives may fail to produce the desired effects in cases 
of espionage because the spies may feel as they have no other choice but to serve the state out of 
fear for retribution if they refuse to cooperate. As for disinformation, the confirmation bias in 
humans could turn out to be a tendency difficult to change, especially when the recipient of the 
information has a predilection to the stance taken through this information. Thus, the goal to 
reorient readers of deceitful information delivered by untrustworthy websites to other sources of 
information containing proven facts could hide various caveats. The culture of oversharing on 
social media, the addiction to these platforms and the predictable reaction of people experiencing 
fear could also be challenging to overcome when it comes to cognitive threats. Moreover, the 
civic consciousness of people regarding the digital space may not develop for many years or not 
even at all unless they begin to perceive consequences from violations of their privacy in the 
digital space the same way they assess harm in the physical space.  
 The second group of strategies that pertains to the recommended change in the narrative 
about victims and perpetrators of cognitive threats also should be examined with some caution. If 
intense hostility between states existed for extensive periods of time (e.g., the Cold War), it may 
be difficult to change the narrative about the rival country or at least, it will be difficult for the 
people of the vilified country to be persuaded that they are no longer seen as enemies. In 




the contemporary requirements of the attention-economy culture, they may prefer to circulate 
headlines that stimulate strong reactions in people, mostly pejorative in nature, because this 
increases their attention and hence, their profits. Lastly, states, non-state actors and some 
politicians may not be inclined to invoke a change in the narrative simply because they 
ef ll  e e le  fea  f enemies for political gains. 
 Establishing unambiguous state positions on cognitive threats as a third strategy that I 
suggest could also be a challenging task. This tendency is observed in cases when politicians and 
party/parties in power have an interest in maintaining the status-quo, especially when the threat 
comes from an entity that they are favorable of, supporting, or when the existing threat creates 
more political gains for them than losses. Diplomatic considerations are also among the reasons 
why many state officials abstain from taking a firm stance against cognitive threats made by 
another state. 
 The same concerns also translate to establishing legislative measures about the digital 
space. Pressure by lobbyists, personal investments of politicians or interest in maintaining the 
current legislation beneficiary to some power structures (so that they can use cognitive threats 
domestically or against opponents abroad) could reveal notable obstacles to creating and 
implementing strong legislation for violations in the digital space. Another element that could 
exacerbate the level of success of this mechanism is the possibility, existing with any law, that it 
could be still somehow circumvented. 
 Education, as a prevention strategy against cognitive threats, also has some limitations 
that should be mentioned. On the one hand, it would be most effective with young people who 
still have not formed an established view on issues. For adults, on the other hand, education 




at least open to considering some information potentially contradicting some of their beliefs. 
However, for people, especially such who are firmly convinced in the rightfulness of a specific 
position or stance, education could not be an applicable mechanism for defense against cognitive 
threats. Even for people who are open to obtaining new educational information, the 
confirmation bias, their group identity, and their social networks typically consisting of like-
minded people could be posing some obstacles to the success of this strategy. Undoubtedly, 
some of them could be introduced to new educational information regarding cognitive threats 
that they will accept even if it is not in full accordance with their current beliefs and those of 
their peers. That said, education would be most effective when offered to younger people and 
adults who could be persuaded to learn to recognize and resist attempts for cognitive threats by 
malicious actors. At the same time, problems with implementing educational information could 
also be encountered in the party responsible for distributing these educational campaigns  states, 
non-state actors, and individuals. States may decide not to allocate the funding for such 
campaigns or to choose to promote the message in ways that fail to reach the desired audience. 
Besides, politicians may be reluctant to advocate for such campaigns because it would decrease 
political benefits that they get from the existence of cognitive threats. Some NGOs may also fail 
to promote the educational messages because of lack of resources (material and human), because 
of flaws of the campaign itself or the way it is intended to reach the recipients.  
 Similar arguments and concerns could be repeated for the last strategy that I 
recommended  bringing awareness of the problem. In addition to them, another considerable 
obstacle for the applicability of this technique could be the relative lack of recognition of 
cognitive threats as such and the need for their prevention in public policy and scholarly agendas. 




may make state officials hesitant to attract attention to a problem without being capable of 
providing evidence implicating the perpetrator. At the same time, due to the nature of this threat 
and the fact it concerns the human cognition and psychological rather than material processes, 
political scientists may be reluctant to focus on the problem and examine it. Influence, 
information processing, and decision-making are categories that could hardly be quantified and 
their causal relationship to politics and international security could hardly be proven beyond 
doubt.  
 In light of these limitations, some strategies under some conditions, appear more useful 
and applicable than others. The state as the most powerful figure among communities and 
individuals has the most authority to counter cognitive threats on a large scale. Therefore, the 
strategies based on state involvement have the most potential for combatting cognitive threats 
and should be perceived as primary. In particular, creating alternatives for victims and 
perpetrators of cognitive threats and establishing clear state positions and creating legislation for 
regulating the digital space would be viable strategies only for states that have the material 
resources to support such programs, states that are not dependent on actors who are benefitting 
from cognitive threats and such that recognize the problem and have the determination to combat 
it. Community participation in creating alternatives for victims and perpetrators of cognitive 
threats could be dependent on various individual factors, and its impact will be significant only if 
a large number of communities join efforts in creating a conversation about culture, religion and 
religious formations, immigration, and adaptation. Changing the narrative about victims and 
perpetrators of cognitive threats also includes many different actors with sometimes conflicting 
interests. The process also takes a lot of time to produce the desired results. Considering these 




and to this extent, they should be perceived more as supplementary, secondary mechanisms for 
mitigating cognitive threats. As such, education and awareness of the problem as strategies will 
also become dependent on the level of state intervention in the fight against cognitive threats.  
 Since cognitive threats have always been an integral part of warfare and conflicts and in 
more recent times also in marketing, it would be unreasonable to believe they will disappear 
since they have been so successful. Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the proliferation 
of the Internet of Things (IoT) devices present practically endless opportunities for data 
collection by companies whose users unknowingly provide large amounts of information through 
smart devices. This fact is what makes cognitive threats even more severe issue than before. The 
expectations are that societies will become more reliant on technologies, more interconnected. 
Thus, the companies controlling the services in the technology and communications sector will 
become even more powerful. Without a stable legislative framework and civic consciousness 
about this changing environment, individuals will be increasingly exposed to digital privacy 
violations. No state policy is capable of eliminating the problem completely, as advances in the 
protection from cognitive threats will result in commensurate advances in the ways cognitive 
threats are made and executed. However, a combination of state policies and actions, community 
engagement, and the awareness of the pertinent threat posed to human cognition has a strong 
potential to at least mitigate the threat. 
 So far, cognitive threats in their diverse manifestations are somewhat recognized as a 
problem in various academic fields but not in politics. If academics identify cognitive threats, 
first, as a weapon in the post-modern warfare, and second as a strategy, deeply integrated into 
marketing and political marketing fields, state intervention will become more likely. Introducing 




harmful consequences from cognitive threats. However, if they keep existing only as an 
anonymous enemy, conceptually ignored by the study of politics, and by policy-makers, the 
eventual solutions to the problem will become more and more distant. I  hi  ca e, h ma i  
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